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INTRODUCTION TO THIS ISSUE

In the issue of May, 1946, *The Review of Religion* published three papers on "Religion and Health," furnished by faculty members of an interdepartmental Columbia University Seminar devoted to study of that subject. This Seminar has been meeting regularly in the intervening years, and, while a full report of its work is not available at the present time, we are herewith, in March, 1949, publishing four papers from the discussions that have been in progress. A few introductory remarks will suffice to explain the context and aims of these four papers.

They are items in a many-sided discussion of a central twofold question posed by the Seminar: What is the bearing on health of the way (1) limitations, and (2) responsibility are viewed and accepted? The four papers here published represent only about one third of the number of contributions to the discussion, but they illustrate some of the more frequently recurring issues and contrasted viewpoints. In a sense, the papers by Drs. Booth and Bone present opposite tendencies in the discussion, while those by Dr. Goldstein and Professor Tillich are intermediate in respect to these tendencies.

Dr. Goldstein's paper is put first, because it contains concepts of health and disease which the Seminar found generally useful. He defines the basic requirement for health as living in an order which permits the individual to perform, without disturbing anxiety, what he regards as his essential functions. The therapy of patients with brain injuries provides an extreme example of how an artificial order, involving great limitations, functions to maintain the best possible health in the circumstances. But the problem of an analogous health-giving order for neurotics, and others without decisive organic limitations, is much more complex, because it involves a less restricted choice of values. It is wrong to suppose that psychotherapy can be separated from value-choices, Dr. Goldstein says; at the same time, he does not find the therapists oriented or equipped for any special responsibility in such choices. The therapist, like everyone else, works under limits of the existing social order from which arise many personality problems.

Dr. Booth says that physicians can not take responsibility for transforming society. Indeed, he adds that all conscious knowledge, all science, is insufficient for such a task. Social systems convey much of

reality's multi-dimensional meaning, a large part of which is unconscious, through collective rites and symbols. Most individuals will find a more health-giving order through participation in such structures than by trying to achieve scientific control of life. Much of contemporary psychotherapy has taken a one-sided concept of autonomous personality and scientific consciousness as its goal. It may approximate the needs of one type of man, but there are other basic types. The personal sacrifices and forms of social responsibility best suited to the health of each type need to be recognized. In this, religion can offer much to correct the one-sidedness of current views.

Dr. Bone expresses a contrary emphasis. He finds so much in society, including many aspects of religion, to be "pathogenic," in the sense of promoting "character-conflicts" in the individual and "compromise solutions" of them. It is not likely that the adjustments recommended by Dr. Booth, by participation in symbolic order, could generally be called "compromise solutions" in Dr. Bone's sense, but some of them could be. Dr. Bone admits the unfortunate need of such compromise, but regards it as distinctly inferior to the cultivation of "freedom-responsibility" on the basis of "radical" or thorough resolution of "character-conflict." His paper is an abbreviation of what he presented to the Seminar. A similar train of thought was also expressed there by Dr. Erich Fromm. This viewpoint, therefore, was more fully developed in the discussion than the present text indicates.

Professor Tillich's paper shows, with remarkable brevity and clarity, how he relates Christian doctrines to current psychotherapeutic concepts. In respect to the existing social order, Tillich is in large agreement with the criticisms voiced by Goldstein, Fromm, and Bone. But he views religious healing as something more ultimate and whole-restoring than social improvement. And, up to a point, like Booth, he emphasizes the mediation of wholeness through "symbols," which are essentially grounded in "being," though not literal transcriptions of it. In the current year, 1948-1949, the Seminar is giving further study to the role of symbols.

The review article by Professor Vlastos was not part of the Seminar's program, but is, of course, highly pertinent to its interests, so that we have held it for publication in this issue of *The Review*.

HORACE L. FRIESS
Chairman and Editor

THE IDEA OF DISEASE AND THERAPY

KURT GOLDSTEIN, M.D.

MY CONCEPT OF THE NATURE OF HEALTH, sickness, and therapy originated from practical work with patients with mental conditions as well as with organic defects of the brain and the body organs. My concepts were built particularly during the attempt to help brain-injured soldiers whom I had under my care by the thousands after the first World War. Thus, it is only natural that the phenomenon of helping is always in the foreground, the more so if one realizes that active interference in the form of helping is a means of finding very useful clues for understanding what is right and what is wrong with an individual in relation to health. What health is we can see nowhere better than by observing human beings who, by the nature of their pathological condition, are destined never to become normal. That is the case with some neurotics and psychotics, but it becomes particularly apparent in patients with defects of the brain through injury which cannot be eliminated.

Before I go into the matter, I want to make a remark concerning terminology. We should distinguish between becoming or being sick, and sickness as something which befalls the organism from the outside. Being sick is a particular change of the function of the organism. It may be caused by a sickness. We are interested here in the phenomenon of being sick, how the function of the organism is modified under this condition, and how the organism returns to normalcy, to "health." For simplicity's sake, however, we shall, in what follows, use the word "sickness" in the sense of being sick.

Let us begin with a very simple observation. Take an individual suffering from a common cold. He may have some headache, run a little temperature. In his everyday life, he may not show any deviation from the norm. He may not feel quite at ease, but not appear sick, and he may not call himself sick. Let the same individual be in a situation where he has to do some difficult and at the same time very important work, say, to take an examination the passing of which is essential for his whole future. Now we are facing a totally different picture. The individual shows a number of bodily and mental symptoms, sweating, trembling, etc.; he may not be able to answer questions which he could answer under other conditions without difficulty. He appears dis-

tracted, confused, in a state of disorder. He feels himself seriously handicapped, more and more embarrassed, and experiences anxiety. He is in a condition which I have called "catastrophic condition."[1] This condition represents the essential characteristics of being sick: first, disordered behavior which makes the individual unable to use his capacities and so to come to terms with the demands of his environment; second, anxiety. It is a question whether this anxiety is not simply a reaction of the individual to the experience of failures and the danger involved in them. It is difficult to answer this question on the basis of such cases as the aforesaid. I do not believe that the assumption is correct; I think disordered behavior and anxiety are the objective and subjective expression of the situation of danger in which the organism is when one is no longer able to actualize his "essential" capacities. Anxiety is neither an effect of disorder nor experience of disorder, nor is the opposite the case. I came to this conclusion from observation of patients in whom this condition occurs pronouncedly, and who, due to defect in the brain, are not able to give account to themselves about anything, and thus are also not able to recognize what has produced the disaster and what the danger may be.

This complex of disorder and anxiety is the prototype of all situations, which endanger the existence of the organism. I should like it to be absolutely clear what I mean here by the word existence. It means the condition in which an individual is able to actualize his essential capacities or what he considers to be such. The trend to actualize the essential capacities, i.e., its own nature, is the basic trend of every organism, and so also of the human organism.[2] Not being able to do that, at least to a certain degree, is breakdown, catastrophe, menace to ex-

1. To this and the following cf. my book, *Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology*. (Cambridge, 1940).

2. I should like to add a few words which may prevent a misunderstanding which I would regret. If I consider self-realization the necessary presupposition of health, that may be interpreted as advocating an egotistic attitude. Therefore I like to stress that the concept of self-realization as the trend of organismic life is neutral with respect to any special concept of the nature of man. It says only that external imposition of any kind of influence is in vain, if it is not accepted by the individual as adequate to his nature. If egotism were the driving force of man it would not help at all to enforce upon him any non-egotistic value system. Any such attempt would produce breakdown. Any helping procedure such as therapy would be hopeless. I think the existence of human beings in societies can be taken as a proof, at least, that egotism cannot be the only motive of human behavior.

istence. From this it becomes understandable that breakdown can be produced by very different causes. And what is more important, any event can be evaluated as cause of breakdown only in relation to the personality in question and the present tasks confronting it. For one individual, not passing an examination may not represent any danger, for another, it may spell disaster for the whole future. The latter breaks down in the aforesaid situation. The brain-injured man breaks down so easily because he is unable to fulfill a great number of the demands of his previous milieu.

If we characterize being sick as disordered functioning of the organism together with anxiety, and health as ordered functioning and normal emotional reaction to environment, one may object that normal healthy life is not at all always ordered, nor anxiety alien to normal life. In normal life incongruities often arise between the capacity of the organism and the tasks imposed by the constellation of environment which contains factors which are not in keeping with the capacities of the organism. The conquest of the world inevitably forces the human organism over and over again into such situations. The coming to terms with the world must proceed by way of constantly recurring catastrophic conditions and anxiety. Shock and anxiety belong to normal life, as philosophers like Kierkegaard, Pascal, and others have seen very clearly. We overlook that fact chiefly because the incapacity to solve problems usually does not put normal individuals into such a condition that essential capacities cannot be actualized any more. They are mostly able to overcome arising anxiety by use of their mental capacities. Here one attitude of the normal is of particular significance —the attitude we call courage, in which ultimately one is not concerned with any particular thing or situation but with a threat to existence. In the final analysis, courage is nothing but an affirmative answer to the normal shocks of existence which it is necessary to bear for the sake of actualizing one's own nature. Individuals differ as to how much anxiety they can bear. The way they can cope with anxiety gives much insight into their nature. If disorder and danger make actualization of essential capacities, or those considered essential, impossible and the individual is not able to bear the arising anxiety, sickness sets in. Whether that occurs or not depends upon a number of factors about which I shall have to speak later.

But first I want to say something about how the organism recovers

from the condition of being sick. The individual feels recovered and healthy when disorder and anxiety have disappeared. If we are dealing with a transient condition it is self-evident how recovery occurs, but it is different if restitution from the condition is impossible. Then the situation of disorder and anxiety becomes more or less permanent, as, for instance, in brain injury, chronic heart failure, or severe neurosis. Observation of such individuals shows that after a certain time they are again in an orderly setting—even the brain-injured person. Such a one fulfills, in spite of remaining defects, a number of tasks so that, superficially, he may not appear so very different from normal. This state is reached by characteristic changes of behavior, all of which have in common that they are suited to protect the individual against entrance of catastrophic conditions. I can here give you only a hint of the different ways in which the organism achieves that. Such an individual may avoid company and situations out of which demands can arise with which he cannot cope. He keeps busy as much as possible with things he is able to do. These activities may not have a great value in themselves, but they protect the individual against danger and anxiety. No stimulus is so dangerous for the brain-injured man, for instance, as an unexpected one, because, due to his defect, it is difficult for him to shift. It is only one other expression of the same phenomenon that such patients cannot take a contemplative attitude. They never play the detached role of a spectator. One of the outstanding features is an excessive and fanatical orderliness. Everything has to be in a definite order. All activities have to be organized as to time in a precise way. These patients cannot stand any vacuum in their way of living. They do not like any emptiness. A particularly interesting phenomenon is the frequently observed unawareness of the defect. We observe this not only in cases of brain defect, but in all conditions where the hindrance to self-actualization becomes excessive and the arising anxiety would be unbearable, as in severe tuberculosis, carcinoma, paresis, etc. This lack of awareness is the more evident the more complete the defect is. I may remind you here of the brilliant description of this phenomenon in tuberculous people in *The Magic Mountain* of Thomas Mann.

If you compare these above-mentioned phenomena with well-known symptoms in neurotics, you will see the great similarity as to the form-of-behavior changes which there, also, protect the individual against

the entrance of unbearable anxiety. By these protective mechanisms the organism is liberated from the danger of catastrophic conditions. The behavior changes represent defense mechanisms against anxiety. The individual is again able to use his remaining capacities and so to actualize himself, at least to a certain degree. From this point of view, one could say he is again in a state of health, and he feels so.

But he is restricted in the actualization of his nature. To this there corresponds a change, a shrinkage of his world compared with the world he lived in before. Life may become more secure by exclusion of the disturbing influences of the demands of the outer world, but due to this shrinkage, it may not be worth living any more. A severely brain-injured man usually does not recognize that, because of his mental defect. The milieu makes it possible for him to live—at least if he can live in a milieu from which no demands arise which produce catastrophic conditions. It is our endeavor to create such a milieu. We arrange a protective custody which allows the patient to get such satisfaction as he needs and protects him against the danger of his previous milieu. Thereby we exclude the individual in a more or less high degree from community with his fellow men. Certainly this is a way of living only for individuals who are not aware of this exclusion. If they were able to feel it, it would again bring them into a danger to existence. Therefore, such a procedure of protection is not at all satisfactory for mentally normal individuals with severe bodily diseases, or for neurotics. If such an individual gets the feeling that there may be no other way out of his conflict, then suicide is the only means of protecting himself against the horrifying effect of not being able to carry on with tasks which appear to him essential, and against the perpetual anxiety of catastrophes. Then we observe the seeming paradox that an individual prefers death to a life so shrunken that it appears to him no longer suitable to realize his nature. He prefers destruction of physical existence to a life which is inadequate to his nature, which means to him non-existence.

In situations in which recovery could be reached only with such severe restrictions of the way of living, there is but one way out of the dilemma, one possibility to avoid unbearable restrictions and so to make life again worth living. The individual must voluntarily bear conflict, suffering, and anxiety. There remains only the choice between this and unbearable restriction. If the patient is able to make the choice he

may suffer, but he is not sick any more, i.e., though disordered and stricken by anxiety, he is, at least to a certain degree, normal. With this alternative it becomes apparent that health is not simply an objective condition which can be understood by the methods of natural science, but a state closely related to a mental attitude by which the individual has to evaluate what is essential for his life. Health appears as a value; the value is the possibility of the individual to actualize his nature in, to him at least, an essential degree, i.e., to exist. Being sick appears as a loss of value, the value of existence.

This choice is not based on a voluntary decision. What the patient can do willingly, is to try out which of the possible ways of living may best bring about order, use of capacities, and therewith health. It is the task of the therapist to help the patient in these attempts. As to the factors producing disorder and anxiety there are, particularly, the following to be taken into consideration:

1. *The Individual Constitution:* Even in pure psychotherapy this factor must not be neglected. Freud has seen that very clearly and expressed several times the limitations which it sets to psychotherapy. On the other hand, one should not take a too pessimistic attitude toward constitutional deviations. Whether they become more or less disastrous depends on the attitude of the individual, which in turn is determined by the influence of the other factors we shall soon discuss. The damage of an unfortunate constitution will be the smaller the more the individual learns to evaluate it as only one cause of his disorder, and to consider it in relation to the total situation of his existence. The problem with which we are here confronted is particularly difficult when we are dealing with constitutional deviations from the norm which are in discrepancy with the ideas and customs of the society in which one lives. An example is homosexuality. If there is no possibility of changing the deviation—and that may be the case at least in some patients—and the individual does not find a social group which allows him to live without continual conflicts, then he has to sacrifice. He must—if he is not able to renounce every direct sex satisfaction—accept the depreciation, even the condemnation, of society. Here our position is enormously difficult, and we should at least be sure that our attitude is free from any moral judgment. This is an extreme example, but we meet in principle the same problem in all severe deviations which are in conflict with the values of a respective culture.

2. Concerning the second factor, *the influence of premorbid experiences,* I want to stress, first, that the conflict with which the patient and we have to deal is always a present conflict. Certainly the present conflict depends also upon the after-effects of previous experiences, physical and psychic; particularly, the power of the individual to solve the conflict or the ways he may go in his attempts to solve it are co-determined by fortunate or unfortunate influences of the past on the individual. Here protective mechanisms which developed against anxiety in childhood and persisted can have a disastrous after-effect. Psychoanalytic technique proved to be very helpful in uncovering forgotten causes of previous conflicts and their influence on present conflict. It is an essential task of every psychotherapy to uncover them; one may use strict psychoanalytic techniques or any other. But uncovering alone is not at all enough. What we uncover is only in indirect relation to the present conflict; the conflicts of early youth differ essentially from conflicts in adults according to the different personality structure of child and adult. It is a frequently made mistake that one overlooks this difference and transfers too easily what the patient remembers of old conflicts onto the new ones. Uncovering of old conflicts has a great significance for psychotherapy particularly because (1) it teaches the therapist something about the personality structure of the patient, (2) it enlightens the patient about himself. But a more important effect of the uncovering procedure is (3) that it leads the patient to discover that for overcoming difficulties one has to search out the causes carefully; one must not be satisfied with superficial explanations, and (4) the patient becomes aware that much of his suffering is due to the effect of old habits which originated as means of protecting himself against unbearable conflicts, but which are senseless and disturbing now that the conflicts to which they owe their origin have died out. All this may help much to solve the present conflict, but it is only the preparation for the possibility of recovery.

Real recovery can be reached only when the individual acquires full insight into the present conflict and is able, if the latter is not solvable, to make the choice to which we pointed above. The center of therapy is a transformation of the personality which enables the individual to make the right choice, to find a new orientation adequate in respect to the values of his life. It has often been demanded that psychotherapy keep free from values. As far as the therapist's attitude toward the

failures of the patient is concerned, this demand is certainly correct. The therapist is not allowed to impose his own values on the patient.

Freud as a typical positivist has believed treatment could be based on scientific methods and concepts alone. All that is outside of science is delusion, particularly religion. Whether Freud's attitude is free of value judgments would have to be discussed. I think belief in science is based on a value judgment too. But however that may be, Freud himself was not at all certain that his theory was so successful concerning therapy. He was, as is often overlooked, much more interested in scientific psychological explanation than in therapy. He realized that —I quote—

> *Weltanschauung* based upon science has . . . essentially negative characteristics, such as that it limits itself to truth, and rejects illusions. Those of our fellowmen who are dissatisfied with this state of things and who desire more for momentary peace of mind may look for it where they can find it. We shall not blame them for doing so; but we cannot help them. . . .

It is an expression of the same scepticism that he later found himself obliged to introduce metapsychological interpretation. In one of his latest papers—I think it was published in 1937—he went so far as to confess that we must use—I quote—"a bit of magic," and adds as a footnote to the paper published in English the German words "es muss doch dann die Hexe dran" (Thus we see we cannot get along without the witch)—the witch, that is the use of non-psychological factors for understanding human conflicts. He confesses that the constitutional strength of instinct is of crucial importance from the beginning, if one wants to understand why the ego is so hampered in overcoming conflict. This is, in correspondence with his pessimistic attitude toward man and even life in general, one basis of the concept of the death drive, and of the idea that the positive emotions, such as love, are only secondary masks for destructive tendencies which are alone genuine, as, for instance, hate.

With such a general attitude, to give real help must be very difficult. The only counsel can be to live according to these tendencies, and to find a way to overcome the tension of conflicts by relaxation, or to moderate the influence of the superego by insight into its origins, or to follow the trends of the superego, which in turn means frustration, conflicts, and disease. Whether it is possible on this basis to find an adequate life satisfying the trend of self-realization and, therewith, health

is doubtful to say the least. It seems particularly difficult for a theory which considers the demands of civilization as an illusion, its structure a product of neurotic guilt.

The hedonistic attitude of the Freudian theory is certainly based on a value system. Whether it is possible to get security and self-realization by this value system is doubtful for individuals living in society. Whether it corresponds to the nature of man also, I doubt. I point to this only to show that Freudian psychotherapy is itself based on a value system, and to show the difficulties which must arise for any psychotherapy which keeps strictly to this theory. There is no doubt that analytical therapy can help the patient. The patients lose conflicts and symptoms, become adjusted to reality by gaining a somewhat detached attitude toward the conflicts which confront them. They are no longer so impressed by difficulties, because they are convinced they can be solved. What really helps in the application of the Freudian procedure is not absolutely clear, and needs further investigation.

If we assume that acquisition of a new value system is prerequisite for success, the therapist has to help the patient to find it. At first he has to help the patient find the causes which have produced disorder and anxiety; then he has to find out how much of these causes can be eliminated, what cannot be eliminated, and what the patient has to learn to bear. The therapist has to judge how much the patient may be able to bear and how much of the protective mechanisms the patient will be able to give up. Finally, how can impairment of the value of health be compensated by acquisition of another value system?

The therapist has to find out by which value system the patient was determined or at least influenced, whether by a value system belonging to his relation to any group, to family, society, church, etc.; whether this relation can be explained, in a way understandable to the patient, as due to previous impositions from the outside, or as belonging to a world which does not exist any more for the patient. The patient may become, by therapy, free of the value system which has no longer value for him. But with that he is not cured. On the contrary, realization of these facts may produce new conflicts, and the destruction of the old value system should not take place before the development of a new one, one which is more adequate to the patient, i.e., which requires only sacrifices which the patient can bear. Here the therapist will be helpful if he has gained insight into the structure of the per-

sonality of the patient, into the latter's capacities, the significance of the one or the other capacity for him, the strength of his courage, the possibilities of the patient to sacrifice, etc. Of all this the patient has to become aware himself, and he has to try to gain a value system which does not demand that he bear more sacrifices than he can take, and makes possible realization of his essential trends. The patient has to grasp the fact that sacrifice is a necessity, not only for cure of his disease but for life in general, not as a positive value, but as a possible presupposition of self-realization. The neurotic patient needs incentives and encouragement to change his attitude; he does not like change because it brings along anxiety. The neurotic, like all patients in this situation, needs protection during the time he becomes aware of his conflicts as cause of his disease, during the time he has to make his choice. This protection flows out of the relationship between therapist and patient.

I should like to discuss in detail the phenomenon of transference with which we are here dealing. Transference is not a phenomenon observed only in neurotics and occurring only in analytic therapy. It plays a role also in treatment and retraining of patients with impairment of special faculties in organic brain lesions, impairment of language, etc. To be sure, transference was given special attention by Freud. Whether the analytic interpretation of the transference situation is correct or not, I cannot discuss here as much as I should like. I want to stress only the following: paramount as the development of transference is in a certain stage of treatment, it is, in the same way, important that it be disentangled at the right time. It is a great danger if the patient remains dependent. That is as harmful to recovery as the development of other protective mechanisms, and can become the origin of various conflicts. The dependence will be overcome by development of a value system which gives the individual the feeling of objective security in his coming to terms with the world. I should like to add here, furthermore, that development of countertransference is a very important factor in therapy. Indeed, it has to be handled still more carefully.

My point of view as to therapy has some similarity with that of Rank (in his last works), Taft, Allen, Rogers, and others. But I am not so convinced that the simple opportunity of the patient to speak freely about his own aggressive, socially disapproved trends is sufficient to

bring about "maturation" and "growth," the two factors considered the bases of improvement in therapy by those authors. As in development in general, this kind of maturation also needs stimulation from outside, i.e., therapy should be somewhat active—though, indeed, only to a certain degree. Basically, the driving forces should originate in the patient; but the therapist should help to originate them.

3. It is often advocated that personal conflicts should be solved by adjustment of the individual to society. As long as that means imposition of a value system on the patient, it is no more helpful than any other suggestive therapy. We often see that neurosis develops from the impossibility of bringing a previously imposed value system into agreement with the demands of the present world. This discrepancy is one important factor in many a neurosis with particularly valuable people. Any simply utilitarian acceptance of a new value system is without effect, may even enlarge the conflict, and so the neurosis. Acceptance is useful only if it is an integrated part of the new structure of the personality.

One of the greatest impediments to therapy in our time is *the uncertainty and inconsistency of present civilization* and the lack of any value system which the individual could accept wholeheartedly, and which could make life worth living in spite of necessary sacrifices. Very little can be found in our civilization which will allow for a satisfactory self-realization. We are confronted here with a very complex problem which I can only touch. I want to point to one special sacrifice demanded by our economic system which seems to me particularly unfortunate for therapy—the transformation of work into having a job. Work can be very helpful as a means, as a value, to actualize personality and to enable the bearing of necessary sacrifices. But the moment earning money for making a mere living becomes paramount, the individual is often forced to separate his work from his personality, the more so as the amount of earned money often influences social self-actualization unfortunately. From this situation there originates a disunity of the personality. This and other peculiarities of the modern social structure tend to produce a split in the personality which makes self-realization difficult.

Ichheizer has published an interesting study of the difference of the interpretation of personality in everyday life and the frame of reference in which the psychologist considers personality. The difference

between the occupational and the private personality produces, he writes, a split, from which inevitable tensions arise, which are deeply increased by the fact that traditional ideology and traditional education posit the unity of personality as an ideal, while the actual conditions of modern life and the existing social system make the realization of this ideal impossible.[3] Here the profound relation between disease and therapy, and the general attitude toward life and the society in which the individual lives, becomes evident. From this point of view, therapy appears to be more than a means for helping individuals to overcome personal conflicts. It must be considered, at the same time, as one attempt among others to diminish the disturbing effect on the individual of a society not organized adequately to human nature. Therapy's hope lies, to a high degree, in a better organization of society. Today therapy is not a very satisfying activity, and often it is doomed to remain patch-work. Therefore therapy—like any other helping procedure—presupposes belief in the possibility of changing conditions for the better, an optimistic attitude in spite of insight into the enormous difficulties, or even doubt as to the results of the effort. That alone can help the therapist to bear his own sacrifice—the inability to do a better job—without being too much disturbed in his own self-realization.

3. "Misinterpretation of personality in everyday life and the psychologist's frame of reference." *Character and Personality,* XII (1943), 145.

CONDITIONS OF MEDICAL RESPONSIBILITY

Gotthard Booth, M.D.

I

THE MAGIC OF EXPERIMENTAL SCIENCE

The position of the medical man in western culture has undergone a fundamental change since the beginning of this century. From the task of treating the ailments of individual bodies, he advanced to the disturbances of individual souls, and, at this point, it soon became obvious that physical and psychological health depends upon the relationships between the individual and his human environment. As the human environment often was found to harm the individual, it was logical enough that, at the International Conference on Mental Hygiene in London (1948) physicians offered themselves as healers of the destructive processes ravaging the body of humanity. This development means that the modern physician reclaims the power of the primitive medicine man, with the slight difference that the medicine man in primitive cultures carries responsibility only for his tribe or nation, while the modern physician feels that he could and should take responsibility for the health and wholeness of the world.

The reasons why medicine considers itself to be in possession of magic powers for changing the fate of humanity are obvious: the physical, chemical, and biological sciences have worked so many miracles in the physical world; psychology has discovered so much about the functioning of the mind. Further application of the principles which have advanced science to the present point seems to guarantee further progress in the control of physical and human nature.

There are certain empirical observations which suggest a sceptical consideration of contemporary medical procedure. Jelliffe[1] raised the question "What price healing?" in 1930, when he found that the surgical cure of long-standing ailments inaugurated a psychosis in several cases under his observation. He asked that the physician take stock of what a given disease means psychologically for the patient. To set free more libido than the individual can handle through his conscious ego "makes the psychotic adjustment imperative." Jelliffe compared the

1. S. E. Jelliffe, "What Price Healing?" *Jour. Am. Med. Assoc.*, xc (1930), 1395.

heedless curing of ailments with the greedy investing of stock market operators who go to the limit of their credits. The analogy lies in the removing of limitations for the satisfaction of doing so: people want as much health as they can get and as much money as they can get. Jelliffe recognized that the curing of an ailment cannot be isolated from the total psychological situation of the patient.

In the field of public hygiene, the following case is in point.[2] When the United States took over the administration of Puerto Rico a high infant mortality prevailed, which was then reduced by public health measures. This medical success, however, increased population pressures and resulted in malnutrition and social misery, because the cultural situation had not been taken into account: the population had stayed Catholic, and, therefore, the original high birth rate continued uninfluenced by Protestant ideas of health. The two examples quoted challenge the scientist to point out that psychological and economic measures could have taken care of the untoward consequences of medical efficiency. On the other hand, it becomes obvious that any scientific planning for the elimination of disease involves interference with individual personalities on a personal or political level, a procedure recognized as a danger to physical and mental health.

The limitations of modern medicine come as a disappointment only to those who have been hypnotized by the practical successes achieved. Theoretically, it had been doubtful even in the times of classical physics whether a scientifically controlled society would be possible. Classical physics tried to understand the whole world as a closed system of causal relations. The nature of such relationships was discovered by experimental procedures and formulated in mathematical terms. This allowed one to set up material conditions in quantitative terms in such manner that predictable effects followed. The possibility of achieving desirable effects always depended on the possibility of establishing material conditions from which such effects would follow by force of the laws of nature. Considering the enormous complexity of nature, there was room for doubt whether conscious control of all conditions for desirable effects is practical. With the discovery of the principle of indeterminism by Heisenberg, even the theoretical possibility of exact prediction of future events has been ruled out. This is extremely relevant for the future of humanity, since the discoveries

2. M. Mead, Personal communication to Seminar on Religion and Health, 1945-46.

of modern physics apply specifically to the evolution of life.[3] The constancy of organic forms on our planet depends on the stability of the large molecules which constitute the genes in the chromosomes and are transmitted from generation to generation for millions of years. Thus our contemporary horseshoe crab has not changed for millions of years. Due to the irregular behavior of the electrons in the molecules, sometimes genes do change and with them the hereditary character of the next generation. In the course of history the chain of hereditary determination has been broken again and again, resulting in the emergence of new and unpredictable creatures. Man and his evolution is not different from the organisms preceding him with respect to the fact that his nature is predictable in terms of broad statistical generalizations, but liable to spontaneous changes in the future. Therefore theoretical as well as practical considerations warn against optimism when medicine expects to heal the conditions of mankind by the methods of experimental science.

II

THE MAGIC OF SYMBOLS

Levy-Bruhl described the following incident as characteristic of primitive thinking. A certain tribe in the South Seas decided on accepting medical treatment from the white physician. First, however, they embraced the Christian religion, because they did not expect Christian drugs to be effective outside of the spiritual setting in which they belonged. Levy-Bruhl presents many similar stories to illustrate the irrational mind of primitives, which he describes as follows:

> Their concepts are felt and lived rather than reasoned. Neither their contents nor their conclusions adhere strictly to the law of contradiction. If our reasoning tries to grasp them one deprives them of their elementary concrete emotional and vital character. This circumstance makes it so difficult and hazardous to understand institutions through which primitive societies express their mentality because it is mystic rather than logical.[4]

Today the "primitive" no longer appear irrational, because we have been learning that neither physical nor chemical methods alone effect reliable cures. The less propitious the psychological situation of the

3. E. Schroedinger, *What Is Life?* (New York, 1945).
4. L. Levy-Bruhl, *La Mentalité Primitive* (Paris, 1933).

patient, the more uncertain are the results of scientific treatment. When we read the statistical reports on the effectiveness of various drugs and operations we may be sure that the percentage of failures includes cases in which the psychological constellation prevented the scientific tool from taking effect. Even under the relatively superficial psychological impact of hypnosis drugs may produce results contrary to their physiological character, e.g., the suggestion of opium being a laxative may cause diarrhea, or, vice versa, castor oil may cause constipation. The reaction to general anesthetics is measurably affected by the psychological setting, a circumstance which would be obvious to the primitive, but disturbing to the scientific anesthetist who expects straight correlations between human weight and weight of ether.

Psychoanalysis has made it clear that the psychological constellations are based only to a limited extent on the reasoning processes of the conscious mind. To a much larger extent our psychological reactions are caused by the symbolic quality of the situation, regardless of our conscious awareness. Freud discovered that the unconscious mind of civilized man is as illogical, emotional, and complex as the conscious mind of primitives. Levy-Bruhl's description of the latter might easily have been used by Freud without changing a word. Neither one of the two scientists, also, realized the positive quality of symbolic processes, because of their prejudices in favor of mechanistic science. Freud, in particular, considered the unconscious essentially as an underworld populated by characters which had failed to fit into the respectable world of logical thinking and behavior. The symbolical language of the unconscious therefore appeared only as more or less ingenious disguise of rejected drives and emotions, waiting to be unmasked and rehabilitated in the conscious world of reasonableness. The procedure of classical psychoanalysis followed the theory used in the physical therapies: the patient was sick because a bad childhood situation had conditioned bad functioning; he was to be cured by subjecting him to the good, rational conditions of the analyzed psychiatrist.

It was the merit of Jung[5] to have discovered and unfolded the positive aspect of the world of the unconscious, i.e., that the symbolic functions express basic conditions of human existence. The timelessness of the unconscious seems to be a deficiency only when considered from the point of view of the conscious mind, which operates within

5. C. G. Jung, *Contributions to Analytical Psychology* (New York, 1928).

the experience of a continuous progress of time and depends on it for its reasoning. Within the unconscious, timelessness is only another way of saying that the world has certain lasting changeless structural qualities. The symbolic order of the unconscious cannot be understood as part of a chain of causes and effects, but represents the permanent forms within which the fleeting events of life and the changing experiences of the conscious mind take place. The forms of human relationships are structures in the same sense as the forms of individual organisms. As far as we can follow the history of the universe, the continuity of the same structures, the same rhythms of cosmic, inorganic, and organic life are the most striking features. If one follows the development of individuals, one is impressed with the stability of certain attitudes and value systems. The so-called "struggle for survival" reveals itself often strikingly as a struggle for the preservation of a certain *form* of life, not a struggle for mere *duration*. Man had rather shorten the time than change the way of his life. As I have illustrated in a previous paper,[6] disease is a symbolic assertion of the character of the personality against the pressures of environment. Szondi[7] has demonstrated in many ways that the qualities and forms of human associations in love, friendship, and occupation persist throughout generations in a way which can be attributed to either conscious choice or to accident.

The aspect of existence which we perceive through symbols is very difficult for modern man to grasp, because his concentration on action, perception, and thought have led to naïve identifications between consciousness and reality. The conscious mind, however, is capable only of perceiving within the three dimensions of space and the additional perception of the historical sequence of time. This four-dimensional world is sufficient for observing and producing certain cause-effect sequences. Reality, however, transcends the world which we know directly through our senses. Most startling evidence of such unconscious dimensions of reality was the discovery made by Dunne[8] that time is not a one-way succession of moments, but that for the unconscious the future is present, that in dreams people quite commonly

6. G. Booth, "Variety in personality and its relation to health," *Review of Religion*, X (1946), 385.

7. L. Szondi, *Schicksalsanalyse* (Basel, 1944).

8. J. W. Dunne, *An Experiment with Time* (New York, 1937).

perceive future events in great detail. As a rule, the phenomenon is not observed, because precognition nearly always concerns matters of little personal importance. The conscious mind persistently selects its perceptions in accordance with its purposes and wishes; it represses conflicting aspects of the conscious as well as of the unconscious world. People with prophetic gifts function only with regard to the lives of strangers, but cannot use them where their own wishful thinking becomes involved. Telepathy, too, depends on the emotional constellation between percipient and agent, as has been pointed out, particularly by Ehrenwald.[9] Precognition and telepathy, although proven by abundant research and easily observable in our daily existence, are still rejected or ignored by many serious scientists. This fact illustrates very clearly how anxiously the modern mind clings to the hope that science, through manipulation of causal relationships, may save the world.

Einstein,[10] although he proved that the facts of the physical world require ten dimensions for their scientific definition, assumed arbitrarily that space and time are the only real dimensions, the others being "only mathematical." The interpretation seems permissible that the reason space and time alone are unquestioningly accepted as reality is connected with their being the dimensions of individual consciousness on which modern man has become so dependent. Long after Einstein's discovery, Jordan, a physicist, pointed out that there is no scientific basis for the distinction between an "objective" world of our conscious perceptions and a "subjective" world of inner experiences. He concluded that both worlds are real, that there is no gap in the transitions from perceptions to hallucinations.

> Since we are already used to consider the content of individual consciousness as just a narrow border of the unconscious, we will in analogy also consider physical space as a narrow border of the much wider reality world of the unconscious. Telepathic communication is essentially independent from physical and physiological conditions. The latter may favor and re-enforce the telepathic communication, but in principle they are not necessary. Telepathic communication means that two people look at the same object in the reality world of the unconscious. It is of secondary importance to which extent such event protrudes into the borderland of physical space.[11]

9. J. Ehrenwald, *Telepathy and Medical Psychology* (New York, 1948).

10. See A. S. Eddington, *The Nature of the Physical World* (New York, 1928), Chs. VI, VII.

11. P. Jordan, "Positivistische Bemerkungen über die parapsychischen Erscheinungen," *Zentralblatt für Psychotherapie,* IX (1936) 3.

Precognition, telepathy, and coincidences[12] are evidences of the unconscious dimensions in which an important part of human existence takes place, but they indicate little of practical significance because of their highly individualized and unpredictable nature. Other observations suggest the quality and dynamics of the general pattern of unconscious relationships. For biology in general, Von Uexkuell[13] has demonstrated systematically that the greater part of the relationships between inanimate nature, plants, and animals are to be understood as expressions of a vast, harmonious organization of nature. Within this harmonious structure perceptual and causal events, e.g., Darwin's struggle for survival, take place as secondary elaborations. For man, Frobenius[14] collected evidence that different cultures are linked in an orderly fashion to certain specific orders in the non-human part of the cosmos, for instance, to celestial bodies, certain plants, or certain animals. Like the biological harmonies of Von Uexkuell, the anthropologic harmonies of Frobenius are mostly not to be understood in terms of cause and effect, such as the adaptation of the Egyptians to the Nile happened to be. The integration of collective human patterns into some established stable non-human pattern of life proved practical in a different sense: it provides the basis for a stable and, eventually, productive society. Each evolutionary step beyond such order means a serious hazard.

This historical experience is strikingly expressed in the African legend of the fall of the kingdom of Karsch, where life had been linked for a long time successfully to the revolutions of the stars. The priests watched them night after night, and, whenever a certain constellation appeared, the reigning king was sacrificed and a new king invested in his place. Thus the constant renewal of life was firmly anchored in the order of the cosmos. Finally, however, this harmony was broken by an individualistic experience: one man did not want to die according to the laws of the universe, he wanted to live as long as he could because he had fallen in love. To live with the woman he loved was more important to him than the order of the kingdom. He hypnotized the priests with enchanting fairy tales until they lost track of the move-

12. L. Bacon, "The Long Arm of Coincidence," *Saturday Review of Literature* (Dec. 14, 1946).

13. J. Von Uexkuell, *Theoretische Biologie* (2nd ed. Berlin, 1928); *Der unsterbliche Geist in der Natur* (Hamburg, 1938).

14. L. Frobenius, *Kulturgeschichte Afrikas* (Zürich, 1933).

ments of the stars and missed the propitious moment for the sacrifice of the king. Thus the life of the king was saved, and, under the new order, for many generations to come trades and arts flourished increasingly. At last, however, this outstanding prosperity aroused the greed of the neighboring tribes; they looted and destroyed Karsch; then the jungle moved in and covered its ancient site.

Throughout all cultures the same phenomenon can be observed: they exist by means of an all-pervading structure which regulates the individual lives of its members. The authority of this structure decides which human qualities and functions are favored, which restricted, which tolerated. Eating, drinking, sex, aggression, charity, domination, and submission all are patterned in amazing variety throughout the world, making all goal-directed activities secondary to the preservation of the basic collective harmony. Since the mechanistic scientist considers goal directed activities the basic concern of man, all cultural structures appear to him as irrational authorities. They do interfere with many pursuits of which human beings are inherently capable, and which some of them consciously desire. Evidently a rationalistic culture, constructed to satisfy the wishes of individuals, would have to eliminate everything not related to those wishes often considered the expression of "basic human nature." The primitive accepts cultural interference with his needs and wishes, because the symbolic organization of life protects him, as Jung pointed out, against the dangers of the soul. He knows intuitively that the forces of the unconscious are stronger than the power of the conscious mind and that, therefore, conscious life should be kept in harmony with the order of the unconscious. Symbolic practices are the means by which conscious life can be directed along safe channels. Symbols are not mere rational signs, but represent an idea which transcends physical facts. Jung exemplifies this statement with the fertility rite of the Watchandies:

> A hole in the earth is not merely a sign or substitute for the genitalia of a woman, but a symbol that represents the idea of the earth woman who is to be fertilized. To mistake it for a human woman would be to interpret the symbol semiotically, and this would fatally disturb the value of the ceremony. It is for this reason that none of the dancers may look upon a woman.[15]

The physical symbol is an instrument through which dynamic relationships in the unconscious world are strengthened in the same way

15. *Op. cit.* p. 50.

as physical and physiological elements are apt to strengthen telepathic communications. The symbols of each culture re-enforce those powers of the unconscious which are in keeping with it, they protect the community against the invasion of those forces of the unconscious incompatible with its culture. The "irrational" authority of symbolic structure integrates the unconscious side of human individuals with the wide world of unconscious realities.

III

ANXIETY CONCERNING DISEASE

As western man developed more and more power to influence the physical world, his consciousness became fascinated by the ideal of the individual who stands by himself as the master of his fate and soul. This seemed possible since the identification of the conscious physical world with reality suggested human souls as discriminate from each other as the physical bodies associated with consciousness.[16] Accordingly, cultural order ceased to be the root and core of individual existence; it became to the mechanistic scientist a harness imposed by vested interests and traditional superstitions. Modern man identifies his isolated soul with his conscious desires. This explains why he is so preoccupied with the extension of his consciousness in time, and with the increase of his power to satisfy desires. In his fantasies Superman has replaced the man beloved by supernatural powers.

Regarding the extension of the life span continuous progress has been made. It has become a major concern to ward off death, whether due to the machines of peace and war, or to diseases. People are constantly admonished to "fight disease," warned that they are running a high risk of dying of heart failure or cancer. The success of such endeavors has led to the development of a new medical specialty, geriatrics, the care of the physical ailments of old age. Furthermore, it has created serious social and psychological problems: the old people often find no meaningful function in society and, consequently, are faced with the unhappiness of an empty physical existence. The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America has created a special commission to study the possibilities of spiritual rescue for those who have saved their bodies from disasters and diseases. If one considers it the

16. Schroedinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 87 ff.

task of medicine to relieve suffering, one may ask whether the prolongation of life does not represent a success of science rather than of medical concern with human suffering.

The loss of purposes for action becomes particularly disturbing to our ageing population, because science has put increasing physical powers at the disposal of people and made them inclined to seek happiness through the exercise of power. Fromm[17] has given us excellent descriptions of this aspect of modern man and his vulnerability to experiences of individual restrictions. I quote: "Man is cast into this world at an accidental place and time, he is forced out of it, again, accidentally. . . . He cannot go back to the prehuman state of harmony with nature" (p. 40). Man's basic quality is productiveness:

> man's ability to use his powers and to realize the potentialities inherent in him. If we say *he* must use *his* powers we imply that he must be free and not dependent on someone who controls his powers. . . . Productiveness means that he experiences himself as the embodiment of his powers and as the "actor". . . (p. 84).
>
> Virtue is proportional to the degree of productiveness a person has achieved. If society is concerned with making people virtuous, it must be concerned with making them productive. The first and foremost of these conditions is that the unfolding and the growth of every person is the aim of all social and political activities, that man is the only purpose and end, and not a means for anybody or anything except himself (p. 229).

It is acknowledged that "every human being, in order to survive, must be able to accept things from others, . . . to exchange . . . to follow authority . . . (p. 115). These passive sides, however, are considered "musts" in comparison to the desirability of productiveness, therefore all the organizational forms of society which limit individual power to act are under constant scientific attack, the question always being whether they are inevitable "musts." Since passive experiences are inacceptable to modern man, he projects the cause of all individual limitations on a bureaucratic state, which is resented as compulsive even in democratic societies. Psychiatrically speaking: the repression of the passive and collective qualities has resulted in the compulsive quality of social existence exactly as repressed sexual passivity makes a woman experience intercourse as rape. Conscious condemnation of sex does not alleviate the anxiety of the woman, nor does

17. E. Fromm, *Man for Himself* (New York, 1947).

condemnation of restrictive authorities free man's social existence; on the contrary, the stronger the protest, the more compulsory institutions become. Lenin, intending to construct a society in which "the state would wither away," founded a particularly authoritarian state.

The conclusion seems justified that collective order and its restrictions form an intrinsic part of the human mind. In primitive man the cultural pattern is not experienced as compulsion, but regulates life naturally just as in the state of health the structure and functioning of the body go on without impressing themselves on the consciousness of the individual. Even in modern man there are noticeable differences in this respect, e.g., between English and French political organization. In England, the identification with the traditional symbolic forms of the kingdom goes with little individual restriction; the English policeman does not carry arms. In France, which abolished all traditional forms of collectivity, bureaucracy exercises power in a highly aggressive manner. In the field of religion, Catholics are less subject to anxieties than Protestants, because, for the former, the relationship with God is part of collective symbolic practices, while, for the latter, religion means that the individual alone must take responsibility for his salvation.

Contemporary society is quite obviously threatened by the historical development of widespread tensions between individual anarchism and need for collective organization, both fostered by rapidly progressing technological science. It is, therefore, a matter of concern that among psychiatrists there is a widespread tendency to identify themselves with the popular emphasis on various freedoms from limitation as the highest value for which personal and political wars are waged. This point may be illustrated from Chisholm's article, "The Re-establishment of Peacetime Society,"[18] because it has been widely acclaimed as a most significant statement of the responsibility of psychiatry. Chisholm expects it to create mature people by teaching them to "regard as suspect everything that we have believed up to now" (p. 34). "Whether the psychiatrist is capable or not is relatively unimportant as long as he stirs up people's thinking . . . although such a program will doubtlessly increase to some considerable degree the insecurity and anxiety of quite a number of people" (p. 33). He considers

18. G. B. Chisholm, "The Re-establishment of Peacetime Society," *Psychiatry* IX (1946), 3.

the abolition of "moralities" as necessary, because he finds "the crippling of intelligence by the bandages of belief, in the name of virtue and security of the soul, as recognizable as the crippling of the feet of the Chinese girl who was sacrificed to the local concept of beauty . . . , the result is loss of natural function" (p. 8). "Good is recognized as just as great a menace as evil. They are the fruit of the one tree and are different aspects of the same thing" (p. 7). "Freedom from moralities means freedom to observe, to think and to behave sensibly, to the advantage of the person and of the group" (p. 9). Such emotional claims for the unique saving power of individual thinking are frequent among psychiatrists and psychologists, in spite of their theoretical and practical familiarity with the other psychological functions of the conscious and unconscious mind. From my own studies of personality structures in the average population,[19] and from common experience, I feel strongly that most people are poorly equipped with the qualifications required by Chisholm's ideal man of the future. In the first place, most people are not very intelligent even when confronted with the problems of intelligence tests which hardly involve their sociological conditioning. More important, however, is the consideration that, even among intelligent people, the tendency toward using their thinking independently is limited by constitutional factors. One large group tends to use it along the lines favored by the parent whose personality, by its quality, not necessarily by tyranny, dominated the childhood environment; the other large group tends to think along the lines of the social environment of their adult existence, regardless of the dominating influences of their childhood. Such personality patterns form on a hereditary, biological level, and it seems impossible to make people at large happier and healthier by emphasis on critical thinking.

The explanation for the psychiatric crusades against the irrational authority of tradition may be found in the fact that the authors are creative scientists. This means that they, personally, have experienced the conflict between the traditions of their upbringing and the new concepts they themselves have brought into being. The authoritative orders on which the uncreative, reproductive individual relies for his peace of mind become a cause for anxiety and frustration to the man

19. G. Booth, "Organ Function and Form Perception," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, VIII (1946), p. 367.

who has new insights and wishes to apply them. Furthermore, in a moralistic democratic culture, any privilege derived from the accident of superior creativeness causes guilt feelings and a wish to assuage them by sharing personal gains with society. Original thinkers project their own resentments of authority on others and assume that the "common man" feels, or should feel, the way they have been feeling. This seems to me the only explanation why modern reformers are so unrealistic about what other people really suffer from: a lack of unquestioned values and of reliable human relationships, not from lack of freedom. Among those who do not owe power and privilege to their own achievements guilt feelings are absent, and therefore they do not try to extend their own condition to others, although they may devote themselves to the real needs of others. This holds true particularly of religious individuals. Not only do kings feel themselves appointed "by the grace of God," but scientists and artists, too, may feel that creativeness is not a result of individual power but a gift to be used for the greater glory of God within his order of creation.

Due to the contemporary emphasis on limitations as the quintessence of evil, little realistic attention has been given to the adjustment of people to limitations. The healthy person who meets the cripple, the rich who meets the poor, recoil with horror: "How unbearable would life be if I were in the situation of this wretched individual." This naïve reaction leads to an avoidance of going deeper into the condition of those who suffer, because modern man is told in ever so many ways that all men are equal, that his misfortunes are due to accidents of birth and environment which could befall anybody, and that each citizen is responsible for creating a universal society for the prevention of all such accidents. Actually, people adjust remarkably well to their own handicaps, their observers notwithstanding, who feel that they would kill themselves in a similar situation. For many years I have been particularly interested in arthritics and Parkinsonians.[20] These people have been active and aggressive above the average, in their days of health; and many have been well off economically also. Even those who are completely crippled and live in primitive hospital wards are less unhappy than one would expect. Very few of them want to die; suicide is extremely rare, but they can be made acutely un-

20. *Idem*, "Personality and Chronic Arthritis," *Jour. Nerv. and Ment. Dis.*, LXXXV (1937), 637; "Psychodynamics in Parkinsonism," *Psychosomatic Medicine*, X (1948), 1.

happy by expressions of pity from outsiders. The reason for this good adjustment is found in the fact that the symptoms of each disease express constitutional personality tendencies on a symbolical level. Disease does not prevent the individual from self-expression, it only reduces or alters his influence on his environment.

The capacity for adjustment to limitations is not confined to diseases developing from constitutional dispositions of the individual. The German concentration camps have provided an extreme experiment in limitations imposed from the outside. An Austrian psychiatrist, Frankl,[21] recently published his own experiences. He found that, within a few days, the vast majority of the prisoners make an adjustment which puts them completely outside of the range of understanding for those living outside the camp. The range of interests and awareness reduces itself in keeping with the biological existence at its lowest level. Some individuals, however, are capable of holding on to their intellectual and spiritual concerns. That people should survive for years under such conditions of material deprivation and mental horror seems incredible to those who do not actually share the experience. Frankl made one particularly important observation. Before Christmas, 1944, a rumor spread through his camp that the prisoners would be set free on Christmas; when this hope was disappointed a great number died within a week without any "medical" cause. There was a biological cause: the adjustment to the former limited existence had been destroyed by orientating the prisoners toward a different situation which did not materialize. It is in keeping with this explanation that religiously orientated people survived the disappointment better, since for them a change in physical restrictions was of less significance.

The preceding remarks on human adjustment to restrictions are not intended as propaganda for medical and sociological fatalism, but they should counterbalance those tendencies in modern medicine which seek health in the indiscriminate expansion of human possibilities. People can fall sick both from too much and from too little freedom. This suggests that their health requires more than the current campaign against limitations. Szondi's "Fate Analysis"[22] gives us a very comprehensive insight into the determining influence of heredity on the course of the personal and sociological development of the indi-

21. V. Frankl, *Aerztliche Seelsorge* (Vienna, 1946), p. 89.
22. *Op. cit.*

vidual; furthermore, it appears that the birth, life, and death of each individual fit significantly into the existences of many other individuals with whom he comes in contact. The basic types of men are essentially stable and reproduce themselves. They are capable of existing under a great variety of biological and cultural conditions. In each person, in addition to basic, inherited qualities, a certain amount of free and unpredictable development take place. Only in a very few individuals do such unpredictable developments lead to the emergence of truly creative personalities, capable of producing new conditions through use of their rational powers. The occurrence of such creative individuals can not be willed; to call it an accident is far more appropriate than it is to the experience of most people, whose lives fit, in many respects, into predictable patterns. The "creative accidents" often happen among the underprivileged and the suppressed. There is no empirical basis for the assumption that they can be engineered by reducing "irrational authorities." The progress of man cannot be made the objective of conscious endeavors. De Rougemont[23] recently devoted a book to the case of the Devil, who, ever since Eden, has been in favor of rational progress. The task of the physician is more limited in scope.

IV

THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE PHYSICIAN

There is little to be said about the ancient task of the physician to relieve physical disabilities and discomforts. Physical methods of therapy have become increasingly effective and, presumably for many years to come, for reasons of expediency they will be used in most cases without the possibility of integrating the physical methods with psychological treatment of the personality problem each disease represents. Psychiatry is only beginning to understand the language of the body and to translate it into terms which can be used directly by the physician.

One of the main tasks of the psychiatrist is concerned with finding the functional needs of the individual patient. To help the individual find congenial objectives for his particular equipment seems to be more conducive to health than to encourage attempts to strive for a

23. D. De Rougemont, *La Part du Diable* (New York, 1944).

way of life which is popularly suggested as "normal." The Chicago Psychoanalytic Institute[24] has changed the approach of psychoanalysis from dogmatic emphasis on undirected release of the repressed unconscious to concern with objectives defined in terms of individual needs. While the old approach to alcoholism tried, mostly in vain, to make the alcoholic either stop drinking or drink moderately, the success of Alcoholics Anonymous has proved that the alcoholic usually needs the experience of being accepted despite his limitations and then loses his destructive need for liquor. Homosexuals are not cured by either suppression of homosexual impulses or by an environment which accepts their hypothetical abnormality, but by helping them to accept the meaning of their actual masculine or feminine equipment. Arthritics who habitually repress their passive sides in favor of action can be helped toward using their capacity for emotional and aesthetic receptivity. The task of the physician, however, should not stop where he cannot improve or cure the pathological condition. On the basis of his concentration camp experiences, Frankl stresses the need for what he calls "existential analysis": "While psychoanalysis tries to make people capable only of enjoyment and productivity, existential analysis has to help patients eventually to become capable of suffering . . . , there is suffering which transcends all illness, which forms an integral part of meaningful human existence."[25] This conclusion is obvious as a biological fact, but difficult to accept in western culture, where action alone is deemed good, and suffering, evil. Only collective situations like wars and revolutions enable the average modern man to accept suffering and death willingly.

The question may be raised whether modern man would not accept the limitations of existence more willingly if the individual could be helped from the beginning to live according to his characterological equipment. This would mean that emphasis be removed from the competitive use of special skills and talents. During the war the Army developed ingenious methods for selecting the right personality for each job. Rees[26] made an eloquent plea that those experiences should be used in peacetime society, and office seekers, particularly, should be investigated as to whether their total personality fitted their responsi-

24. See F. Alexander, and T. French, *Psychoanalytic Therapy* (New York, 1946).
25. *Op. cit.*
26. J. R. Rees, *The Shaping of Psychiatry by War* (New York, 1945).

bilities, or whether they were impressive only through the exercise of limited, perhaps even antisocial, talents.

Methods such as those described in the preceding paragraphs will hardly prove adequate substitutes for the security which older cultures have provided by a symbolical organization which gives to most of the members an unquestioned and acceptable function and position. The contemporary tendency to dissolve the surviving remnants of traditional forms and symbols of society as "irrational authorities" seems to be a highly questionable procedure. From the point of view of mental hygiene, it seems wiser to help people toward a new understanding of the meaning of those authorities which still exist in their experience. There are three features of Christian tradition which I consider particularly significant for the health of modern man. In a previous contribution, I discussed the significance of *sacrifice*.[27] In our highly competitive culture this means the sacrifice of the competitively most valuable function in favor of other functions of lesser competitive value. This agrees with Christian emphasis on the sacrifice of pride.

The doctrine of *original sin and salvation by faith* is significant as an acknowledged or unacknowledged part of psychotherapy, because in it man accepts his separation from a transcendent being, with its meaning that he cannot become reunited and saved by any individual effort he might make, but only by surrendering his realized limitations to divine grace. Particularly in our aggressive, moralistic society it is as difficult as it is essential to understand the limitations and possibilities of man as separate from any code of worldly accomplishment.

Participation in the services and *symbols* of the church is important, because through them man transcends the experiences of the physical world of his consciousness, particularly of his overemphasized individuality. The equality of all church members in relation to service and ritual gives emphasis to their common relatedness to the ground of all being. The symbolic life of the church forms the positive counterpart to the individual sacrifice of pride.

For the psychotherapist himself, orientation through the symbols of religion may have particular value. The publications of Eisenbud[28]

27. *Review of Religion*, X (1946) p. 385.

28. J. Eisenbud, "Telepathy and Problems of Psychoanalysis," *Psychoanal. Quarterly*, XV (1946), 32; "Analysis of a Presumptively Telepathic Dream," *Psychiatric Quarterly*, XXII (1948), 103.

have documented in great detail and with rare honesty the fact that the insecurities and anxieties of the analyst are picked up telepathically by their patients. Such anxieties in difficult therapeutic situations are perhaps greater for the physician who relies entirely on his own intellectual powers than for one who relates his work to a transcendent order. However, such definite religious orientation is apt to cause serious difficulties in patients with deep religious conflicts.

V

CONCLUSION

Contemporary fascination with the possibilities of materialistic science has created a problem for medical thinking. That science is able to produce radical changes in physical conditions has led to a utopian attitude toward the limitations of human existence. For practical and theoretical reasons emphasis on scientific planning in terms of the physical sciences seems conducive to more anxiety rather than to greater happiness. Medicine has failed to realize that a most significant part of man transcends his conscious, physical dimensions. This unconscious part of man contains his collective organization, his links with other individuals, and with the organization of nature in general; it can be experienced and acted upon mainly through the use of symbols. It is the basic responsibility of medicine to keep man's consciousness in harmony with his timeless qualities and his oneness with the structure of existence. On the other hand, individual differences of personality regarding activity and passivity, productiveness and reproductiveness, individualism and adaptiveness, etc., should be considered more important than the concept of basic human nature in dealing with problems of mental hygiene and therapy.

Medicine shares with religion concern with the salvation of human beings; it has become increasingly an endeavor to perfect individual human beings. Religion, in contrast, has always emphasized the limitations of all human effort and the transcendent character of all perfection. Mutual understanding between religion and medicine could become an important element in overcoming the contemporary anxiety regarding disease and other limitations. Physicians need a strengthening of their intellectual and moral courage, so that they may learn to accept the limitations of their work without blaming them on the limitations of the social order. For such orientation religion may provide the spiritual means.

NOTES ON INTEGRATION, FREEDOM, AND RESPONSIBILITY

Harry Bone

It is frequently said that freedom and responsibility should go together. As far as the structure of human personality is concerned, they do go together. This is a factual statement, not the projection of a moral norm. A person can not be more responsible than he is free to be; he will be as fully responsible as he is free to be. Whatever a person has done, he had to do—even though, as is generally the case, he himself believes he could have done differently. He not only could have but would have done differently if, and only if, some of the factors in the situation, including himself as a highly determinative part of the situation, had been different. This concept of unqualified psychological determinism is indispensable for the discovery of the conditions of freedom, and hence for the increase of freedom, and hence for the increase of responsibility. The frustration of moral effort is due in large part to the fact that one tries to do better instead of realizing that with his current character-structure, his present unconscious motivations, he can not do better. With such a realization, one provisionally ceases trying to make the fruit good and directs attention to making the tree good, by finding out where and why it is bad.

The following sketchy statement is concerned with certain conditions of inner freedom, specifically with a distinction between *more limited* and *more complete* forms of freedom-responsibility.

A person is free and responsible to the extent that his character-structure is integrated in terms of a personally developed hierarchy of essentially harmonious values. ("Values" is used as synonymous with life-purposes, aims, goals, major motives, attitudes, action-tendencies, etc.) A person is unfree and irresponsible to the extent that his character is composed of structures which are in conflict with each other and express themselves in mutually contradictory values. One in whom these latter conditions predominate is said to suffer from a character neurosis; he offers the best opportunity to understand neurotic conflicts as they function in predominantly mentally healthy persons as well as in neurotics. The elements of character and conduct of such a person are to be understood as expressions of his contradictory

tendencies, or as attempts at integration, or as consequences of the contradictory tendencies or the attempts at integration. Examples of these three categories are: inconsistencies of character and conduct; compromises such as satisfying unavowable motives under the guise of acceptable ones; inconsistent self-evaluation, with its consequent uncertainty of personal identity, indecision, and fatigue.

People with deep conflicts in their character-structures are either successful neurotics or unsuccessful neurotics. They are "successful" if the pseudo-integration which they have constructed on the contradictory foundations enables them to fulfil the minimal requirements of their society and their own minimal requirements of subjective happiness. They are "unsuccessful" if these minimal requirements can not be satisfied. The condition then becomes a crisis which can not continue. There are three possible directions for the life-course beyond this point: breakdown, re-establishment of a "successful" pseudo-integration, or radical resolution, for the first time, of the basic structural conflicts and consequent establishment of a genuine integration. The second possible direction of the life-course is a pseudo or compromise solution of character-conflict and results in a limited degree of freedom and responsibility; the third is a true or radical solution and results in a more complete degree of freedom and responsibility. The distinction is of great practical importance, because, when a person in crisis seeks the assistance of a helper, whether psychiatric or religious, the nature of the solution that is achieved often depends in large degree on the outlook, understanding, and skill of the helper.

The two concepts, pseudo-integrated and integrated, are neither of them absolute. All human beings would fall somewhere on a scale connecting the two abstractions. In fact, in our highly pathogenic society, the pseudo-integrated condition described as "successful neurotic" is perhaps statistically normal. Surely it applies to a large proportion of psychiatric and religious personnel. One might say that success in living in our realistic historic situation is best conceived as growth, with the years, in mental and moral health—two aspects of one and the same phenomenon. Since a person's evaluation of human nature and its possibilities is largely determined by his own character-structure, and since we helpers are neither paragons of mental health nor saints, ability to distinguish between pseudo and genuine integrations of character is obviously desirable.

The ability to make this distinction is fostered by understanding the origin and vicissitudes of various character-structures, a bare outline of which will now be attempted. Among the numerous needs of human nature, two general needs which are dynamically interrelated may, nevertheless, be abstracted from each other. These are the need to be in contact with and on good terms with oneself (intra-personal integration), and the need to be in contact with and on good terms with one's fellows (inter-personal integration). These needs are permanent and inescapable, because rooted in our nature as concommitantly individual and social beings, separate and yet related beings. The individual who, during the formative years of infancy and childhood, constructs his character in relations with integrated parents will become an integrated character. The children of neurotic parents will, on the other hand, become neurotic. Recurrent patterns of neurotic parents are: not wanting the child; burdening him with one's compulsive need for affection, or for the vicarious realization of frustrated goals, or the need to dominate, or the need to sacrifice oneself; molding according to rigid ideals; spoiling, preference for siblings, etc., etc.

In all these cases the child is placed in a dilemma: he must sacrifice either his need for the development of his own nature by reasonably free expression of his successively arising maturational urges, or abnegate acceptance by the parent. He may comply and save his relations with his parents, or he may defy and save his relations with himself. Neither is more than a partial, costly "solution," because good relations with oneself and with others are each the necessary condition for the other. Furthermore, he can not eliminate either need from his personality by eliminating it more or less from consciousness. Hence he has two basic foci of self-organization. The result is a split in his foundations. Since he can not integrate the foundations, he builds a kind of unity out of compromises of various kinds between tendencies emanating from the two foci. These compromises constitute the numerous items in the museum of psychopathological mechanisms. At best the pseudo-integrations succeed only partially; the compliant person still has powerful assertive needs that must be expressed in some fashion and yet kept out of collision with the compliant tendencies. He is forced to deceive himself as well as others, and thus loses contact with dynamic forces in himself. The aggressive person still

has powerful needs for affection, however unconscious they may have become.

When the pseudo-integration has stiffened into some degree of firmness, potentially developmental experiences are perceived and used so as to be assimilated into it. It is then further consolidated. In mating, for instance, a compliant person will tend to select a dominating partner, and will activate the partner's dominant tendencies. Because of their compulsive needs, rooted in their respective character-structures, neither can be free to nurture responsibly the give-and-take equality necessary to the increase of freedom and responsibility. The maturing religious development is similarly distorted: the helpless, submissive person reads into the cosmos a helpful authority that is the precise answer to his needs; the aggressive person uses the authority of his religious experience to manipulate others under the guise of saving their morals and their eternal happiness. Under these conditions, religious maturing cannot be what it should be, a progressive realization of freedom and responsibility. The subjective euphoria and feelings that life's problems are solved, which accompany these mating and religious compromises, are really due to the apparent confirmation of a defective way of life. For, all along, the neurotic has registered, deep in his personality, that his integration was not authentic. But he has had to depend on it and believe in it, because he has also had a profound unconscious conviction that no solution of his basic conflicts is possible.

In spite of the terrific resistance to change that always characterizes the pseudo-integration, because of the vital function it performs in substituting for true integration, it is, nevertheless, essentially unstable, because of the explosively contradictory tendencies in the basic conflict. (This has been elaborately analyzed by Dr. Karen Horney in *Our Inner Conflicts*.) Hence breakdown is frequently threatened. When such a crisis occurs, the psychiatrist or the religious worker is likely to be called upon desperately. Our analysis reveals that this threat to the pseudo-integration may be an opportunity for a more basic integration than the individual has ever achieved. At this point, the outlook of the helper becomes an important determinant of the future life-course of the person in distress. The helper's individual degree of understanding will determine the kind of solution he strives

to accomplish. What is possible will be strictly limited by the case in hand; often, more or less of a compromise will be the best that can be achieved. But there is ample evidence that many people in trouble are not helped effectively to their maximum potential of integration, freedom, and responsibility, because we helpers do not believe as much as the truth permits in the reconstructive resources in human nature. Our lack of faith is rooted in our insufficient understanding and skill, which in turn are rooted, in part, in our own limited degree of integration, freedom, and responsibility.

PSYCHOTHERAPY AND A CHRISTIAN INTERPRETATION OF HUMAN NATURE

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OUR LAST DISCUSSION has led us unintentionally to basic theological problems. The question came up whether there is a justified as well as an unjustified guilt feeling, a justified as well as an unjustified self-acceptance. We have discussed the problem as to which kind of disease and which kind of anxiety can or should be removed and which should not. I have been asked to explain the answers to these questions given by classical theology. I will try to do it, though with the anxiety which a theologian inescapably develops when he realizes how distorted and unintelligible practically all classical religious concepts have become to the men of our time. The only way to use them in spite of this situation is to relate them to genuine present experiences which can be assumed to be similar to the original experiences out of which the symbols of the classical religious tradition have arisen. Man must be considered under three aspects: first, under the aspect of his created goodness or original innocence; second, under the aspect of the distorted existential situation in which he finds himself actually; third, under the aspect of his rehabilitation through healing or saving powers which he experiences in life and history.

I

The first aspect in which the Jewish-Christian tradition differs markedly from most non-Christian traditions is the idea that man and nature and "being as being" are good in their essential structure *(esse qua esse bonum est)*. The state of man from this aspect can be described as that of "dreaming innocence." It is a state of untested and undecided goodness (expressed in paradise or golden age myths) and, therefore, a state which can be lost. It is, philosophically speaking, a state of mere potentiality and, therefore, not a state at all in terms of a period of the past. But it is something which everybody at every time experiences, the transition from innocence to guilt in his actual existence.

Man, like all creatures, is finite. But man is different from all creatures (as far as we know them) because he has the quality of freedom.

We can define man in his essential and most central structure as "finite freedom." It gives to the state of dreaming innocence an ambiguity which produces basic anxiety in man. Man is anxious to use his freedom, to actualize his potentialities. He is afraid of losing their realization. On the other hand, he is inhibited against using his freedom by the dread of losing himself in this use. Everyone is driven, by the dread of remaining unfulfilled, towards transcending his dreaming innocence; but everyone is, at the same time, afraid of losing his innocence when he imagines the unknown realm of actuality and the dangers connected with it. Created goodness is not perfection but possibility (Goldstein: Man is that being which has "the possibility"). The finitude and anxiety which belong to the state of innocence imply a group of characteristics which are, with different strength, effective in all individuals and cultures. For instance, man's essential loneliness and seclusion, his insecurity and feeling of strangeness, his temporality and melancholy are qualities which are felt even apart from their transformation by guilt. They are the heritage of finitude and are overcome only in the measure in which man participates actually in something infinite. But even then the tension between the infinite and the finite in human nature never completely disappears.

This also refers to disease and death. Both are inescapably connected with finitude. The necessity of dying can be called that germ of disease in man which is dependent on his finitude. But all this does not contradict the essential goodness of human nature. Loneliness and insecurity, strangeness, disease and death, are conquered permanently in the measure in which they are voluntarily accepted as the heritage of all creatures. But they can be accepted only on the basis of an undisrupted unity between man and the infinite ground and *telos* of his being—religiously speaking, God. This unity is given potentially in man's dreaming innocence, actually (though only fragmentarily) in his state of health and salvation.

II

Man actualizes his freedom. Everyone continuously loses his dreaming innocence. He conquers his fear of the unknown realm of actuality and falls into the grip of what he is afraid of: in trespassing on his mere potentiality, he separates himself from his original and immediate unity with the infinite. He tries to become himself like God in magic

knowledge and magic power. He tries to reach infinity, not in subjection to the infinite, but by drawing the infinity into his own finite being. He ceases to accept his finitude, contingency, transitoriness, and with them his anxiety, solitude, and mortality. Thus, the dreaming innocence is lost, man contradicts his own created goodness, he falls under compulsions, self-destructive trends, and despair.

This is what in symbolic language is called "the Fall" or original sin. This almost unusable word points to a universal experience of mankind, namely to man's split within himself, to his separation from and enmity toward other beings, and to the permanent threat of losing the ground and meaning of his life. The "Fall" is not an historical event; it is the permanent and universal transition from innocence to guilt in every human being. The fact that this transition is universal makes it tragic: no individual can escape the participation in universal guilt. But tragic guilt is guilt. Everybody is responsible for it; it is not a natural happening, but we are involved in it with our total personality, and this means with our freedom. Most religions express this feeling. They call our present existence the result of a blinding illusion (India) or of a curse over all mankind (Old Testament) or as blindness on the part of those who are "great" and a curse upon them (Greece). In all these cases the blindness or the curse is regarded not as a mechanical necessity, but as the guilt of not accepting the infinite as infinite.

In this situation the natural anxiety of finitude is transformed into the desperate anxiety of guilt. Now the natural self-relatedness becomes selfishness, the solitude becomes bitter, the strangeness becomes aggressive, the insecurity becomes *Sorge* (being anxious about tomorrow). Disease splits natural and bodily wholeness, and the horror of death cannot be conquered by courage.

This description indicates the implications of separation, although in no human being are these implications always explicit. The main significance of such a description is that it shows the possibility of understanding the same phenomena in man's individual and social life in traditional religions as well as in psychotherapeutic terms. In both cases one point must be emphasized: namely, the difference between tragic guilt and moral failure. Sin is first the former, and only on the basis of "separation" do moral consequences appear. Sin in the moral sense is a consequence and not the basis of sin in the religious

sense. Religious as well as psychiatric healing is dependent on this insight.

III

All religions pronounce a message that there is a healing power in reality. Healing or saving does not mean the removal of our finitude, on the contrary, it means its acceptance. We are healed as finite beings, not from finitude. But we are healed by being reunited with the infinite. The source of this healing power as it is envisaged and symbolized in the different religions cannot be discussed here. But there is something in common in all religions which is especially emphasized in the Jewish-Christian development, namely, that the first act in the process of reunion must come from the infinite towards the finite and not vice versa. The separation cannot be overcome from the side of the finite in its tragic separatedness. All ideas of divine illuminations and incarnations are based on this experience. In Christianity it takes an especially personalistic form: while in the state of innocence we accept ourselves as we are, including all the marks of our finitude; in the state of guilt we can accept ourselves only in terms of an "in spite of." We can accept ourselves only as being accepted in spite of being unacceptable. The first step of healing is always that we realize our situation; the second, that, in spite of this situation, we accept ourselves as being accepted; and the third step, that on the basis of this reunion the splits and compulsions of our separated existence are dissolved.

This is the description of the religious idea of justification by faith, a term which is hardly understandable to theological students and not understandable at all to the majority of people. It must be reinterpreted, and the idea of self-acceptance which has such a significance in psychotherapy can be used for this purpose. But it must be emphasized that neither for religion nor for psycho-therapy is self-acceptance an easy-going process of "forgiving and forgetting." Religion has made this clear in the traditional doctrines of atonement, showing the heavy price which had to be paid and the tremendous toil which was required for our salvation. There is no orthodox doctrine of atonement, and it is good that this is so. The function of all the doctrines of atonement is to overcome the justified guilt-feeling by a self-acceptance which, as the psychotherapist knows, is possible only by going through the depth of suffering (descent into Hell).

We have discussed human nature from the point of view of three aspects. They all are necessary. If one of them is lacking, neither the nature of man nor the nature of disease and healing can be understood adequately. If the doctrine of man's original goodness is lacking, man is identified with his unlimited libido and the despair about life which is its necessary consequence. Then healing in a radical sense is not possible. Freud is right in combining his libido doctrine with his doctrine of the death instinct for individuals and cultures. But he is wrong in saying that this is man's essential nature (instead of his existential distortion). If he were right, Schopenhauer's introduction of Indian ideas to the West would be the last answer to the problem of human nature. Salvation would be annihilation of creaturely existence.

If the doctrine of man's separation and tragic guilt is lacking, no genuine guilt-feeling is possible; tragedy is superstition, and human personal and historical life is a continuous progress towards a state of perfection. For such an attitude personal and racial healing is medical or educational amendment, but not salvation.

If the doctrine of salvation is lacking, no healing is possible. The only possible attitude is the stoic apathy which tries to overcome anxiety by heroism.

Classical Christianity, in emphasizing these three aspects of human nature, is nearer to recent developments in medical psychology than any other attitude in the history of human self-interpretation.

RELIGION AND MEDICINE IN THE CULT OF ASCLEPIUS: A REVIEW ARTICLE*

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THIS BOOK COMMANDS THE ATTENTION of serious students of Greek religion. The first volume provides a valuable instrument of research by bringing together nearly all the ancient literary texts and many of the inscriptions as well that bear on Asclepius. The second volume is a commentary on this great mass of evidence. It reviews ancient and modern opinions and propounds a fresh interpretation of the "essence" of Asclepius and his cult. The erudition of the book and the vigor of its argument will not surprise those who are familiar with the earlier work of Professor Ludwig Edelstein. His dissertation on the Hippocratic Corpus established him at once as a leading figure in Hippocratic research.[1] In the present work he has collaborated with his wife, Dr. Emma J. Edelstein, who is listed as joint-author in both volumes. But, since he assumes final responsibility for the actual writing of the second volume and for all its conclusions, it will be convenient to refer to him throughout this review as "the author."

Judgments on the selection and arrangement of the material in Volume I may be left to philologists.[2] I restrict myself here to the dis-

* *Asclepius.* By EMMA J. EDELSTEIN and LUDWIG EDELSTEIN. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1945. Vol. I: Testimonies, xvii, 470 pp. Vol. II: Interpretation, x, 277 pp. $7.50.

1. Περὶ Ἀέρων *Und Die Sammlung der Hippokratischen Schriften, Problemata* 4 (Berlin, 1931). Noteworthy among his later publications are the article "Hippokrates," in Pauly-Wissowa, *Realenzyklopaedie,* Nachträge, 1290-1344, and a number of papers in the *Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine.*

2. Martin P. Nilsson, in his review of this book, (*Amer. Journal of Philosophy,* LXVII (1947), 215-19, censures the omission of important archeological material. Particularly regrettable, it seems to me, is the omission of the third and fourth stelae of the great Epidaurian Inscription, (the first two stelae are included as T423 in the Testimonies; I shall refer to this inscription hereafter as the "*Iamata*"). However, one of Nilsson's strictures is mistaken: "Of the inscriptions from the Asclepius sanctuary at Lebena (*Inscriptiones Creticae,* I.XVII. 6-31) only one is adduced"; six are actually included in the Testimonies. Professor Ivan M. Linforth, in his review, in *Philos. Rev.* LVI (1947), 210-15, criticizes the unhistorical arrangement of the material and the splitting up of single texts (e.g., the Hymn of Isyllus) into fragments that are scattered in widely separated portions of the Testimonies. Some

cussion of the second volume. At a number of points the author breaks with prevailing views, puts forth his innovations with challenging self-confidence and supports it with heavy documentation. His argument can hardly be ignored. Where it fails to persuade it compels criticism. This is what I must attempt here, since three of its important conclusions leave me unconvinced:

(1) that the original Asclepius was nothing but the physicians' divine patron; at this stage, prior to his adoption at Epidaurus, he was not a healing hero, did not practice incubation, and "had no concern with the sick" (p. 94);

(2) that when Asclepius did go into healing on his own account, his cures differed from those of "all the other healing deities" by following "the pattern of rational and empirical medicine" (p. 101);

(3) that his "philanthropy" ministered to a need neglected by every other agency of classical antiquity, the provision of free entertainment for the indigent sick.

I

By the latter half of the fifth century, perhaps earlier, practicing doctors had come to be called "sons of Asclepius," *Asclepiadae*.[3] How did it happen that Asclepius won for himself this place as the "culture hero" of medicine? The author makes a good case for ascribing this mainly to the influence of the epic. In Homer, Asclepius was the "blameless physician," the father of two heroes who are famous for their medical skill in the *Iliad*. The Hesiodic *Catalogue* popularized the saga of Asclepius as Apollo's son, Chiron's pupil, healer of renown, finally killed by Zeus's thunderbolt when he used his fabulous powers to raise the dead. Those who claimed him as their ancestor, called themselves by his name, and put themselves under his protec-

minor points may be added: The Testimonies are annotated by useful cross-references; but these seem to be incomplete, and the promise in the Preface that "through extensive cross-references attention has been drawn to all passages which may have any bearing on one particular problem" is not fulfilled. Thus, a note on *adyton* in T516 refers to T423.18, but not to (the no less important) T426; prostration as an attitude of prayer in T580 is referred to T584 and T438 (where there is a further reference to T451) but not to T331.131. Incidentally, "cf." should not have been used indiscriminately for reference to (a) different passages and (b) the same passages elsewhere in the book; it is annoying to look up a reference and find time and again that it only refers to the same words printed under a different serial number.

3. T217 ff. And see below, p. 7.

tion would have a religious (and therewith a quasi-juridical) status wherever their wanderings might take them, throughout the length and breadth of the Hellenic world (pp. 60 f.).

If the Asclepius of the legend could thus be put to such practical use by the doctors, would it follow that the legend of Asclepius was itself originally meant to glorify the doctor's calling? So the author seems to reason when he interprets the Hesiodic saga as "a fairy tale which in eternal symbols expresses the mission of the physician (p. 79), and frowns upon those features of the legend that portray Asclepius as an aristocrat or a magician. Our author fancies him instead as one of "the common people," plying his craft and earning his living among them (pp. 45; 52). He discounts Asclepius' part in the Voyage of the Argonauts and in the Calydonian Hunt, as attested only by late (Alexandrian) authorities (p. 38). But there is nothing "late" about the Chiron episode, and Chiron taught young noblemen, Achilles, Jason, and the rest. Xenophon lists Asclepius, as well as Machaon and Podalirius, among those who learned from Chiron "venery and other noble pursuits."[4] Nor is it likely that the aristocratic age of Greece would picture a son of Apollo as anything but an aristocrat. The poems in Hesiod's *Catalogue* in particular "serve the purpose of establishing the genealogies of noble families" (p. 54). Why should the Asclepius tale form an exception?[5] Its inclusion in the *Catalogue* certainly suggests that Asclepius too was claimed at the time as the ancestor of one or more noble clans.[6] This is confirmed by the fact (which our author ignores) that noble Asclepiads are known to exist in the classical period;[7] and it agrees with the princely rank of Asclepius

4. T56; cf. T3 (Appolodorus), "Chiron, the Centaur, by whom he was . . . taught the arts of healing and hunting."

5. The argument that "the myth of Coronis and of the physician Asclepius was hardly the proper genealogy of a proud family" (p. 54, and n. 4) is inconclusive. A hero does not need to have a wise and virtuous mother and a happy end. The myth fulfils its genealogical function if it establishes Asclepius' descent from Apollo and his heroic deeds as a medical wonder-worker.

6. In the face of the well-known cases of the Kerykes, Eumolpidae, etc., I cannot understand how the author can hold that "in Greek history there is no indication that knowledge of any kind was ever restricted to one particular family" (p. 58). On the very next page the author tells us of the Chronidae who "had drugs unknown to others."

7. Cf. R. Herzog, "Die Wunderheilungen von Epidaurus," *Philologus*, Supplement 6, vol. XXII (1931), 147, n. 12: "Die Asklepiaden sind in Kos wie die Herakleiden, mit denen sie sich immer wieder verschwägern, ein Fürstengeschlecht, das

himself and of his two sons in the *Iliad,* a fact which the author tries to explain away (pp. 5 ff.).[8] The existence of noble physicians is, of course, perfectly compatible with the fact that the common run of doctors were men of the people. Diviners and heralds too, as "workers for the people" *(demiourgoi),*[9] were generally commoners. Yet Dolon, the son of a herald, is one of "the leaders and rulers of the Trojans" (*Il.* 10.300 ff.); the seer Melampous and his lineage are nobles (*Od.* 15.225 ff.).

Nor does the author succeed any better in turning the Asclepius of the saga into a "rational" doctor. Asclepius' use of the Gorgon's blood[10] to heal or *to destroy* smacks of the medicine man,[11] and so does the focal feature of the whole legend: his power to raise the dead. To this the author replies that (1) every doctor tried to save people from death's door, and (2) there were doctors in antiquity who actually claimed to revive men who had already died.[12] The first observation is irrelevant; the second rests on worthless evidence. Thus the tale "that Empedocles became famous because he had sent away the dead woman alive" comes from a source which reeks of the supernatural.[13] The most charitable construction one can put on this fable is to think of it (along with the pseudo-Empedoclean fragment 156) as an embroidery on the closing words of Empedocles' fragment 111,

auch in der Politik eine Rolle spielt. Nicht alle Asklepiaden wurden Aerzte, und die (*sc.* ärztliche) Schule nahm auch dem Geschlecht nicht Angehörige auf." (I shall refer hereafter to this admirable study as "Herzog"). The very idea of intermarrying with ordinary medical *demiourgoi* would shock the highborn Greek (cf. Plato, *Gorg.* 512dc).

8. Homer's motives for portraying them as princes are beside the point; all that matters is that the poet sees no contradiction between medicine and princely rank.

9. *Od.* 17.383 ff.; 19.135.

10. T3 (Apollodorus); the author (p. 43, n. 76) compares the representation of the Gorgon in the main temple of Asclepius at Epidaurus.

11. The italicized words, in Apollodorus, mark another point of contrast between Asclepius and secular medicine. Like other gods, Asclepius was the sender of disease (e.g., T396) as well as its healer.

12. P. 45, notes 81 and 82.

13. Heracleides Ponticus *ap.* Diogenes Laertius 8.60-62. The woman was in trance; "for thirty days he kept her (though) breathless and without bodily pulse." After telling this marvel Heracleides tells (*loc. cit.,* 67-68) how Empedocles vanished in the middle of the night, and all that could be seen of him was a "heavenly light and the glitter of torches," whereupon his friends were told that they should "sacrifice to him since he had now become a god."

"Thou shalt bring back from Hades the life of a dead man,"[14] which also promises the iniate powers of rain-making and wind-control. When the ancients referred to these lines they, at least, did not confuse them with "rational" medicine: Satyrus quotes them apropos of Empedocles' powers to perform magic (γοητεύοντι) and "much else besides."[15] Similarly for the second item in our author's evidence, the physician "followers" of the Thracian god-king Zamolxis, "who, it is said, can even give immortality" through their incantations:[16] the less said about them as practitioners of "rational" medicine, the better.[17] The power to confer immortality or to revive the dead had no more to do with the doctor's calling than the medicine-man has to do with medicine.

We can now consider the author's view that, until his elevation to godhead at Epidaurus, Asclepius was nothing more than the doctor's patron. A cult which in classical times flourished in scores of scattered localities, including some of the most backward regions of the mainland and the Peloponnesus such as Thessaly and Arcadia, would be presumed to be of considerable antiquity. This is the general view which, to my knowledge, our author is the first to dispute. We are now asked to believe that there was no such healing-cult until about the end of the sixth century, when, in the author's view, the Epi-

14. See J. Bidez, *La Biographie d' Empédocle* (Ghent, 1894), pp. 24-35, and H. Diels, "Über die Gedichte des Empedokles," *Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Akademie* (1898), pp. 396-415. (Fragments of the pre-Socratics will be cited as in Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, 5th edition, Berlin, 1934-37). Diels' ascription of this fragment to Empedocles' poem *On Nature* (on the presumption that the second person singular refers to Pausanias, son of Anchitus, to whom this poem is addressed) is more than doubtful in view of the parallelism with fragment 112 which is known (Diogenes Laertius 8.62) to belong to the *Purifications*. The promise of supernatural powers in fr. 111 is out of harmony with the naturalistic categories of *On Nature*; the recall of a spirit from Hades only makes sense on the Orphic assumptions of the *Purifications*.

15. *Ap.* Diog. Laert. 8.59. Heracleides (*loc. cit.*, 61) called him "both a physician and a *mantis*" with reference to fr. 112. Cf. also the association of physicians and *manteis* in fr. 146; and see the texts under A13 and A14 in Diels-Kranz. For the notion of the *iatromantis*, see Aeschlyus, *Ag.* 1623. Eum. 62, *Suppl.* 261, and Aristoph., *Plut.* 11.

16. Plato, *Charm.* 156d. That this has nothing to do with *physical* immortality seems clear from Herodotus 4.94.

17. As for Pliny's report about Asclepius of Prusa "who brought back a man *e funere* (burial or funeral?) and preserved his life" (*Nat. Hist.*, 7.124), it may mean anything or nothing.

daurian cult had its origin. When Amphiaraus, Trophonius, Amynus, and the rest, were healing at their respective shrines, Asclepius was only worshipped by the doctors; and if by others, then only as the founder of medicine.[18] Our author's grounds for this view rests mainly on his analysis of the legend. He certainly has no trouble in showing that the legend of the Epidaurian god is substantially the Hesiodic saga, duly expurgated and embellished to fit the ethical notions and political claims of Epidaurus. So he reasons—quite rightly, I think—that the Hesiodic legend was *the* legend of the hero Asclepius. And since he has argued that this legend portrayed no magical healer but an ordinary doctor, he concludes that it could not have been the myth of a healing hero; had there been a healing hero, *his* legend would have followed an altogether different pattern. The argument fails if, as I have tried to show, our author's interpretation of the legend is wrong. The Asclepius of the Hesiodic legend, whose arts could raise the dead, is tailor-made for the cult of a healing hero.

To maintain that there was no such cult, our author would have to fall back on a second line of defense: the fact that Asclepius' grave is not mentioned in early testimonies:[19] a bona fide hero, our author argues, could only have healed at his grave (pp. 50, 92 ff.). But this is inconclusive. In principle, the hero should stick to his grave, but he

18. He does admit, however, that, long before the Epidaurian cult, Asclepius, as son of Arsinoe, was a national hero at Messene (pp. 32, 33 and note 40), whence, the author thinks, Asclepius may have been taken to Arcadia after the second conquest of Messene by Sparta (p. 69, n. 7). If Asclepius was a national hero at Messene and Arcadia, why not elsewhere? At Phocis he enjoyed the cult-title *Archagetas* (T719), but only, the author argues (p. 96, n. 20), as founder of medicine. The proof adduced is the reference to Asclepius in Diodorus 5.74.6 (T355) as "leader (*archegos*) and founder" of medicine. But Diodorus is only parroting the rationalistic theory that divine honors were accorded to the "founders" of the various arts. This view is a typical product of the Ionian enlightenment and no clue at all to the original meaning of a cult-name at Phocis. (Similarly for the phrase "founder of our science" in Sextus [T341].) *Archagetas* in T719 can only refer to a national hero of some sort. The fact that the Phocians had Xanthippus or Phocus as ancestral hero does not prove that they might not have any number of others as well; the Plataeans had seven (Plut., *Arist.* 11).

19. But see Cicero (T379) and Clement (T101). The author argues against the first (p. 50), but rejects the second (p. 93, n. 9) without argument. The evidence, such as it is, hardly warrants the author's flat statement that no tomb of Asclepius was known in early centuries. He is perfectly correct, however, in his contention that none of our texts associates the *cult* of Asclepius with his grave; and this is all that matters here.

may not be so obliging. Aias wanders from the place of his death in the Troad, crosses the Aegean, and returns to his native Salamis.[20] Achilles strikes off to a new settlement far away in the Euxine.[21] Heracles spreads himself all over the Greek world and claims (among so many other things) a virtual monopoly over medical hot springs.[22] We can only tell what a hero can or cannot do by finding out ex post facto what he did. There is no rule to determine a priori that a healing hero could not have practiced incubation, water cures, and other wonders except at his grave or cenotaph. Why should not his cult image make just as good a base of operations?[23]

But even if the author's thesis were conceded *in toto* two further difficulties would remain:

First, we would have to account for the various techniques of religious healing which (on this hypothesis) Epidaurus loaded on the patron of secular medicine when it turned him into a medical miracle-worker. Where did they come from? The author would credit them all to Maleatas, with whom Asclepius is associated at Epidaurus, Tricca, and the Peiraeus. But this source would account for one, and only one, item in the healing-cult: the sacred dogs;[24] and even so, there would be no evidence that the dogs had an iatric function in Maleatas prior to his association with Asclepius. The two most widespread and persistent items in the healing-cult, incubation and the snake[25] can not be explained from this source: there is not one bit of evidence to connect them with Maleatas independently of Asclepius. What we do know is that both incubation and the snake were in fairly

20. Herodotus 8.64. Cf. Wilamowitz, *Glaube der Hellenen,* (Berlin, 1931-32), II, 11.

21. L. R. Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults* (Oxford, 1921), pp. 286-87.

22. Athenaeus 512f; Aristoph., *Nub.* 1051.

23. So, *e.g.,* the hero Pellichus in Lucian, *Philops.* 18 ff.

24. 293 and notes 6 and 7; L. R. Farnell, *Cults of the Greek State* (Oxford, 1907), IV, 235 ff.; F. R. Walton, *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology,* XLVI (1935), 178 ff.

25. The snake is obviously *the* sacred animal of Asclepius; in various instances he appears as actually incarnate in the snake: in T846 (Livy, *Periocha* 11) the Roman envoys bring back from Epidaurus a snake *in quo ipsum numen esse constabat* (cf. T757, and T748 with Herzog's illuminating comment, 37). By contrast, the sacred dogs are only a local feature, being prominent only where Asclepius is connected with Maleatas. Thus, only at Epidaurus is there any recorded instance (*Iamata,* Nos. 20 and 26) of a healing wrought through a sacred dog; and only at the Asclepieion at the Peiraeus (T515) do we know of a sacrifice to the dogs.

general use among the healing-deities.[26] Maleatas too, would very likely have used them, if he too were a healing deity before he joined Asclepius; but that is precisely what we do not know. To derive their known use in Asclepius from their unknown use by Maleatas is to play the game of *ignotum per ignotius.*

Secondly, there is the problem of chronology. The author thinks it "safe to say that Asclepius did not become a god (at Epidaurus) until the end of the sixth century B.C." (p. 98); though Pindar's references to athletic victories at Epidaurus (T556-59) suggest the third rather than the fourth quarter of the sixth century as the latest possible date.[27] Now the earliest reference to the doctors as "Asclepiads" is in Theognis 432-34; and if these lines are not by the Megarian poet but, as the experts think probable,[28] a later interpolation, we would have no definite evidence of Asclepius' vogue as the doctors' patronymic hero prior to the fifth century. We do have evidence, on the other hand, that even in the fifth century Asclepius is by no means the only divine patron of secular medicine. In Pindar, the god of healing is still Paeon (*Pyth.* 4.270), and in Euripides, it is Phoebus who gave the Asclepiads their drugs (*Alc.* 970). The older term for doctors, *Paionii,* is still in use (Soph. *Trach.* 1208), and *Paionion* appears for "hospital" in comedy.[29] Thus the author's assumption that Asclepius was canonized at Epidaurus only after (and because) he had already become the doctors' hero cannot be anchored in evidence. It is only a guess, and not a plausible guess at that.

II

In his treatment of temple-medicine, our author is anxious to clear Asclepius of the charge of fraud and magic. For the first he relies on the fact that the veracity of the god was never seriously challenged in antiquity even by "scientists and philosophers"; except for Lucian's exposure of Alexander,[30] the practitioners of Asclepius "remained free

26. For the snake in Amphiaraus, see Aristoph. fragm. 28 (Kock), and the fourth century relief at Oropos, reproduced as the frontispiece in Herzog. For the snake in Trophonius, Paus. 9.39.3.

27. The author's counter-suggestion that the contests at Epidaurus in Pindar were really dedicated to some other deity (p. 208) is not supported by any evidence.

28. P. 55, n. 5.

29. Crates Comicus 15.3 (Kock).

30. Our author brushes aside this "exception" rather lightly with the remark that "Alexander was unmasked as a charlatan" (p. 160). The fact of the matter is

from all charges of fraud" (p. 160). But this over-simplifies the problem. Between bare-faced fraud, on one hand, and creditable truth, on the other, lie infinite graduations of imaginative distortion of fact in the twilight of religious mystery. Plato defended the "noble" lie as a way of getting across to the masses[31] verities and sanctities whose formal essence was beyond their grasp; and religious myth or ritual was the vehicle of these edifying deceptions. Why may not the priests of Asclepius have felt that they were serving the "deeper truth" of divine healing by various means ranging all the way from suggestion to impersonation?[32] The latter is dramatized with great gusto in the *Plutus*.[33] Our author discounts this as "poetic fantasy and comic license" (p. 146). The fact remains that the idea of the priest's impersonation of the god did not carry the imputation of outright fraud; had it done so, the effect upon the audience would have been not amusement but shock.

The author fails to notice in this connection that the official records at Epidaurus themselves present us with an instance where the actual event is completely different from the concurrent dream. In No. 17 of the *Iamata,* a sore is cured by a snake, while the patient is dreaming that "a youth of beautiful form" put a drug on his sore toe. Since the patient was asleep, the temple attendants were presumably his only source of information as to what actually happened.[34] Is it irreverent

that this unmasking registered only with "sensible men," presumably Epicureans and sceptics like Lucian, and with Christians (par. 25; 38). The mass of the people continued to venerate this "charlatan," and high personages of the Roman court maintained their support. The objectors did so in peril of their life (par. 45; 56). The oracle retained its great renown, the cult continued to flourish at least down to the middle of the third century (as we know from numismatic evidence), and Alexander was still honored as "prophet" after his death (par. 60). Were it not for Lucian's animus, we would never have heard of the "charlatanry" of this particular cult of Asclepius. How many Lucians were there in the ancient world?

31. *Rep.* 414 c *ff.*, 458 e *ff.* Cf. also *Laws* 663de.

32. The Delphic priests who read so deftly their own ideas into the Pythia's ravings doubtless did so without sense of fraudulent design; cf. H. W. Parke, *History of the Delphic Oracle* (Oxford, 1939), p. 37.

33. T421. An exceedingly interesting feature of this story is the fact that the figure which Cario explicitly introduced as a "priest" (l. 676) is nevertheless immediately referred to by the Wife as "the god" (684, and again at 696 and 705); Cario too drops "priest" and speaks of "god" at 723 and thereafter.

34. That the patients themselves expect temple-functionaries to take a hand in the cures is clear from No. 23, where Aristagora dreams that the "sons of the gods" (Herzog [153, n. 25] cfs. *iatroi* in No. 48) in the Asclepieion at Troezen cut off her

to suggest that a priest—acting for the god and perhaps throwing in a snake for good measure[35]—could do as much for a sore toe as a holy snake on its own account? Our author does well to reject the exploded theory that the Asclepieia were nothing but hospitals with religious stage-effects. The atmosphere of the miracle certainly predominated. Yet how explain archeological discoveries of contemporary medical instruments in the Asclepieion at Cos unless some use of them were actually made on the spot?[36] Herzog's researches have shown that the best of contemporary medicine would not even attempt some of the operations (*e.g.*, deep abdominal incisions) which figure in the patients' dreams at Epidaurus. But Herzog's negative conclusions do not exclude the hundred and one things that the priests could do with drugs, traditional or scientific, and even, at times, with instruments.

It is a pity that our author's "historical evaluation of temple medicine" (pp. 158 ff.) is not prefaced by a serious effort to sift out fact from fancy in surviving accounts of the healings. He gives no thought, for example, to what the pilgrims themselves might have contributed by way of imaginative embroidery upon the facts. Such embellishments are scarcely "fraud"; they are shaped not by the priests' will to deceive but the patients' will to believe and, even more, by the universal (and intensely Greek) love of a good story.[37] It is not only the Epidaurian *Iamata*[38] that should be read in this perspective. The reports of the most eminent physicians—Galen and Rufus,[39] for example, whose stories our author finds so completely reassuring[40]—are to be taken with several grains of salt, since none of them bother to identify their sources. Rufus tells us that a certain Teucer of Cyzicus is asked by the

head. In No. 27 the attendants bind the patient to the door knocker while the god operates. In No. 17 itself, the "youth of beautiful form" (cf. the "handsome boy" in No. 31) are no doubt temple-functionaries.

35. In the *Plutus* the priest has both a medicine-chest and snakes at his command; similarly the god in T448, and Amphiaraus in fragm. 28 (Kock, 1.399) of Aristophanes' *Amphiaraus*.

36. Herzog, 148. It is not clear that the author has taken account of this when he says flatly that "there is no evidence whatever that physicians participated in temple healings" (p. 158); cf. also above, p. 9, n. 1.

37. On this see Herzog's excellent remarks, 57 ff.

38. The author concedes (pp. 146 f.) that these are not "the best material that could be hoped for."

39. Rufus, T425 (*ap.* Oribasius); Galen, T459, and cf. also T458 and T436.

40. "Ample proof of the actuality of the dreams and of the effectiveness of the cures" (p. 147).

god whether he would like to exchange his epilepsy for another disease; he consents; "a quartan fever attacks him, and thereafter he is free from epilepsy." Did Rufus get this story first-hand from Teucer, or from others at second or n-th hand? And even if from Teucer himself, was it pinned down immediately after the god's "apparition" at the Asclepieion? Or is it the story that Teucer was telling months or years later, long after he found out that, having caught malaria, he was now was free from epileptic fits? It is obvious that none of these questions can be answered from Rufus' account; he is plainly not interested in such questions. His report is a paragraph from a medical treatise, not from an *Aretalogia* of Asclepius; and it is told "in illustration of the Hippocratic *Aphorisms* that fevers generally relieve spasms, a principle which, according to Rufus, had been successfully utilized in medicine."[41] The Teucer story is picturesque collateral. Rufus believes it, else he would not have repeated it, but there is no evidence that he subjected his source for it to any kind of historical scrutiny. All we can get out of his account is that, given the scientifically accepted fact that quartan fevers will "cure" epilepsy, Rufus was ready to believe that one instance of it occurred under the auspices of Asclepius. Galen's texts are testimonies to his piety rather than to his efforts to arrive at historical truth. They amount to no more than to a believer's willingness to credit his god with the unknown cause of inexplicable cures.

For the difference between the patient's own story of a miracle-cure and its public version, our author might have looked to the first of the *Iamata*. Here, as Herzog has shown, is a key to the *Quellenkritik*. "Cleo carried the burden in her womb for five years, until she slept in the Temple and He made her sound." That is Cleo's account, as inscribed on her votive tablet. Compare this with the official tale on the temple stele: Here the five-year "burden"—*baros,* which Hippocratic medicine diagnosed as a mola—becomes a five-year *pregnancy*. The healing of the "burden" becomes a *birth,* and what a wonderful birth it is, producing forthwith a lusty boy who washes himself at the fountain and walks alongside his mother. It is just such a story as this and not, as the author would have it, the "eighteenth-century" assumption "that God does not exist, or if He exists, that He never interferes in the af-

41. E. T. Withington, "The Asclepiadae and the Priests of Asclepius," in *Studies in the History and Method of Science,* edited by Charles Singer, Oxford, 1921, Vol. II, 203.

fairs of the world" (p. 145), that should caution us against taking at face value any report of Asclepius' cures, even when endorsed by pious physicians. The result surely need not be to write off all the cures as whole-cloth fabrications. If we discount our stories by ninety per cent, the residue could still be a "wonder" to the patient, as the loss of her "burden" obviously was to the good Cleo. There is no a priori reason to believe that Asclepius was any worse at such "wonders" than the Virgin is today at Lourdes, or the Panaghia Evangelistria at Tenos.

Consider now the second of the author's contentions, that the wonders of Asclepius were quite unlike those credited to his ancient confreres in the business of divine healing: "They too cured the sick, but nobody knew how they did it. Their accomplishments were outright witchcraft which could not be checked" (p. 101). Asclepius' miracles, the author would have us think, were "strictly medical miracles" (p. 154); however startling in their effects, they were "rational" in their *modus operandi*; true to Asclepius' reputation as a doctor, they were "fashioned after the human art of medicine" (p. 79). But the records will not bear this out. A case of gout is cured by the bite of a goose;[42] to regain his sight Gaius must "go to the holy base (of the god's statue) and there prostrate himself; then go from the right to the left and place his five fingers on the base and raise his hand and lay it on his own eyes".[43] Neither does the dream imagery always cast the god in the role of a practicing physician. "In dream-apparitions the god cut veins, he operated on his patients, he applied remedies" (p. 101)—yes, so he did, at times. At other times dreams picture him in acts which are shockingly out of line with the practice of secular medicine: he restores paralyzed knees by trampling down the patient with his horses;[44] he induces pregnancy by approaching a woman with a snake which has intercourse with her;[45] he cures an epileptic by the pressure of his ring.[46]

42. *Iamata,* No. 43. Cf. No. 26, where the patient is cured when licked by a sacred dog, and the numerous snake-cures.

43. T438: *I.G.* 14. 966 (Rome, 2nd c. A.D.)

44. *Iamata,* No. 39.

45. *Iamata,* No. 42. In No. 31 pregnancy is induced by "the touch of the hand." Cf. Aeschylus, *Suppl.* 312. For the magical import of this gesture, see *ibid.* 571-73 (Zeus' healing touch is a species of θέλγειν), and generally, T. C. Allbutt, *Greek Medicine in Rome* (London 1921), pp. 33 ff.

46. *Iamata,* No. 62. For the ring as a magical instrument see Herzog, 109-111.

In the light of such facts I cannot see that Asclepius was so different from the other divine healers of his time. Incubation, sacred snakes, holy water,[47] etc., he shared with any number of other gods and heroes. There may have been more hocus pocus in their cult than in his; the difference would be only a matter of degree. He specialized in medical wonders, but there is no good reason to doubt that his rivals also made the most of such medical lore as had percolated into the popular mind. Why should not a client of Amphiaraus or Trophonius dream of being treated by surgery or cautery or salve? A fourth century votive relief from the Amphiaraon at Oropus[48] portrays an astonishingly close parallel to No. 17 of the *Iamata*. On one side we see the dream, the application of a salve by the god; on the other, we see the "real" cure, no doubt concurrent with the dream, by a snake that licks the affiicted part. There is no reason to think such a parallel exceptional. Anyhow, our author's distinction between the "rational methods" of Asclepius and the "hocus pocus" of the other healing deities did not occur to the ancients. The warmest devotees of Asclepius made no such claim for him. Aelius Aristides compares him to Amphiaraus and Trophonius with no suggestion that their "oracles" and "ephiphanies" are less rational than his.[49] I doubt if this pious neurotic would have taken kindly to such a suggestion. His Asclepius is "the great miracleworker" (T409); the stranger the god's prescriptions, the more they thrill him; the signature of his god is the *paradoxon* of the cure.[50]

Facts such as these are too obvious to miss. Our author cannot help acknowledging them in spite of his own thesis, and is then forced into flat self-contradiction. On pages 153-54, he tells us that "the medical treatment which he (Asclepius) gave was in many instances contrary to all human experience and theory"; though a few pages later he is back to his claim that Asclepius "did nothing which did not follow with perfect logic from what people had seen or heard" (pp. 165 f.).

47. For sacred water in Asclepius see e.g., T409, T804, T791: Herzog, 155-56.

48. Herzog reproduces it as the frontispiece to his "Wunderheilungen von Epidaurus" and offers a brilliant commentary, pp. 88-91.

49. The point of the comparison is that they are local (Boeotia), while Asclepius and his sons perform the whole world over. Our author generally discounts the analogy between Asclepius and his Boetian rivals; but he concedes it implicitly in another context (p. 248), by recognizing that Asclepius made little headway in Boeotia precisely because Amphiaraus and Trophonius satisfied the local demand for his product.

50. See especially T317.8, T408, T411a, T417.

When he has to admit that the "rationality of Asclepius' treatment seems strangely interwoven with the fantastic and the unreal" (p. 154), he tries to explain away the difficulty in two ways: First, he believes that Asclepius' dabbling in magic is an occasional lapse that does not compromise his predominantly rational character. Secondly, he holds —and this he argues at length—that ancient standards of rationality were so different from ours, that Asclepius' miracles would not offend their reason. Their concept of natural law, he assures us, "applies only to such phenomena as were within the range of the ordinary; extraordinary events and circumstances were on a different level" (p. 156). This is true enough of most of the *epigoni* of Greek philosophy after the fourth century and of the general public at almost any period of Greek history. But is it also true of the great figures of the Greek enlightenment and of the authors of the Hippocratic treatises in particular? Surely the most interesting question in this connection is whether or not the Hippocratic doctors would have tolerated the notion of divine healing as an act of supernatural interference with natural causality. Here the author stands by the answer he had offered in an earlier monograph on "Greek Medicine in its Relation to Religion and Magic."[51] There he had argued that since some of the Hippocratics identified God with nature, "they as scientists embraced a supernatural dogma,"[52] while other Hippocratic treatises acknowledged "the divine as a factor apart from nature."[53]

This strikes me as a complete misunderstanding of the basic categories which the Hippocratics shared with the pre-Socratic philosophers: Here nothing can "interfere" with nature, for nature is all there is;[54] outside of nature there is nothing. If divinity exists then, so far from being "above" nature, it is fused with the regulative principle of the natural process.[55] Thus the divine is sustained through the very

51. *Bulletin of the Institute of the History of Medicine,* v (1937), 201-46.

52. *Ibid.,* 211.

53. *Ibid.,* 214

54. The common title of the cosmological treatises of the pre-Socratics is *Peri physeos.* (See *s.v.,* in Kranz's Wortindex, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,* 5th edition, Vol. III, 465b; also W. A. Heidel, *"Peri Physeos," Proc. Amer. Acad. of Arts and Sciences,* XLV [1910], 81, notes 10 and 11). For the pre-Socratics whatever is real is subsumed under *physis.*

55. Cf. my "Equality and Justice in Early Greek Cosmologies," *Classical Philology,* XLII (1947), 156-78, notes 153 and 178; and Deichgraeber, "Hymnische Elemente in der philosophischen Prosa der Vorsokratiker," *Philologus,* LXXXVIII (1933), 347-61.

extinction of the supernatural. To say "all things are divine"[56] makes good sense precisely because the terms "divine" and "natural" have the same denotation. But it is nonsense to say that "all things are supernatural," and no Hippocratic writer is guilty of such a semantic monstrosity. To say that "some things are supernatural" would be equally impossible in the Hippocratic universe. Our author reads into the treatise, *On the Sacred Disease,* the view that the divine is "only one factor" in disease, "nature" being another, and concludes: "the two spheres of the divine and of the natural are then fundamentally separate, although their influence is combined in every action."[57] But this is what the text in question actually says: "This so-called sacred disease comes from the same cause as others, from the things that come to and go from the body, from cold, sun, and the winds which are ever changing, never at rest. These things are divine" (*op. cit.,* 21). It would be forcing the text to turn the last sentence into "these things are *the* divine."[58] Neither here nor anywhere else in this treatise is there any suggestion that "the things that come to and go from the body" are more divine than is the body itself. Nothing could be more foreign to Ionian thought than the segregation of the environment as a "divine" sphere from the "natural" sphere of the human organism. How could a Hippocratic treatise think of "cold, sun, and winds" as anything but natural, though divine?[59]

To be sure, it would be a mistake to suppose that this world-view entails an a priori denial of healings through incubation and the other techniques of the Asclepieia. So far the author is perfectly right. But he misses the exact terms on which Ionian naturalism would admit the possibility of such facts. *If* they are facts, it would stipulate, then

56. *On Ancient Medicine,* 22.

57. *Op. cit.,* 213.

58. W. Nestlé, "Hippocratica," *Hermes,* 73 (1938), 3, mistranslates in just this way ("Das ist das Göttliche"), as though the text were, ταῦτα δ'ἐστὶ τὰ Θεῖα.

59. Our author's other attempt to locate "the divine as a factor apart from nature" in Hippocratic treatises is no more successful. He takes "divine" in *Prognostic,* 1 and *On Diseases of Women* (Littré, Vol. VII, 312) to refer to "the spontaneous reactions of the body (*op. cit.,* 214). This interpretation is good enough; but so far from proving his point, it proves the exact opposite. For the Hippocratics spontaneity (*to automaton*) is "nothing but a name without substance" (*On the Art,* 6; cf. *On Nutriment,* 14); i.e., it is not a *vera causa,* independent of natural necessity; so far from being a real "factor apart from nature" it denotes nothing but natural necessity itself when the cause is unknown and/or independent of human art. For natural necessity as "divine" see Euripides, *Troad.* 886.

they are *natural* facts, and therefore subject to natural necessity. The perfect example of this position is Democritus. His theory of the *eidola* shows how far Ionian rationalism might go in acknowledging the possibility of such things as prophetic dreams, telepathy, and the "evil eye," yet do so along strictly naturalistic lines.[60] The virtuosity of his theory lies precisely in its power to bring the best show-pieces of magic down to the prosaic level of the natural nexus. Explaining these phenomena by mechanical impact, Democritus explains away their supernatural origin and value. If the prophetic dream occurs when one atomic cluster (the dream-*eidolon*) hits another atomic cluster (the dreamer's soul), then the result cannot be an "apparition," "monster," "miracle," or "portent"[61] in any sense that would serve the uses of traditional piety. If the dream is an "apparition,"[62] it is no more so than any visual sense-datum is an "apparition" of a material object.[63]

For the worshipper of Asclepius, on the other hand, the dream is an "apparition" in just the traditional sense.[64] The heart of incubation is

60. Democritus A77-A79, A136-A137, B166; and cf. my "Ethics and Physics in Democritus," *Philos. Rev.*, XLIV (1945), 581, n. 24. That the *eidola* are atomic clusters and are thus subject to the laws of the atoms and the void is perfectly clear. What is not clear in our sources is the exact mechanism by which these *eidola* give rise to precognition. Here are our best clues to what Democritus' theory probably was:

(1) A77 (Plutarch, *Moralia* 735a) tells us that the *eidola* may "communicate to the recipients the opinions, thoughts, and impulses of their senders"; transmitting a person's intentions, they would so far permit prediction of his future actions.

(2) Democritus' theory of augury (A138 [Cicero, *de div.* 1.57.131]) assumes that the long range effects of present atmospheric conditions may be read off from their immediate effects on the vital organs of animals. Since atmospheric factors have an even more immediate effect on the *eidola* (A77), the state of the latter might enable one to predict whether the coming season would be salubrious or pestilential.

61. φάσμα (or φάντασμα), τέρας, θαῦμα, σημεῖον, the traditional terms for any natural event which is an "appearance" of (normally hidden) supernatural powers. Thus Odysseus, praying for a "sign" from Zeus, says, Διὸς τέρας φανήτω (*Od.* 3.173); in Pindar, *Ol.* 8.41-43, the τέρας of the three snakes is a φάσμα κρονίδα.

62. φάσμα, Epicurus, *De Rerum Natura*, 11.8; φαντασμός, Epicurus, *Ep. ad Hdt.*, 51.

63. Most interesting in this connection is the atomistic use of *eidolon* ("phantom" as well as "image" in Greek usage since Homer) as a technical term for the physical stimulus in vision. One could hardly debunk the belief in ghosts more effectively than by explaining *all* visions through such "spectral" effluences.

64. The common name for chronicles of the "manifestations" of the power of various deities in Hellenistic times is *"Epiphaneiai."* For the references see Herzog, 49. In the *Iamata* the common term is ὄψις; but note ἐπιφανέντα τὸν θεόν in No. 3, παρουσίαν τὰν αὐτο[ῦ π]αρενεφάνιξε ὁ Ἀσκλαπιός in No. 25, ὄψις ἐφάνη in No. 9,

the belief that a supernatural being, ghost or god, can "stand by"[65] in the dream. This is *the* miracle of incubation. If this can happen, anything can happen. If the god chooses to "stand by" the dreamer, he may choose to turn the dream itself into waking reality. So it happened to Bellerophon through the power of Athena Hippia,[66] and so it happens time and again through the power of Asclepius to his suppliants.[67] Alternatively, the god may not choose to appear in the dream; but whatever vision he may send, the effect is a "healing of Asclepius," though the cure may seem to follow by perfectly natural means.[68] Nor is the mechanism of incubation essential in every case.[69] Why should the god's power be limited to this particular channel? Even less is the god bound by any one role, like that of the physician, which is indeed his favorite. He can act as well the part of the magician,[70] restore a broken cup,[71] recover hidden treasure,[72] or regulate the weather for ships at sea.[73] He is an all-around wonder-worker, and he is this just because he is a traditional god, who can play fast and loose with the

ἔφανεν in No. 47. For an instance of ἐπιφαίνεσθαι with this distinctive sense earlier than those noted in Herzog or in Liddell and Scott, *s.v.*, see Herodotus 3.27.3.

65. ἐφίσταμαι *e.g.* of Patroclus' ghost, *Iliad* 23.106; cf. Asclepius in Nos. 4, 7, 8, 46, 67 of the *Iamata, et passim* in other texts: ὁ θεὸς ἐπιστάς becomes the conventional formula for the *parousia* of Asclepius in the dream. Cf. also παρίσταμαι, T456, and ὑπερίσταμαι, *Iliad* 23.68 and Herodotus 7.17.1.

66. Pindar, *Ol.* 13.66-77. Pindar's phrase ἐξ ὀνείρου δ'αὐτίκα | ἦν ὕπαρ is repeated almost verbatim in T444, the story about the poetess Anyte in Paus. 10.38.13.

67. E.g., Nos. 13, 14, 30 of the *Iamata,* and passim.

68. So, e.g., No. 14 of the *Iamata*: a stone in the membrum is ejected in a nocturnal emission, the patient dreaming not of Asclepius but of "a fair boy"; nevertheless, it is duly listed among the Ἰάματα τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος καὶ τοῦ Ἀσκλαπιοῦ.

69. E.g., Nos. 5 and 16 of the *Iamata* which like No. 14, could have happened just as well in the patient's home as in the Asclepieion, and without the slightest association of the result with Asclepius or any other diety. Intermediate cases are those healings by sacred animals (e.g., Nos. 20, 26, 33, 43) which have nothing to do with incubation but are nevertheless obviously miraculous.

70. Just six of the testimonies are listed are the heading "The Magician." The principle of the classification is obscure. Why is the papyrus on Asclepius-Imouthes (T331) here rather than under the medical Epiphanies?

71. No. 10 of the *Iamata.*

72. No. 46 of the *Iamata.*

73. T282, T317, T331.214-15, and No. 56 of the *Iamata.* It is significant that, as our author notes (p. 250), "many of the early temples were situated in harbors or in coastal towns." Equally significant is Aristides' expression (in T317.10): "when they were at sea and in the midst of a storm, the god appeared to them and *stretched out his* hand"; the identical expression is used of medical miracles (e.g., T448, T456, and see above P. 13, n. 2.).

natural limits of the possible and the necessary. This is the true picture of Asclepius, the Epidaurian god, as it is also the true picture of Asclepius, the hero of the Hesiodic legend. Neither figure can be forced into the straight-jacket of the "ideal physician." It is an inversion of the facts to say, for example, that Asclepius was a *mantis* only because *mantike* was "the physician's birthright" (p. 104). The doctor's prognoses follow a method whose principles are rational and empirical, however clumsily and fancifully applied.[74] Those of Asclepius are intrinsically non-empircal and non-rational; and his medical predictions are a sub-species of his general powers of divination[75] which are the prerogative of supernatural beings.

Thus Hippocratic medicine and Asclepius' cures are polar opposites *in principle*.[76] The first is *techne*: it is based on the confidence that the knowledge of the order of nature points the way to its orderly control.[77] The second is the renunciation of *techne*. Man turns to Asclepius when he "despairs of mortal skill"[78] and throws himself upon the mercy[79] of a superior power that is unlimited by natural *ananke*. The hope for miracles begins where the belief in the intelligible order of nature ends. That priests and doctors nevertheless managed to get along quite comfortably together need not cause surprise. The Greco-Roman world was well accustomed to such marriages of convenience.

74. There is no evidence to support the author's earlier claim (*Problemata*, 4 [1931], 84) that "many doctors tried to arouse the impression that they owed their knowledge to superhuman divination." References to divination in the Hippocratic treatises are critical and contemptuous (*On Acute Diseases*, 8; *Prorrhetic*, II, 1; *Regimen IV*, 87; *Diseases of Girls*).

75. They were so considered in antiquity; T366 (cf. fragm. 116 of Apollodorus Atheniensis *ap.* T301); note the terms χρησματίζειν (T438) and πρόρρησις (T317.6) of Asclepius' miracle-cures, and χρηστήρια (T710) of the Asclepieia.

76. This was obvious both to Asclepius' devotees, like Aelius Aristides, who gloried in the difference between the way of his god and those of the doctors and, at the other extreme, to critical minds who saw that incubation undercuts not only medicine but every other art as well: "if remedies of illness were so given," then navigation, writing, readings, etc. would be so given, T416 (Cicero, *de Div.* 2.59.123).

77. Cf. *On Sacred Disease* 21: the confidence that man need not be hopeless or helpless in the face of any disease (οὐδὲν ἄπορόν ἐότιν οὐδὲ ἀμήχανον) is predicted upon the belief that all disease is *natural*: "each has a nature and power of its own. . . . Most are cured by means of the very same things that caused them" (cf. *ibid.* 5, ἀλλὰ φύσιν ἔχει... καὶ πρόφασιν... καὶ ἰητὸν εἶναι).

78. T 404 (Thank-offering to Asclepius by Aeschines the Rhetor).

79. The common term for the clients of Asclepius in the *Iamata*, is *hiketes*, "suppliant."

Cicero knew that divination was sheer superstition, yet was himself an augur; in the very treatise in which he refutes augury he upholds its practice *ad opinionem vulgi et ad magnas utilitates rei publicae* (*de Div.*, 2.33.70). If an Epicurean could hold priestly office,[80] so might a follower of Hippocrates serve as priest of Asclepius in the state cult. What searchings of heart and scruples of conscience this symbiosis might entail, we do not know. Towards Asclepius the Hippocratic corpus keeps a studied silence.[81] Its attacks are confined to individual "magicians, purifiers, charlatans and quacks" who had no official status in the public cult.[82] The temple authorities, on their side, would be glad enough to get the support of the doctors whenever they could, as they apparently did at Cos.[83] They could also import into their stock-in-trade drugs or instruments from current medicine without abating in the least their claims for the god's miraculous powers: *materiae medicae* that would be useless in the hands of mortal doctors might accomplish wonders when administered by the "true" physician. The one thing the priests did not and could not import from secular medicine was the Hippocratic world-view. Its naturalistic aetiology would "fritter away"[84] the faith of the devout. Hence Asclepius' known hostility for the Epicureans,[85] who had turned into militant dogma the

80. So, e.g., Hermon in Lucian, *Symp.* 9.

81. Except, of course, for the reference to Asclepius in the Oath. The only treatise which enjoins prayer to the gods (*Regimen* IV, 89 and 90) mentions Helius, Zeus, Athena, Hermes, Apollo, Ge, and "heroes," but not Asclepius.

82. *On Sacred Disease*, 2. That they had no official place in the public shrines seems clear from *ibid.*, 4, "they [the purifiers] should have brought them [the sick] to the sanctuaries. . . . As it is, however, they do nothing of the kind, but merely purify them." Plato too makes a sharp distinction between the "charlatan" purifiers (*Rep.* 364b and e) and the public cult.

83. So Herzog, 147 ff. There is no discussion of this interesting point in the present volume.

84. So Plutarch (*Nic.*, 23) describes the effect of the teachings of the *physiologoi* on the masses. Our author tells us (p. 161) that Asclepius' cures did not require faith. This is a mistake. In Stele A of the *Iamata* four (five, if one includes No. 11) out of twenty miracles had to do with the discomfiture of the sceptic. What the author means to tell us, I suppose, is that faith is not regarded here as the *creative agency* of the cure. There is no parallel in Asclepius to "thy faith hath made thee whole"; the creative power rests entirely with the god. But the patient is normally expected to acknowledge this power. The miracle-cure itself may be the means of eliciting the acknowledgment from the doubting Thomas (as in Nos. 3 and 4 of the *Iamata*).

85. T399 (Aelian); Lucian, *Alexander*, 46.

naturalism of pre-Socratic inquiry. Their denial of the power of the gods to over-rule natural causes made them "atheists" in the eyes of Asclepius. Aelian's story of the priest's prescription to the Epicurean epitomizes this attitude: if the man wants to get well, he must burn the book of Epicurus, and make a plaster of the ashes.

III

We can now deal briefly with the author's view that "in many instances" the priests gave free board and medical care to suppliants who were too poor to pay their way for an extended therapy at an Asclepieion (p. 177). This rests on two grounds: (1) the god's reputation for "philanthropy", and (2) the existence of temple-hostels where pilgrims could put up. Neither warrants the conclusion.

Asclepius had no monopoly on the divine (and human) virtue of "love for men." The same compliment is made to a number of other deities.[86] The claim that Asclepius had any special concern for the poor (p. 175) rests on a single sentence in Aelian: "Asclepius may heal Pauson and Iros [notorious beggars] and any other of the poor people" (T406).[87] Much is made of Asclepius' willingness to take small offerings, the cock in particular; this is said to be "an extraordinary attitude" (p. 189). Whatever "extraordinary" may mean here, it cannot mean "unique", for it is only the old Hesiodic maxim (*Op.* 336), "sacrifice according to your means." To charge what the traffic will bear is a sensible practice and hardly peculiar to Asclepius. His rival, Amphiaraus, ruled at Oropus that "each may sacrifice whatever he wishes."[88] This was the general practice of gods and heroes, barring, of course, special predilections and tabus: "the farmer [sacrifices] an ox

86. Eros and Hermes respectively are termed "most philanthropic" of deities in Plato, *Symp.* 189ce, and Ar., Peace 392. Prometheus is *philantropos* (Aesch., *P.V.* 11 and 28), and so is Cronus (Pl., *Laws* 713d), and the gods generally (Plut., *Num.* 4).

87. The author also refers to Artemidorus, *Onirocritics,* 2.34 (T259). This says that it is a good omen when poor people dream of "terrestrial gods," such as Hecate, Pan, Ephialtes, and Asclepius. I cannot see how this fanciful principle of dream-interpretation warrants the author's conclusion that "as a terrestrial god, he (Asclepius) was by nature the god of the destitute" (p. 176). Was Hecate also "by nature the god of the destitute"? The full paragraph which Artemidorus devotes to Asclepius (2.37 = T451) says nothing whatever about this alleged relation to the "destitute."

88. Inscription at the Amphiaraon of Oropus (4th century B.C.). Walamowitz, *Hermes* 21 (1886), 92, lines 30-31.

from the plough, the shepherd a lamb, the goatherd a goat, someone else incense and cake; the poor man, however, propitiates the god by just kissing his own right hand."[89] A kiss is even cheaper than a cock. The author is carried away by his own enthusiasm for his god when he takes at face value Julian's remark that Asclepius expects "no reward" for his cures (p. 113). Nilsson comments drily: "The inscriptions from Epidaurus tell another story."[90]

Hostels for the entertainment of pilgrims must have been a fairly widespread institution of Greek religion. They are attested at least as far back as the fifth century.[91] That the Asclepieia had their share of them is a reasonable assumption, and it is confirmed by the evidence, such as it is.[92] But what reason is there to think that such hostels would give free entertainment to poor people? None, except the blank cheque on the aforesaid "philanthropy" of Asclepius. Yet for over seven centuries this philanthropy had failed to meet one of the most urgent needs of the place: "The Epidaurians about the sanctuary were in great distress, because their women were not allowed to bring forth under shelter, and their sick were obliged to die under the open sky."[93] This was due, of course, to the ceremonial uncleanness of death and birth. But there was nothing in the tabu against the erection of special quarters where "a man may die and a woman give birth without sin", yet this had to await the generosity of a Roman senator in Pausanias' time. Of the theological inspiration of this deed we know nothing, but its date is significant. Bolkenstein's studies[94] have established the fact that the critical change in the ancient concept (and practice) of *philan-*

89. Lucian, *de Sacrif.* 12. Neither is the idea that the gods care more for the attitude of the giver than for the cost of the gift peculiar to Asclepius; the Delphic sponsorship of this idea is probably as early as the sixth century; see H. W. Parke, *History of the Delphic Oracle* (Oxford, 1939), pp. 392 f.

90. In his review, cited above, p. 1, n. 3. The assurances of a pious author like Aelian, that "never would the gods demand money for health, nor would they even accept it" (T455 and T320) can scarcely be taken at face-value. In the same passage Aelian goes on to say that though the gods don't work for money, they do expect us to show our gratitude by way of such "little things" as thank-offerings. Given a wealthy client, like Phalysius, these "little things" might run as high as 2,000 gold staters (T444).

91. Thuc. 3.68.3.

92. P. 176, n. 13.

93. T739 = Paus. 2.27.6.

94. *Wohlätigkeit und Armenpflege im Vorchrislichen Alertum* (Utrecht, 1939) —a most important work.

thropia, from its classical sense of "love for men" to its later sense of "concern for the poor," came during the later Empire. It was the times —the growing impoverishment of the masses, the increasing attention of Roman rulers to state measures of poor relief, and, I would add, the competition with the Christian communities, preaching a new doctrine of solidarity and implementing it by well-organized charities[95]—that turned pilgrim-hostels in pagan temples into alms-houses and hospitals. What, if anything, Asclepius contributed to this change we do not know.

IV

This review, in spite of its inordinate length, is anything but complete, and may not leave the reader with a just impression of the many-sidedness of this important work. It cannot even begin to notice the last third of the book, which discusses the cult, image, and temples of Asclepius. For many shrewd and enlightening observations on these and other topics the reader is referred to the book. Here I have kept deliberately to the examination of three important theses which, if true, would compel a thoroughgoing revision of our present idea of Asclepius. All three are determined by the author's assumption that Asclepius is nothing more than a divine physician, and that his religion consequently symbolizes the rationality and "philanthropy" of Greek medicine. I believe that this assumption is mistaken, and I have tried to explain why.

95. This seems to me the one serious omission in Bolkenstein's discussion. It is not enough to show, as he does (pp. 414-17), that Christian charity derives historically from the Jewish *Kirchenstaat.* One must also see that, in intensity of feeling and in range of its organized application, the teaching and practice of charity in the Christian communities had a shattering effect on pagan sensibilities and institutions, an effect which the synagogues could not have rivalled.

Le dualisme dans l'histoire de la philosophie et des religions. Introduction à l'étude du dualisme platonicien, du Gnosticisme et du Manichéisme. By SIMONE PÉTREMENT. Paris: Librairie Gallimard, 1946. 127 pp. 85 fr.

Le dualisme chez Platon, les Gnostiques et les Manichéens. By SIMONE PÉTREMENT. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1947. 354 pp. 350 fr.

Mlle. Pétrement is a brilliant pupil of Alain, Bréhier, Lavelle, and Puech. One who reads only the first of these two works, which will hereafter be referred to as the *Introduction,* may get the impression that her brilliance arises from improvisation and a Chestertonian facility for inventing paradoxes. But such an unfortunate impression would quickly be dispelled by a reading of the second and larger work, which would show that the author is not only brilliant and original but also impressively learned and for the most part sound.

Though many readers may, like the reviewer, find it impossible to accept all her conclusions (which, to her credit, she describes as "hypotheses"), they will probably be grateful to her for stimulation and instruction. My own reaction is a mixture of envy and relief—envy of her priority of publication in a field where I have independently come to some of the same conclusions, and relief that someone else has taken the risks of publicly expressing somewhat unconventional views. It is only fair to add that, in my opinion, Mlle. Pétrement has shown more imagination and skill in tracing the origins of Gnosticism than most of her predecessors in this field.

Since the smaller and earlier volume is not only *une oeuvre de vulgarisation* but is also designed to be an introduction to the documented study, the present review will concern itself chiefly with the arguments presented in the *Introduction.*

In chapter I, on Religious Dualism, we are told that dualism in religion is not necessarily the belief in two gods, one good and the other evil, equal and opposed, whose conflict produces the history of the world. It is something more general; it is the belief in two principles, of which one is ordinarily regarded as divine. The dualistic Manichaeans, for example, never give the name of God to the evil principle (p. 9). This point seems to me slightly labored, since, for all

practical purposes, the King of Darkness, as the Manichaean evil principle is sometimes called, has at times as much power as the principle of light.

> The transcendence of the divine is already a separation of God from a different principle. It is already a certain dualism to oppose God to the world, the spiritual to the temporal, heaven to earth, grace to nature (p. 13).
>
> There is a dualism exterior to the world, consisting in the transcendence of the divine world and in the existence of this world, which in the history of Gnosticism preceded the dualism internal to the world, that is, the division of the world into two substances issuing from two different principles (p. 15).

On this see below.

In the Zoroastrian conception of the *Cinvat* bridge, to which the soul comes after death, the author finds evidence "better than any direct affirmation that for the author of the Gathas, who is perhaps Zoroaster, there are two worlds separated by an abyss" (p. 19). In a footnote she adds that this "bridge of separation" is connected with the idea of the separation of the good and the evil, and not of the separation of the two worlds. One would like some further discussion to resolve what seems like a contradiction. There is no further clarification of this point even in the more extended passage on Zoroastrianism in the second volume (pp. 315-27).

"It is therefore possible that in every religion where the divine is transcendent above the world, there is at least a germ of dualism" (p. 21). See below on p. 73. "For just as there is no perfect dualism, so there is not, it seems, any perfect monism" (p. 26).

Chapter II deals with Philosophic Dualism. It begins with a brief survey of varieties of dualism in philosophy and science, such as the opposition of the ideal and the sensible in Platonism, noumenon and phenomenon in Kantianism, automatism and freedom, tension and relaxation, and the like.

> There are many forms of dualism. But this diversity is perhaps only apparent. It is obvious that all these dualisms are interconnected, so that they perhaps form only a single dualism in reality. When a philosopher is a dualist on one point, he is usually a dualist on all points, and if he a monist on one question, he is a monist on all (p. 32).

This qualified generalization is followed by an ambitious characterization of the history of philosophical tradition. "Just as Plato, Des-

cartes and Kant are dualists on all these points, philosophers like Aristotle, Leibniz and Hegel are much more monistic than their teachers, and tend in each of these domains to return to unity" (p. 32). On this dichotomy I do not feel competent to pass judgment, but my confidence in the soundness of Mlle. Pétrement's classification is weakened by the fact that she seems to contradict herself in another passage (p. 108), where she says, "It is not Descartes himself who arrives at the rigorous dualism of principles but his enthusiastic disciple Régis . . . , and perhaps one must also regard as a development of Cartesianism the speculation of Bayle, another Cartesian, so favorable to Manichaeism." In the first passage she says that certain philosophers are more dualistic than their disciples; in the second, she says that they are less so. Here again one would like more detailed discussion to remove seeming inconsistencies.

Her rather too neat scheme is somewhat modified by the admission, "One can never say that a philosophy is monistic or dualistic. All that one can say—and this at least can hardly be denied—is the Plato is more dualistic than Aristotle, Descartes more than Spinoza or Leibniz, Kant more than Fichte or Hegel" (p. 34).

The Place of Dualism in the History of Philosophy is the subject of chapter III, in which the author, with magnificent courage, makes further daring pronouncements. "Philosophical dualism at its highest degree is always found at the beginning (of a tradition). It gradually becomes weaker and weaker. It accompanies philosophy at its birth and youth. It recedes in proportion as it grows old" (p. 36). But this is true only if each set of monists begins a new period in philosophy. And can one apply the concepts of birth and old age to such brief intervals as those between Plato and Aristotle or between Kant and Hegel?

Equally paradoxical but more appealing perhaps is her thesis that there is more unity in dualists like Plato, Descartes, and Kant than in monistic philosophers, because the dualists "seize the diversity of external things in their own unity" (p. 40). She adds, however, that this view is impossible to prove.

For the student of Gnosticism there are especially interesting observations in chapter IV, on The Place of Dualism in the History of Religion, and in the following chapters. The author recognizes, as have an increasing number of scholars in recent years, that there are

Gnostic tendencies in the earliest Christian writers. "The earliest of all, Saint Paul, is also the one in whom these traits are most marked" (p. 45). Experts in Indian philosophy will have to decide whether she is right in saying that, in Buddhism, "Mahayana represents the moment when dualistic pessimism, as in Saint Paul, becomes by its very excess an optimism" (p. 55).

But when it comes to distinguishing later and more sophisticated forms of religious and ethical dualism from what is commonly supposed to be their primitive forms, Mlle. Pétrement seems to be too intent upon making her points, undeterred by any urgent feeling of the necessity of working out the still troublesome problem of the essential differences between primitive thought and literate thought. (Incidentally, it has been reported, I do not know how accurately, that toward the end of his life Lévy-Bruhl courageously abandoned or drastically modified his lifelong belief in the pre-logical character of primitive thought.)

Mlle. Pétrement holds that while most mythologies recognize distinct good and evil forces, they do not recognize two principles of good and evil (p. 64). This seems to me a doubtful assumption. If we suppose (as most anthropologists do in practice, though they warn against the theoretical dangers of identifying the psychology of primitive men with that of modern savages) that preliterate societies had elaborate systems of clan and family classification, why should they not have been able to conceive of good and evil as general principles?

More helpful, I think, though not unassailable is her view that the opposition of cosmic forces is surmounted in so-called primitive religions (though this view, incidentally, suggests that she recognizes the existence of principles of good and evil in primitive thought).

> Just as dualism is not necessarily ditheism, so ditheism is not necessarily dualism, nor is polytheism pluralism. One must distinguish these two series: monism, dualism, pluralism on the one hand, and on the other hand, monotheism, ditheism, polytheism. They are not equivalent. In the first, it is a question of principles, in the second, of gods. The first is obviously more philosophical than the second, and that is why in religions which are hardly philosophical, religions which consist wholly in stories freely told concerning particular phenomena or in practices, dualism is relatively rare, and we are never sure of finding it (p. 69).

But, one might add, we are never sure of not finding it.

The author is probably right in saying that Zoroastrianism was not a primitive religion but the reformation of a primitive religion (pp. 69-70). It is less certain whether this was the reason why the opposed principles of light and darkness were of unequal power. At any rate, it is important to note her further qualification that "Mazdaean monotheism, which was dualistic, never became monistic, or, if it did yield to monism, it was at the same time that Mazda yielded to Zervan, infinite time" (p. 73).

Chapter V, on Some Characteristics of Dualism, discusses the following statements: (1) dualism is on the whole more subjective than monism; (2) dualism is largely negative and critical; (3) dualism is in a sense a search for salvation and for deliverance from error; (4) when salvation has been found, it is regarded as something new and unknown, a change of direction or method.

In chapter VI, on The Meaning of Dualism, Mlle. Pétrement makes some pentrating remarks:

> Plato's doctrine of the One and the Dyad does not mean that the One is above all dualities but that there remains a certain irreducible duality beside the One (p. 86).
>
> Dualism is not the rejection of unity just for fun (*par plaisir*). . . . The dualist seeks unity perhaps more ardently than anyone else. Unity is necessarily unachieved because the action of the subject is inseparable from thought. That is why dualistic philosophies have a more subjective character than monistic philosophies (pp. 88-89).

But this seems to be contradicted by what the author says at the beginning of chapter VII, on Dualist Doctrine, namely that "All thinking presupposes a division, but the dualist is he who takes cognizance of this condition and recognizes it but does not wish to efface it" (p. 92). Perhaps the reviewer is not the only reader who finds himself alternately applauding the subtlety and insight of the author and deploring her tendency to follow up one brilliant generalization with another that contradicts it.

In chapter VIII, she sketches the Two Stages of This Doctrine. "The dualism of the principles of good and evil is never separated from that of the transcendent and the sensible, of spirit and matter" (p. 102). This thesis is illustrated, according to Mlle. Pétrement, by Manichaean doctrine in which the opposition between light and darkness, between knowledge and ignorance, is said to be prior to that between good and

evil. But this priority is not attested by the Manichaean sources which she quotes in her larger work (pp. 200-1). In these sources the opposition between good and evil is mentioned together with that between light and darkness. This much, however, may be granted, that the Manichaeans seem to stress the opposition of light and darkness more than that of good and evil. The further question arises whether this is a matter of doctrine or merely of terminology. But one should appreciate the justness of her remark that in Gnosticism the ruler of this world "is not so much evil as ignorant or blind; it is naked force, pure destiny, pure necessity" (p. 105). In this connection I should like to commend her admirable discussion of the proto-Gnostic concept of Necessity in the later writings of Plato, which is to be found in the larger volume (pp. 39-41).

Of several examples of her facility in formulating paradoxes in the manner of Chesterton (whom she mentions with apparent approval in one or two places), one of the most successful appears in the last chapter, on The Two Levels of Dualism, where she writes, "In another sense dualism is perhaps the only theism, for the 'God who is not' is perhaps the only God" (p. 120, note).

This has been a difficult review to write because of the shifting character of the author's undeniable brilliance. She is one of those gifted scholars whose errors or half-truths are often more illuminating than the more solid but duller truths of less ambitious scholars. I must also say once again that the *Introduction* should not be judged wholly apart from her larger work on the subject of dualism, which contains a wealth of well selected and well ordered source-material and excellent discussions of recent scholarly literature. Both books should be read by every student of Gnosticism especially.

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Apotheosis in Ancient Portraiture. By H. P. L'ORANGE. (Instituttet for sammenlignende Kulturforskning, Oslo, Ser.B, xliv.) Oslo: H. Aschehoug & Co.; Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard University Press, 1947. 156 pp. 97 illustrations. N.Kr. 25.

Professor H. P. L'Orange, of the University of Oslo, is one of the students of art who is constantly aware of its religious implications,

and in his field, the art of Late Antiquity, these are of pre-eminent importance. I shall mention only two of the earlier papers in which he deals with such matters. In "Sol invictus imperator" (*Symbolae Osloenses,* 1935), he takes up the gesture of the raised right hand from which magical power seems to emanate. From the time of the dynasty of the Severi, whose relations to the Syrian sun-cult are well known, this gesture appears on Roman coins representing the sun god or the emperor. The emperor is equated to the sun god; he is *Kosmokrater.* In another paper, "Domus aurea—Der Sonnenpalast" (*Ibid.,* 1942) Professor L'Orange makes the bold assumption that the circular dining room in Nero's palace, which, like the world, revolved day and night (Suetonius, *Nero.* 31), was intended to be an image of the world over which the sun emperor ruled. The idea is an oriental one, and he refers to descriptions, in Cedrenus and various medieval sources, of the throne room of the Sassanian kings which was constructed according to a similar idea.

His monumental work, *Der Spätantike Bilderschmuck des Konstantinsbogens* (1939), contains excellent plates and is much more important. The central theme is the sun symbolism, to which the older reliefs were adapted. It is not true that the inscription on the arch, *instinctu divinitatis,* was chosen by the Senate, as has been said, to avoid hurting Constantine's Christian feelings. The emperor had always been associated with the sun god and with Victoria. The *divinitas* was the protector of the empire,*Sol invictus aeternus Augustus,* the sun god, and the emperor took over the rule of the universe from him. Under Constantine's son, Constantius, the same symbolism continued; but Christianity transformed it, subordinating the cosmic powers to Christ. These comments may interest the reader, dealing, as they do, with one of the prevailing ideas of late paganism and revealing its important connection with the autocratic status of the Roman emperor.

The present book, treating another aspect of the divinity of rulers—the expression given their faces, their heavenward gaze—begins with references to various passages about rulers inspired by gods (to which I might add the myth that Minos received his laws from Zeus). The author says rightly, "it was not mere chance that the inspired type, which was to dominate the representations of antique rulers, should have originated with Alexander." For Alexander the Great was per-

suaded of his divine mission. His heavenward gaze is alluded to in literature and can be met with in an almost unlimited number of sculptures, coins, etc. After his death, his portrait was glorified in various apotheoses, and he was idealized so as to resemble a god. The long hair rising above the forehead is characteristic of him, and Professor L'Orange thinks that he was equated to the sun god.

This type of representation was initiated by the Hellenistic rulers (Professor L'Orange calls it the Hellenistic Savior-type) and invaded Rome. It is found on coin portraits of Scipio Africanus, the younger, who according to tradition conversed with Jupiter in his temple. During the Imperial Age, when conflict arose between the cultural heritage of Rome and that of the Hellenistic kingdoms, it became more prominent. This is shown in the portraits of some of the emperors. Nero's portrait was transformed after the breach with the Senate in A.D. 64. Until then, his hair was dressed in the ordinary way; afterwards, in the manner of Alexander. A like difference is observable in the early and late portraits of Domitian and Septimus Severus, the latter also being represented in the type of Serapis, a sign of his African birth. Space forbids me to enter upon an analysis of the portraits of the other emperors. I shall only mention that the numerous portraits of Constantine the Great, which show him gazing heavenwards, all belong to the time when he had become sole ruler, after his victory over Licinius in A.D. 323.

So far we have spoken of the rulers and their divine inspiration, but still more interesting is the transformation of portraiture which occurred under the influence of Neoplatonism and Christianity. The physical features fade and the spiritualizing traits gain greater prominence. The eyes, mirrors of the soul, dominate the expression and stare into a higher, divine world. Man becomes a divinely exalted being. The literature of the age tells the same story; for example, when the Neoplatonic philosopher, Proclus, delivered his inspired lectures, it is said that his face was divinely illumined. Even the portraits partook of this transformation. According to an easily recognizable formula, they are painted so as to glorify the ruler and, by doing away with natural conditions and normal human relations—our usual canons of judgment—to represent him as a being of a higher order. The figure, frontally placed, facing the beholder, is of supernatural dimensions, a

devotional figure disengaged from its context, the *Majestas Domini,* which the Church adopted for her God.

The eyes are the mirror of the soul, and art is the mirror of religious feeling. The great conversion of mankind, which took place in Late Antiquity and reached its apogee in the last century of the Western Empire, is mirrored in art with an intensity which helps us to understand its depth. Professor L'Orange's book is concerned first, quite naturally, with kings and emperors, because these first laid claim to divine inspiration, but it also shows how the same idea pervaded the rest of humanity. Philosophers and teachers, martyrs and Fathers of the Church were likewise inspired from above, and gazed in a like manner into the spiritual world. Indeed, this book helps us come to a visualized understanding of the religious force, be it Christian or pagan, which animated Late Antiquity and has survived so lastingly.

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Les paradoxes du Bouddhisme. By Taymans d'Eypernon, S. J. Bruxelles: L'Edition Universelle; Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1947. xiv, 311 pp. 130 fr. belges.

Buddhism, it would seem, has not been interpreted to the West, but largely misinterpreted. One by one, statements accepted from earlier writers are being challenged today. Hīnayāna, or Southern Buddhism, has been generally supposed, for example, to involve the complete denial, not only of the Divine, but of any soul or self. And now we have Father d'Eypernon affirming that early Buddhist thought "was not so far away from the conception of the soul as is generally supposed." He reaches this conclusion in the course of a penetrating examination of the paradoxical affirmation of Nirvāna.

Whether Father d'Eypernon has sufficiently weighed the agnostic reserve of Buddhist thought, whether he has considered the ethical objections to "soul theory" implicit in Buddhist thought and practice, may be questioned, and some will doubtless continue to maintain a nihilistic interpretation of Nirvāna in spite of his damaging criticism of this view. Meantime, it must be allowed that he presents a formid-

able argument, whilst his sympathetic survey of Buddhist history, religion and philosophy is both illuminating and lucid.

If his estimate of Southern Buddhism is accepted, with its emphasis on religious content and continuity, then, perhaps, there will be fewer headaches when it comes to the definition of religion in general, and we may hear no more of misleading attempts to outlaw this important tradition from the proper field of religion by reducing it to a pale morality devoid of religious impulse.

Southern Buddhism appears, to some observers, to portray a realm of heavenly bliss which is Nirvāna, only to leave this realm uninhabited. For Hīnayāna psychology, so it is held, denies the existence of any soul which may survive to enjoy such Nirvāna bliss; the monks of Ceylon, Burma, and Siam appear to teach that what we consider a human "self" is nothing more than a temporary conjunction of changing aggregates which will cease to cohere once the full Nirvāna vision is attained. Yet they forsake the world, enter monasteries, and pursue arduous disciplines in order to speed the day which will bring them to the further shore and the peace of Nirvāna.

On Christian premises, thought Father d'Eypernon, observing his Buddhist friends during his five years sojurn in Ceylon, this monkish resolution would be understandable. Suppose a *soul* destined for Nirvāna, a soul to be nurtured and strengthened by such disciplines, then all is explained. But Buddhist doctrine, with its apparent rejection of any kind of "soul theory," seemed to deny the possibility of such an explanation, while the paradoxical affirmation of Nirvāna remained, contradicting the entire system of Buddhist thought which emphasises impermanence.

There were, of course, scholars who resolved the contradiction by denying that Nirvāna meant permanent bliss. Nirvāna, they claimed, meant annihilation—the final destruction of such life as we know, the flame extinguished forever, the aggregates of "individuality" dissolved —and there were passages in the Buddhist scriptures to support this negative view. But there were other passages which encouraged a positive conception, representing Nirvāna as the harbor of refuge, the cool cave, the matchless island, the Holy City. Nirvāna was thus presented in two aspects, and both, concluded Father d'Eypernon, must be considered. To separate them, choosing one aspect in preference to the other, was "to mutilate true Buddhism under the false pretext of in-

troducing more logic." The two aspects could, indeed, be reconciled if the annihilation, which is Nirvāna, was seen to refer to the final destruction of those passions, attachments, and conditions which prevented the realization of permanent bliss, which is also Nirvāna.

This reconciliation, however, left the task of a further reconciliation—between the conception of Nirvāna as a realm or condition of bliss and the denial of the soul. For what was there to survive to enjoy this felicity?

Father d'Eypernon was impressed by the fact that the Buddhist monks themselves seemed to be unaware, in spite of their discussions of the problem, of any ultimate, inner contradiction sufficient "to break the harmony of their interior life," a life pursued through long centuries. It was not enough, therefore, to conclude, as did de la Vallée Poussin, that Nirvāna was a mere dogmatic affirmation, sustained *in spite of* the contradictory philosophical emphasis until the development of Mahāyāna thought provided a tardy reconciliation. The reconciliation must be somewhere implicit in the earlier philosophy itself.

Research in the Pali Canon led him to conclude that early Buddhist exposition did, in fact, provide "an element of conciliation," an element not fully exploited hitherto, but nowadays brought to the fore by some of the Singhalese monks. This element lies in a conception of action or Karma which distinguishes between the act itself and the determination of the act, leading to a conception of perfect activity, liberated from all the determinations known under present conditions of change and instability. There are three kinds of deeds—bad deeds which sustain the temporal bondage, good deeds which tend towards liberation from this temporal bondage, and perfect activity, which is only possible when the temporal bondage is overcome and the will is released from all misleading attachments. Now, since Buddhism conceives existence and personality, not in terms of substance but in terms of causality, this threefold distinction corresponds to a threefold conception of personality—man moved by evil determinations, man moved by good determinations, and man free from all such determinations when the realm of the impermanent is left behind. It is only this third condition which is stable. Therefore, it is only here, in eternity, that any soul can be denoted. What exists before is just the germ of such a completely spiritual or "intellectual" nature. Under temporal condi-

tions, "intellectual operation exists, but this substance has not yet found its principle of equilibrium."

In his prior, embryonic condition, man is but a "moment" in a causal series, a moment which is both the effect of infinite antecedents and the point of departure for infinite consequents; he is *être cause, être causé* like all else under present Saṃsāra conditions, from a grain of dust to a mountain, from material activity to conscious perception, involved in the chain of causality.

"Now let us suppose," says Father d'Eypernon, "that this chain of causality develops a space (a reality admitted by primitive Buddhism as eternal, immutable, as the place of causality), while beyond space there is another reality, Nirvāna, also eternal and immutable, the state where all relative causality ceases. Suppose, finally, that a method has been discovered which permits the moment of causality which is called man to break the chain, to break free from the antecedents and consequents of the causal series in space; would this moment-man be annihilated? He would cease to be actually the product of another, cease to pass into another, but, by that same token, he would cease to be relative and changing; "il serait pour soi et à soi; il serait *nirvané*."

Buddhist premises do not, then, oblige us to deny the existence of any kind of spiritual being whatever. What they do is to oblige us to conceive such a being as "pure activity."

It thus follows that if we look for a description of true human personality in Buddhism, we must not consider man under Samsāra conditions, where that personality is still but a muling babe, pushed around in the cradle of impermanence; we must consider man in Nirvāna, when all the germs of perfection have been purified by discipline and have ripened in contemplation.

While, therefore, we cannot denote the soul in this present life, where personality is only embryonic, the seed of what is to be, we can denote it in Nirvāna, which means the flowering of personality, a flowering beyond the grave, a condition in which the spirit, disengaged from the body and all temporal limitations, abides in pure spontaneity, utter detachment—*forma est actus.*

This conception, remarks Father d'Eypernon, has much in common with the definition of personality generally accepted in the scholastic philosophy. Is he, then, reading into Buddhism his own philosophy? If so, he would not be the first Westerner to do so, and it might be said

that, in this present case, it is not so much a parallel philosophy as a parallel religious discipline which inspires interest and insight. What Father d'Eypernon says in tribute to the monk who assisted his research recalls a similar tribute paid by Dr. Rhys Davids to a similar Buddhist companion. But, whereas Dr. Rhys Davids thought of his Buddhist friend as a fellow-intellectual, Father d'Eypernon thinks of him as a fellow-pilgrim. This point of view leads him to emphasize the correlation of Buddhist monastic discipline and Buddhist thought, an emphasis which informs his criticism of previous interpreters, such as Childers and Stcherbatsky, and also prompts the conclusion that the distance between Southern and Northern schools of Buddhism is not so great as is sometimes supposed.

A brief final chapter indicating a possible apologetic to commend the Christian faith to Buddhists accentuates what is, indeed, evident throughout his pages, the author's deep respect for Buddhist character and ideals. We have come a long way from the day when it was possible to accuse his great predecessor, St. Francis Xavier, of lack of interest in Oriental thought.

In his Introduction, Father d'Eypernon remarks that there is a renaissance of Buddhism today, assisted by the growth of Asiatic nationalism and a tendency to criticize the civilization—and the wars—of the West. He cites Grant Brown on the custom which ensures that Burmese boys enter a monastery for religious instruction before they attain manhood. This, however, is no new custom in Burma, and the reference, in such a connection, is somewhat misleading. Other minor criticisms might be made, but their possibility in no way detracts from the value of a very stimulating and illuminating appreciation of Buddhist religious life and thought.

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A History of Jewish Mysticism. By Ernst Müller. Oxford: East and West Library, 1946, 197 pp. 8/6 (in America, $2.50).

Ernst Müller is a Viennese Jewish scholar, whose German translation of the *Zohar,* published at Vienna in 1932, is standard, and whose other writings on Jewish mysticism include a German translation of

Abraham Ibn Ezra's *Book of Unity* and discursive studies of mysticism in the Scriptures, *Sefer Yezira,* and the *Zohar.* Now the East and West Library, a subsidiary of Phaedon Publishers, Inc., has included Müller's brief *History of Jewish Mysticism* among its first publications.

This is a most worthwhile enterprise; Jewish mysticism is both interesting in itself and of value to the student of comparative religion. It arises from impulses akin to those which produce mystical movements in other religious traditions; it has the unique feature of occurring in a religion with an extremely exalted God-idea, and, in its nonmystical form, no mediator. Jewish mysticism serves, therefore, as a case study of the development of mediatory concepts. Furthermore, as Jewish dispersion has carried Judaism to the end of the earth, Judaism has absorbed elements of all the cultures with which it has come into contact, and, in large part through its mystical movements, has transmuted these elements so that they accord with traditional Jewish ideas of God, man, and nature. Thus it presents the student with an excellent example of cultural diffusion and interpretation.

There are many barriers to the understanding and even to the accurate historiography of Jewish mysticism. Many of its documents are unpublished; their linguistic variety is as broad as Jewish dispersion; manuscripts lie unrecognized in libraries all over the world until one of the few patient and discriminating scholars equipped to work in this field happens to come upon them. Until recently the rationalistic emphasis of Jewish scholarship itself proved a deterrent to qualified persons to enter this field. For all these reasons, it is too soon for us to expect a definitive history of Jewish mysticism.

If this is fully realized, and the popular nature of Müller's *History* is taken into account, the qualified praise which I am able to give this book will require no further explanation. It is as good an account for its purpose as can be written at this time. Müller has treated with broad scholarship and catholic sympathy the traces of mysticism in the Scriptures, later evidence of the existence of mystics in the Haggadic Midrash, in Philo and other allegorists, and in the various apocalyptic writings of the early centuries of the common era, the first evidences of an organized mystical doctrine in the Talmud and in schools of Merkabah mysticism and Jewish gnosticism, the origin of the Kabbala and its diffusion through Europe, its high-water mark in the *Zohar,* such later developments as the Lurianic Kabbala and Has-

sidism. There is an extra chapter on Kabbalistic tendencies outside of Judaism, and an appendix of brief selections from mystical writings.

If the book has a fault, it is the author's over-zealous sympathy with the movement he is chronicling. This, of course, serves as a corrective to the lack of sympathy exhibited by nineteenth century Jewish historians. It can, however, be misleading; Müller's account of the "Mystical Aspects of the Bible," for example, would lead the reader to believe that Scriptural traces of mysticism are both more frequent and more important than they actually are. Even the author's caveat, tucked away in his introduction, that in the biblical period "we can hardly speak of mystical theories, but the whole religious life is in it more deeply penetrated than in later epochs with what may be called the mystical consciousness" (p. 10), serves rather to justify the writer than to warn the reader. A similar caution should be exercized by the reader with respect to Müller's discussion of Philo and the allegorists. Allegory in Philo does have similarities with the symbolical interpretation characteristic of the Jewish mystics, but it is over-hospitable to treat Philo so extensively as a part of the history of Jewish mysticism. And if Philonic allegory and intermediation is germane to the history, would not the Karaite, Benjamin of Nahawend, be equally appropriate? A further example of uncritical over-hospitality is to be found in the ninth chapter, on "Cabbalistic Tendencies Outside of Judaism," where Müller accepts the completely discredited belief that the Catalonian, Raimond Lull, was influenced by Kabbala, and also differs from the best recent scholarship in ascribing to Lull the authorship of a book *De auditu Cabbalistico.*

Perhaps part of the difficulty lies in the fact that Dr. Müller, as becomes a good European, relies excessively on French and German supporters of mystical movements for his sources of information. It is unpardonable that his references to Spinoza's relation to Kabbala were written without the use of Harry A. Wolfson's *Spinoza,* the fullest and most accurate account of Spinoza's sources and of the influences on his thought. But Wolfson's book does not even appear in the bibliography, though other and inferior works by Freudenthal and Gelbhaus do; they were published in Stuttgart and Vienna respectively, and Wolfson's work had the misfortune to be published in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

Despite these strictures, and some dubious statements in other parts

of the book, on which no comment has been made in order not to swell this review out of proportion, it is the opinion of the reviewer that Dr. Müller has made a valuable if slight contribution to the contemporary study of Jewish mysticism. Without the scope or the depth of scholarship of Gershom Scholem's works, Müller's popularization, because of its brevity and its discursive style, will reach an audience far wider than Scholem's work can. It is to be hoped that later editions will repair some of the inaccuracies, and reduce—if it can be done without violence to Dr. Müller's viewpoint—some of the atmosphere of over-enthusiasm in this otherwise basically sound account of Jewish mysticism.

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The Pastoral Epistles. By Burton Scott Easton. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. xiv, 239 pp., $3.00.

Not infrequently a distinction is made between the great creative books of the Bible in which the insights of inspired individuals are embodied, and the books which reflect the extent to which these insights were understood and actually appropriated by the religious community. If this distinction is adopted, it is perhaps fair to classify the Gospels, Acts, the Pauline letters, including Ephesians, Hebrews, and Revelation as the "great books," and to place the rest of the New Testament—that is, the Pastoral and the Catholic Epistles—in the second category. But such a classification must not be allowed to obscure, as it has often done, the real importance, in their own way, of the less individual and inspired parts of that literature. The true balance is on its way to being redressed through the appearance in the last few years of two excellent studies of I Peter, an admirable commentary on the Johannine Epistles, and now Professor Easton's interesting and able commentary on the Pastorals. One of Dr. Easton's major contentions is that I and II Timothy and Titus are by no means mere echoes of Paul; they are worthy of consideration for their own sake and with reference to the urgent purposes they were designed to serve.

The book is in three parts: an historical introduction in which the author sets forth his view of the origin, purpose and date of the

Pastoral Epistles; a translation of and commentary on the text, both proceeding paragraph by paragraph; and a series of thirty-six "word studies." These word studies, comprising more than a fourth of the book, make one of its most valuable features, the more so because they have the virtue of being intelligible to readers who do not use Greek. The commentary itself first deals with a given paragraph in a general way and then proceeds to a discussion, in a typographically distinct section, of any special problems it may contain. The whole is marked by Professor Easton's extensive and thorough scholarship, and by his ability to write clearly and simply. I should say that this is the best commentary on these epistles, whether for scholar or layman, now available in English.

The epistles, according to Dr. Easton, "deal with the pastor's varied duties [hence their name], whether in his defense of the faith, the organization and care of his flock, or his own Christian life," but their major purpose was to meet the "grave emergency" created by the rapid spread of "Christian" gnosticism, with its dualism, docetism, and strange vacillation between the extremes of libertinism and asceticism. Jude and II Peter and the Johannine Epistles were aimed at particular forms of this "heresy," but the Pastoral Epistles "are concerned with gnosticism in all its protean forms." The author recognizes the unity of the three epistles—they all come from the same hand, have the same general character and style, and are dominated generally by the same interests—but (largely on the basis of traces he finds of a developing church polity) believes that an interval of perhaps ten years separated II Timothy, the earliest to be written, from I Timothy, the latest. The letters are dated just at the end of the first century: II Timothy ca.95, Titus ca.100, and I Timothy ca.105.

Only a few pages are devoted to the question of the authorship of the epistles, but these few pages contain the most cogent summary I have seen of the arguments against their having been written by Paul. That the "Pastor" may have incorporated (especially in II Timothy) fragments of genuine Pauline correspondence is acknowledged, but no emphasis is placed upon this possibility in the interpretation of the letters.

The view that II Timothy was the first of the three epistles to be written is ably defended by Dr. Easton, but the claim that the group

should be dated as early as the years just around 100 carries less conviction, at least to this reader. One of the strongest arguments in support of this claim is the contention, on the basis of II Tim. 2:17-26, that when this letter was written the Pastor was still advocating the toleration of heretics (in contrast with his attitude in I Tim. 1:20). But is it quite clear that vv. 20-26 are referring to the "heretics" mentioned in vv. 17-18? The evidence of Polycarp's knowledge of the Pastorals, as Walter Bauer and others have pointed out, can be taken, only slightly less plausibly, to indicate the Pastor's knowledge of Polycarp or, better perhaps (in view of the "knowing therefore" of Poly. 4:1) dependence by both upon a common document or a common speech. The Oxford Committee could grade the probability of Polycarp's knowledge of the Pastorals no higher than B. Many would hold, even in the face of the data cited by Dr. Easton, that Irenaeus is our first indubitable witness to the existence of the Pastorals, and that the internal evidence is perfectly compatible with the theory of a date toward the middle or at the middle of the second century. It should be added, perhaps, that if with Harrison the bulk of Polycarp's Epistle is dated as late as 135, one could accept the claim of his use of them and still date them as late as 125.

I did not understand how Dr. Easton (unless simply on the ground of date) could so decisively reject the possibility that one of the heretical groups with which these epistles were concerned was the Marcionites, when he is so clear in recognizing that the gnostic heresy took many, and often contradictory, forms. It will be agreed that although Marcionism cannot be truly described as being gnosticism, it had, nevertheless, been greatly influenced by gnostic teaching, as witness its dualism, docetism, and asceticism. It was regarded as a type of gnosticism by its opponents. Why should it be excluded as one of the targets of the Pastor?

Historically, perhaps the greatest importance of the Pastorals consists in the light they throw on the development of church polity. Here Professor Easton's position seems sound and impregnable. For the Pastor the terms "bishop" and "elder" can be used interchangeably—the government of the several churches was vested in groups whose members might be called by either name—but since it is almost inconceivable that there were not individuals in the churches corresponding to

"Timothy" and "Titus" themselves, "the Ignatian [monarchical] bishops are actually found in everything but the title." Thus, "the distinction between 'Timothy' and the other elders was one of 'office' and not of 'order.'" The author adds the illuminating comment: "The same may well be true of the Ignatian bishops as well, for nothing is told of the manner of their ordination."

The book is full of the most valuable information and suggestions on the theology and the actual functioning of the churches in the important and obscure period which lay between the end of the Apostolic Age and the clear emergence of the Catholic movement in or near the time of Irenaeus. For most purposes a difference in judgment as to exactly where the letters fall within this period is not significant. Dr. Easton's new book has substantially increased the already great obligation under which New Testament scholarship stands to him.

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Jesus, Son Only-Begotten of the Father. A Prayer by NERSES the Grace-filled, Armenian Catholicos, 1100-1173, rendered into English by JANE S. WINGATE. New York: The Delphic Press, 1947. 158 pp. $5.00.

This book is a labor of love in every sense. The sixteenth century MS from which the translation was made is a copy of the poetical works of Nerses Shnorhali snatched at the risk of life from a burning pile when the Turks were systematically destroying the property of the old monastery of Derevenk near Kaiseri. It was given to Mrs. Wingate in 1915 for safe keeping, when the Armenians were being deported to perish in North Arabia. It was translated as a labor of love and is dedicated to the martyred Armenians of the Turkish Empire, among whom the translator was born and later, with her husband, lived and worked, and whose patience, fortitude, and devotion seem to captivate all missionaries who work among them. The proceeds of the sale of the book are to be applied to a fund, in memory of the translator's husband, to train Armenian teachers for service in the Near East.

There are few figures in the history of the Armenian Church who have won so high a regard among the Armenians themselves as Nerses IV, who was appointed Patriarch (the 64th in their Patriarchal List)

in 1166, after the abdication of his brother Grigor III Pahlavouni, and is known among them as Shnorhali, "the gracious." Some of us can still remember the Armenian student we had here at Columbia not so long since, who could rarely open his mouth without quoting some saying of Nerses Shnorhali for our edification. Others will perhaps remember the little volume, widely circulated in the days of our grandparents, *Preces Sancti Nersetis Armeniorum Patriarchae viginti quatuor linguis editae,* which began at both ends, since some of its Oriental versions had to be read from right to left. In the history of the Church he will probably have his enduring fame as a theologian, for his *Indanraken,* or apologetic statement of the doctrines and rites of the Armenian Church, which he prepared for presentation to the Byzantine Emperor Manuel I Comnene, is still referred to as an authoritative document. To the mass of the people in his own community, however, he is best known for his contributions to the hymnal and the liturgy. Though his style, like that of several of his contemporaries, was an attempt to revive the old classical forms of diction, his work was essentially popular, and thus simple in expression. The above-mentioned *Preces,* for example, are arranged in a series of twenty-four, one for each hour of the day, and so simply expressed that even a growing child can use them. All this popular poetical and devotional writing of Nerses breathes a spirit of humble and simple piety, and incidentally, like the hymns of Charles Wesley of a later day, provides a popular presentation of the typical beliefs of the Church, a sort of theology in simple form.

It is thus of some service to have available in English a representative work of a writer who has made so considerable an impression on the life of his community. The work chosen was a good one. It is well known and much beloved by the Armenian people, and reveals in a quite remarkable way the piety of the sainted Patriarch, and his method both of instructing and nourishing the spiritual life of his flock. The theme, if one may call it such, of *Jesus Son,* is how history leads up to the redeeming work of the Son of God, and at every step reproaches us for our sin and shortcomings, so that we turn to Him for forgiveness and redemption. It falls into three parts. Part I traces biblical history from Adam to the times of the Maccabees, preparing for and looking towards the incarnation. Part II covers the life and teaching of Christ. Part III concerns His passion, resurrection, and

His place at the final Judgment. This is not told as history, but as a series of pegs on which to hang the writer's devotional reflections concerning faith, penitence, and matters of godliness, interwoven with which is much of the doctrinal teaching of the Armenian Church, such as their views on such matters as baptismal regeneration, the perpetual virginity of Mary, the intercession of Saints, etc.

The translator has had the help of modern Armenians to ensure the correctness of the rendering of the lines of the poem, but unfortunately she has sought to preserve the metrical form of the original, with dire results. There is a certain stately dignity and sonorousness in the original verses of Nerses, who showed considerable skill in the way he made the most of the riches of the Armenian language to adorn his verses. Much of this beauty of the original must, of course, be lost in a translation, which can never reproduce the effects the author gets by his choice and arrangement of words, but a faithful rendering into dignified prose could have been fairly literal and yet satisfactory. None but a highly skilled translator, however, could make much of a success of a metrical rendering. The metre the translator has endeavored to reproduce here is the iambic tetrameter ᵕ -/ᵕ -/ᵕ -/ᵕ -, which of course goes well in English verse, as e.g., in Tennyson's

> "Whatev'-/ er cra'-/ zy sor'-/ row saith',
> No life'/ that breathes'/ with hu'-/ man breath'
> Has ev'-/ er tru'-/ ly longed'/ for death'."

But Mrs. Wingate has forgotten that in such a metrical arrangement the English words must have their natural accentation and their normal syllabic values, with the result that, to make her verses scan, she turns monosyllables into dissylables, or vice versa, shifts the accent from penult to ultima, accents a word one way in one line and the same word differently in another, and so on, so that we get by the score such monstrosities as—

> Who took'/ to them'/ daughters'/ of Cain'.

What is even worse is that the necessity of preserving the metrical scheme has demanded such torturing of the English that sentences which would have read with smooth dignity in prose are here so awkward and clumsy as to be painful.

The printing also seems to have been a labor of love, and Mr. Artin

K. Shalian deserves a word of praise for his efforts in the typography to give a worthy dress to this publication of a work of one of the revered writers of his Church.

ARTHUR JEFFERY

Columbia University

Poets of Christian Thought: Evaluations from Dante to T. S. Eliot. By HENRY M. BATTENHOUSE. New York: The Ronald Press, 1947. vii, 175 pp. $2.50.

On going through this oddly academic little book one is impelled to deplore the general absence in present-day American criticism of an imaginative resource for comprehending the inter-relations between poetry and belief that have frequently been intrinsic to the literary art of the West. The temper of mind that is brought to bear on this problem is ambiguous, to be sure, and yet it may be set down in some such manner as this: it is generally either assumed that there may be *no* organic relation between theology and literature—an assumption which, when held by those with a penchant for psychological speculation, is usually elaborated in terms of the Freudian dogma that a religious orientation of personality is symptomatic of personal illness and that, consequently, if such a person writes novels or poetry in which the religious concern is substantive, his work can only be taken as an interesting case-book of spiritual debility; or it is assumed that there may be such an organic relation, in which case it is either elucidated in terms of the further assumption that a religious analysis of the human situation being irrelevant to contemporary experience, the religious symbols must be translated into the symbolism of another *Weltanschauung* more congenial to modern thought; or this relation is simply taken at its face value without the profounder question being raised as to the extent of correspondence or conflict between the explicitly religious affirmation and the deeper mythological structures which, though they may remain unarticulated, are, nevertheless, regulative of the poet's vision.

One could go on to document these characterizations along the careful lines that Stanley Hyman has recently followed in his much too under-estimated book on contemporary critical practice, *The Armed Vision* (Knopf, 1948). But Professor Battenhouse's excursus into the

history of Christian poetry is, at any rate, perfectly illustrative of the third type of failure. Not only does he fail to draw a full enough circle of definition around his subject, but one is struck quite as much with a curious failure of sensibility, for though his final chapter is on Mr. Eliot's poetry, he seems quite unaware of the critical revolution that Eliot has been quietly accomplishing over the past thirty years, which has resulted in a whole body of new conceptions of at least six of the eight figures with whom he deals. Indeed, the hollowness and unreality which one feels in all of Mr. Battenhouse's chapters may very well derive finally from their having been written at too great a remove from this whole movement of critical perception and taste that represents so fundamental a departure from the great mentors of the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century—from Arnold and Sainte-Beuve and Saintsbury and Gosse.

Mr. Battenhouse's purpose may be very simply stated: he wants to select a limited number of figures from the history of literature, each of whom, following Dante, represents a broad phase of post-Renaissance cultural development, and each of whom, in having been crucially formed by the Christian religion, projects a full and rounded statement of human experience in which the recourse to Christian categories is basic and determinative of the whole. And the poets he selects for the accomplishment of this purpose are Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, Wordsworth, Tennyson, Browning, Emerson, and T. S. Eliot. One has no quarrel with him about Dante or Milton or Eliot, but he at least fails to anticipate and most certainly fails to answer many of the questions that occur in connection with all the others when they are so unequivocally subsumed under such a title as that which he has given to this volume. One recalls, for instance, Santayana's considered assertion that Shakespeare's remarkableness appears at just that point where it is noticed that "among the greater poets" he is perhaps alone in "being without a philosophy and without a religion."

> In his drama there is no fixed conception of any forces, natural or moral, dominating our mortal energies. . . . Those of us, however, who believe in circumnavigation, and who think that both human reason and human imagination require a certain totality in our views . . . can hardly find in Shakespeare all that the highest poet could give. Fulness is not necessarily wholeness, and the most profuse wealth of characterization seems still inadequate, if this picture is not somehow seen from above and reduced to a dramatic unity . . . (*Interpretations of Poetry and Religion*, p. 163).

Or again, Mr. Middleton Murry has suggested much the same thing in his book, *To the Unknown God*: "Up to Shakespeare the spiritual history of man—I speak of the West alone—is comprehended within the Church; with him it passes outside it." Well, neither Santayana nor Murry (to cite only two of many commentators who have raised this question) has probably resolved what is perhaps the central ambiguity in Shakespeare, but they have certainly given a most provocative statement of a kind of problem which, as I say, Mr. Battenhouse seems neither sufficiently to anticipate nor to attempt to resolve.

And again, the deep and thoroughgoing cleavage between a Christian background and an instinctive, temperamental bias towards philosophic idealism which one encounters in both Wordsworth and Emerson involves a whole complex of questions that ask for much broader definition than Mr. Battenhouse seems disposed to give. Or if one continues one's quarrel with the book, in the case of Browning, it must be said that to consider his "religiousness" apart from the undeniably coarse and somewhat "muscular" Christianity of Kingsley and others of his Victorian contemporaries, who formed the spiritual milieu which Browning rarely transcended, must inevitably result in a relaxation of the critical intelligence when the effort is made to determine what the poet himself has to offer us. Mr. Battenhouse says of Browning: "He is sane, sociable, and religious." But it does not seem to occur to him that to be as sane and as sociable as was Browning would not have been, in Victorian England, to be as fully immersed in Christian orthodoxy as Mr. Battenhouse seems to consider Browning to have been.

This kind of criticism of Mr. Battenhouse's work could be extended, but suffice it to say that his basic failure which, in turn, betrays him into making a number of fundamental errors of interpretation is, as I suggested earlier, that of not pursuing sustainedly enough the question concerning the structure of belief that is organic to a poet's vision and which may, as it frequently does, contradict at many points the surface religious content of his poetry. His tendency is, in other words, to accept too uncritically the poet's declaration of faith in "God the Father Almighty, Maker of heaven and earth," as adequate self-representation.

In closing, the admission should, of course, be made that with a book of this kind, whatever its excellences, the temptation to quarrel with the author about his selections of subject-figures is inevitable, but

the inevitability of the quarrel notwithstanding, I cannot resist registering my doubt as to the validity of Mr. Battenhouse's principle of selection—or lack of principle. When one considers the present difficulties of holding orthodox doctrine in our heterodox world, it seems to me inconceivable that in a book of this kind, designed as it is to "cast some new light along the road of faith," Tennyson, Browning, and Emerson should be taken as representative of the nineteenth century in preference to Baudelaire and Gerard Manley Hopkins, or even such a minor figure as Christina Rossetti, who was considerably more than a Pre-Raphaelite. Nor can one reconcile oneself to even so cursory a summary of the history of Christian poetry as this book is intended to be in which there is no mention of Donne or the English Metaphysicals, whose spiritual experience bears so closely upon our own and can consequently be so instructive. And it is equally difficult to understand the omission of so important a phase of this history as the Catholic Renaissance in the present century, which has played so vital a role in the literatures of both France and England. But again, we can only ascribe these serious and unfortunate omissions, finally, to the author's evident detachment from the history of contemporary sensibility.

NATHAN A. SCOTT, JR.

Howard University

Religion and Society. By S. RADHAKRISHNAN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. 242 pp. $3.50.

These lectures were delivered during the war, which account for some references being out of line; however, this makes them, in some respects more significant, for they reflect the conviction that comradeship or fellowship of religion as a fundamental need of man was becoming increasingly clear.

For Professor Radhakrishnan, social reconstruction in the light of religious ideals rests upon the paramountsy of the individual, and with him in his spiritual capacity. This is the only basis for a satisfactory society. "Those who separate themselves from the rest of the world in the name of religion or race, nation or policy, are not assisting human evolution, but hindering it." Coming from a leader of Hindu thought, this is a significant statement. We would like to see

leaders of other great faiths join with him in this conviction, and unite with him in concerted effort to bring about such a situation.

The first two lectures support this basic point of view. In these, as in others, the author uses a thorough examination of Marxian philosophy as a background, to bring out by antithesis what he means by the individual and his significance.

He deplores the division of the world on religious grounds: "Religion . . . should be the binding force which deepens the solidarity of human society. . . . It ranges from the gentle heightening of life to the intensest degree of ecstasy in God." As for religion in the new world order:

> All religions are now attempting to express themselves in a new idiom, and so are approximating to one another. Untenable doctrines are not so much refuted as set aside, and the universal elements of religions on which there is agreement are emphasised. . . . We must cultivate democracy as a state of mind, a style of life. A world brotherhood can be born only by the achievement of community within ourselves. Here is the task for religion.

The lecture on Hindu Dharma is of unusual interest because of Professor Radhakrishnan's treatment of the subject, and of the citations which he uses.

The essential aim of the social order is directed to "such a development of social conditions as will lead the mass of the people to a level of moral, material and intellectual life in accord with the good and peace of all, as these conditions assist each person in the progressive realization of his life and liberty."

The adaptability of dharma to changing times is emphasized: "Though dharma is absolute, it has no absolute or timeless content"; and "social flexibility has been the chief character of Hindu dharma." "In this fateful hour, when our society has become a pathless jungle, we must listen to fresh notes as to ancestral voices." In the past, "To meet new conditions new smṛitis arose, and there is nothing either in the Vedas or in past usage which requires us to adhere to old forms which have become outworn."

The lecture contains some fresh interpretations of Hinduism and of its pressing contemporary problems. However, like men everywhere, the author has not gone as far himself as his reading of the present suggests. He repeats what is now constantly being said about caste: "The basis of the varṇa dharma is that every human being must try

to fulfil the law of his development. We must discipline our life in conformity with the pattern of our being, instead of wasting our energies in following those which we lack." He does say, however:

> As the result of the liberalising influence of Western civilization, caste customs are being slowly modified, and connubial restrictions are getting slackened. . . . To develop a degree of organic wholeness and a sense of common obligation, the caste spirit must go. We have to get rid of the innumerable castes, with the spirit of exclusiveness, jealousy, greed and fear.

"Women in Hindu Society" is a comprehensive study of Hindu dharma with respect to women. A few items only in his treatment can be noted here. He finds: "There was no religious obligation that every girl should be married. . . . Latterly, however, on account of economic and other conditions, unmarried people are on the increase." Historically, in the Epic period, women did not suffer from any special dissabilities, but, "Under the shadow of the great ideal of saññyāsa, the weaknesses of women were exaggerated as a warning to monks." And, "It is in *Manu* and the *Dharamśāstras* that the doctrine of the perpetual dependence of women on men is ennunciated." Also, "The difficulty of securing happiness for girls is the cause for the preference for boys, and not any unfairness to the female sex." It will be a surprise to many to learn that "In the pre-Christian era, divorces and remarriages took place in all sections of society." But all will agree that "A law establishing monogamy among Hindus is long overdue."

Concerning war and non-violence, Dr. Radhakrishnan says: "Today wars are not glorified, but accepted with regret . . . ," perhaps too general a statement. And, further, "Humanity is struggling to emerge out of an order which is played out" (this was said in 1942). For the Hindu view: "We can not say that the Hindu scriptures require us to avoid the use of force altogether." Non-violence does, however, belong to the last two stages of life, the hermit and the wanderer.

There is a *nice* exposition of Arjuna's exact feelings about war, and some sophistry: "The recognition of the kṣhatriya class indicates the justification for the employment of force."

Violence and punishment are not identical, but, they are difficult to disentangle: "The Hindu scriptures commend non-violence as the supreme duty; but they indicate occasions on which departure from this principle is permissible." The *Gita* does not tackle the right or wrong of war.

The Christian can not justify war: "Faith in force is a disease that has twisted and tortured the world." His comprehensive remark is: "Our descendents will view with shame our social behavior as nations, even as we view enforced sati and the slave trade, and the sooner we anticipate the views of our descendents the better it will be for humanity."

As for the settlement after the war: "There is, however, a strong feeling among millions of the world's population that both sides stand rooted in old ways, and will evade justice to the oppressed."

Hitler is an effect, a symptom, not a cause. To avert Hitlerism we must resolve that all men, irrespective of race, color or creed, shall have the basic opportunity to work and earn a living wage; that education, health, decent shelter and civil liberties shall be available to all. The glaring contradictions of an economy which is forced to destroy food while people starve, which supports an incredible luxury side by side with an unbearable squalor must be ended.

Professor Radhakrishnan argues for an international authority saying: "Force when used by an international authority, is not naked assertion of power. It is used to liberate the creative capacities of the social order." Finally, the ends of political action "must help us to develop friendship and fellow-feeling among the peoples of the world."

These Lectures contain many passages worthy of quotation; and they are marked by the character of the quotations which he makes from Hindu sources, and often by his rendering of them. Professor Radhakrishnan speaks as a Hindu, for his faith, but he goes further, urging fellowship of religions as a new world order.

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India

BOOK NOTES

The Anatomy of Lango Religion and Groups. T.T.S. Hayley. Cambridge University Press, 1947. xi, 207 pp. 13 Pl. 1 Diagram, 1 Map. 21*s.*

The need to record "primitive" cultures has been so pressing, and the number of working anthropologists so small, that few tribes have been systematically studied by more than one trained investigator. The Lango have already been studied by Driberg, whose book on the tribe is one of the classics, and this work is doubly welcome for that reason. Although the two authors agree in most of their conclusions, there are enough differences to indicate the range of variation to be expected when two excellent technicians obtain their information from different informants some years apart. The present book also shows the influence of modern developments in social anthropological theory and technique of presentation. Thanks to these, it is able to convey a tremendous amount of information in a very small compass, but can scarcely be recommended as light reading.

The most interesting part of the book from the point of view of the student of comparative religion is that dealing with the Lango concept of *Jok.* This is the mainspring of all tribal supernaturalism, yet it is difficult if not impossible to define in terms of any of our own concepts. It is like *mana* in that it is "a neutral power permeating the universe, neither well nor badly disposed toward mankind, unless made use of by man" (p. 3). However, the author also states that "it is present when human beings are in a highly excited emotional state," (p. 11) more specifically in everything connected with the sexual act, and that "it is associated with every human being as that part of him to which we usually apply the term *spirit* or *soul*" (p. 16). In spite of numerous discussions with professional magicians of various sorts, he was unable to resolve these differences. It seems clear than Lango religion, in spite of its numerous and rather complex rituals, has not felt the need of a coherent philosophic basis. It is essentially behavioristic, with a minimum of rationalizations, a feature shared with many "primitive" cults.

The recently developed techniques of social anthropology have made possible an unusually clear analysis of Lango society in terms of the multiple social units to which the individual belongs. These units are analyzed in terms of content and function, and their close relation to the ceremonial life of the tribe is indicated. Belief in the necessity for such group ceremonies, reinforced by their frequent performance, has here become the main unifying force in a tribe in which political organization is notably lacking. The last two-thirds of the book is devoted to a meticulously accurate description of various ceremonies which are classified on the basis of the various social units responsible for their performance.

This book would be invaluable to anyone intending to work with the tribe as administrator, missionary, or even trader. It might well serve as a model for some of the government reports on the natives of our own recently acquired Island possessions.

Ralph Linton

Zen Buddhism. By Alan W. Watts. London: The Buddhist Society, 1947. 20 pp. 75¢.

Father Watts has given us, in just twenty pages, an outline both compact and comprehensive of that strange, paradoxical form of Buddhism known as Zen, on which he has been an expert for many years. He discusses first its background in Indian religion, that is, the *advaita* philosophy of the Upanishads translated by the Buddha himself from the realm of metaphysics into the realm of psychology. Next come the Chinese influences, especially Taoism, from which Zen derived its dynamic concept of Reality as "a *flowing* power," in contrast to the more static Indian Brahman or Thatata. Thus Zen is a "synthesis of the contemplative insight of Indian religion, the dynamic liveliness of Taoism, and the down-to-earthness of Confucianism. Zen is grounded precisely in this faith or trust that ordinary life is Tao, and is to be accepted or loved as such." Here one is tempted to ask why, if "we are one with Reality just as we are, here and now," it seems to be necessary to enter a monastery and practice a highly developed technique of meditation in order to experience the "flash of insight termed *satori*." But perhaps it is just another of those "paradoxes" with which religion is always confronting us. M. B.

Revelation and Response in the Old Testament. By Cuthbert A. Simpson. New York: Columbia University Press, 1947. viii, 197 pp. $2.50.

Among the more fruitful concerns of present-day Old Testament scholarship is the interest in biblical theology. The attempt to illuminate the great theological lines of unity running through the religion of Israel is, in our day, both urgent and promising, precisely because we are aware of the diversity which marks the historic forms of this religion.

In this little book, Professor Simpson pursues the course of revelation and response in the religion of Israel from pre-Mosaic Yahwism to the Exile. He investigates and attempts to formulate the theological character of both revelation and response. Revelation in the Old Testament is to be understood as God's activity toward man, liberating him "from those tendencies within him which, if yielded to, will drive him to inevitable frustration" (p. 10), God's activity is mediated to man through the ordinary course of events and evokes from him a confident, creative response of "self-surrendering acceptance" (p. 5). Response then, in the Old Testament is to be understood as surrender to "self-revealing Reality," disclosing the unity of life. Response becomes progressively more comprehensive in the development from the "momentary, emotional monotheism" of primitive Yahwism to the well-reasoned "ethical monotheism" of Second Isaiah (p. 20).

In primitive Yahwism, the Israelites respond to the manifestations of Yahweh in storm and volcano with a strange abandon, not with the crippling response of "self-regarding fear." This response demonstrates its creative capacity when Israelitic clans migrate from the desert region of Mt. Sinai to the

oasis of Kadesh. According to the author's drastic reconstruction of this early history of Israel, Yahwism conquers the Kadesh cult and appropriates the characteristics of the local numen for the understanding of Yahweh. Yahweh, the god of uncontrollable force, now becomes the god of creativity and the god of justice, giving decisions through the sacred oracle. The process is repeated subsequently in the land of Canaan. Yahwism masters the heterogeneous multiplicity of Canaanitic hero and cult legends, and gathers all facets of existence in the cultivated land into a unity of life under Yahweh. Yahweh reveals himself as the directing power in historical events throughout the growth and decline of the monarchy. The "creative minority" in Israel responds to these events and interprets them constructively as a summons to return to its true vocation. Although the author ends his study with the first years of the Exile, he insists that this pattern of revelation and response could profitably be followed through the intervening centuries down to the Incarnation, in which he finds the meaning of the pattern fully revealed.

This book is welcome because it asks questions about the profound biblical problem of how God speaks to man and of how man answers. Unfortunately, the questions are stated more effectively than they are answered. The author gives, at best, a fragmentary characterization of Old Testament revelation. He ignores its persistently personal nature and its character as encounter; one wonders how he could have done otherwise, since he passes over the Sinaitic theophany almost in silence. He overlooks the fact that Yahweh comes to man in the Old Testament, speaking, hearing, demanding, forgiving, acting, and is thereby present in the fulness of his person. Instead, Dr. Simpson usually suggests that Yahweh is present in a veiled fashion when events are understood as the expression of his will.

One might also question the fact that Professor Simpson builds his theological exposition in such large measure upon his own reconstruction of Israel's early history. It is not only that the theology falls to the ground if the historical reconstruction is not cogent, but that such a theological effort is no longer part of the Old Testament discipline. Old Testament theology should be descriptive, presenting various cross-sections of theological unity running through the biblical documents. When it abandons this unity, it disintegrates into *Religionsgeschichte*; when it proceeds too much from a reconstructed history foreign to these documents, it sacrifices the objectivity which guarantees Old Testament theology its place in the Old Testament discipline.

That is not to say that *Revelation and Response* is not a valuable little book; it is to say that it could have been better. R. F. JOHNSON

The Byzantine Patriarchate, 451-1204. By GEORGE EVERY, S.S.M. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. xviii, 212 pp. $3.00.

This is an extremely valuable book for all students of religion and of the history of Europe during the centuries of which it treats. For it is written far

more objectively than most church histories dealing with the period and the separation between East and West. The author has made an excellent attempt to picture the role of the Emperor in the complicated scheme of life and to paint his position as no layman but certainly not a priest. In the same way he has treated satisfactorily the growth of national churches in the East, in those areas which had passed from, or never were under, the control of the Emperor.

Yet perhaps the best parts are the final chapters tracing the definite development of the final schism not to the excommunication of Michael Cerularius in 1054, but to the entire situation created by the seizure of Constantinople by the Crusaders. Up to that moment what had been a private quarrel between Pope and Patriarch over questions of supremacy and minor differences was turned into a widespread national emotion which rendered it impossible for the other Patriarchs to remain friendly with both rivals.

The reader unfamiliar with Byzantine problems will be amazed at the complicated situations, political as well as theological, that were presented by the constant quarrels between the Greeks and the Orientals, and also by the equally unrealized disputes between the Western ideas of the Romans and Italians and the Germans. These culminated in the spiritual triumph of the Popes, but for a long time they furnished able emperors and patriarchs the means of winning the support of portions of the West, or of putting pressure on their Western adversaries of the moment.

The book disposes of the idea that life in the Byzantine Patriarchate was sterile and static. The author has shown admirable balance in passing over some of the more unimportant theological controversies, but he has given a real picture of a relatively unknown period and culture. All in all, the book can be heartily recommended as a guide to the events of the period of most intense rivalry between the two capitals, and as an explanation of the two conflicting theories of the relations between Church and state. C. A. M.

Windows Westward: Rome, Russia, Reunion. By Stephen C. Gulovich. New York: The Declan X. McMullen Co., 1947. ix, 208 pp. $2.50.

It is hard to review this extraordinary book, for it unites a deep irenic sincerity with a tone that cannot fail to irritate the Dissidents, as the author calls all the Orthodox except Berdyaev. His dislike for Constantinople and the Byzantine Empire has led him to put a sinister interpretation upon the Orthodox side of all disputes, even while he gives a tolerant and understanding summary of the tangled events in Eastern Europe and America which concern the Catholics of the Byzantine-Slav rite. Had he been able to forget some of these prejudices, he could easily have presented the Roman Catholic version of the conversion of Russia and/or Rus in a clearer and more attractive form. As it is, his accounts of the Byzantine-Slav Liturgy, and the problems which it has faced in America, are highly valuable and deserve serious attention, and it is easy to sympathize with his conclusions. However, the book is obviously more

intended for Roman Catholics than for the Orthodox, and it may, despite a few inaccuracies especially in names, serve to spread a knowledge of the problems of these millions of Christians now suffering from Soviet persecution.

C. A. M.

Christian Nurture. By HORACE BUSHNELL. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947. xi, 351 pp. $4.00.

A little over one hundred years ago Horace Bushnell dared to deliver two "Discourses on Christian Nurture" to his ministerial associates in New England. Published in 1846, then withdrawn from the book stalls because of opposition, they were fortified with a spirited "Argument" and re-published; finally they were amplified (1861) into a remarkable book destined to become an American classic—*Christian Nurture,* the thesis of which is that character is formed interpersonally from birth.

After one hundred years this basic concept still needs to be broadcast, for modern psychology and sociology have confirmed its truth and verified its importance for tomorrow's society. We know now that Bushnell hardly overstated the case when he declared: "Let every Christian father and mother understand, when their child is three years old, that they have done more than half of all they will ever do for his character" (p. 212). Certainly the thesis is undeniable: there is an "organic unity of the family" in which the parents determine the development of their children "not only when they teach, encourage, persuade, and govern, but without any purposed control whatever" (p. 76).

Bushnell makes it all so crystal clear and provides such a wealth of modern, reliable counsel on how to develop truly Christian character that his book seems to gain significance with the passing years. On the subject of effective child-care, it continues to be one of the best books for parents because, as Dean Weigle points out in his Introduction, its counsels are connected by a consistent philosophy of life and religion, instead of being a mere collection of devices that have chanced to work. Bushnell proves to parents, for instance, that, since the family is an organic unity, they cannot escape responsibility for directing their childrens' attitudes, their philosophies of life, their religion. Actually, he shows, it is illusory to think that children develop attitudes all by themselves; it is folly to suppose philosophies of life are created independently; it is irresponsible for parents to declare they will not "influence" their children religiously but will let the children work out any faith they choose. Actually, "the parent exercises himself in the child, playing his emotions and sentiments, and working a character in him, by virtue of an organic power" (p. 21).

In part, it is a keen awareness of man's sinfulness which gives such urgency to Bushnell's appeal: the task of developing good character is so great that parents dare not postpone it or disavow their responsibility. "The child, after birth, is still within the matrix of the parental life, and will be, more or

less, for many years" (p. 19). Infancy is the most plastic period of personality and only parents are in position to do the shaping. One may ask critically, what parent is equal to this task or what teacher able to instruct parents in it? Bushnell's answer is that there exist no simple methods, no sure techniques. More than anything else, desirable character in children is shaped by parents who have that desirable character themselves: "The only true method here is the method of faith; to be more perfectly and wholly trusted to God, more singly, simply Christian" (p. 230). In *Christian Nurture* good psychology links up with good religion, and together they dare to believe that the wise and loving nurture which this book describes can be our children's heritage.

ROBERT H. BONTHIUS

The College Seeks Religion. By MERRIMON CUNINGGIM, New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1947. 319 pp., $4.00.

This latest of the Yale Studies in Religious Education is a study of religion in the undergraduate colleges and universities in America. But it is more than a simple survey of the present status of religion in a given number of schools. It provides, first of all, a brief discussion of colleges in the twentieth century, their growth, their increasing secularization during the earlier decades of the century, but their gradual turning back toward a greater concern for spiritual values in general and for religion in particular. Then follows a brief resumé of the major movements in religious thought since the turn of the century, which, while sketchy and incomplete, is nevertheless a valuable picture of the changing religious scene.

All of this furnishes an excellent background for a serious study of the historic attitudes of the institutions of higher learning, church related, independent, and tax-supported, toward religion, and an examination of the place of religion in the prevailing philosophies of religion which he characterizes as, the progressive, the classic, and the liberal. Also, there is a discriminating discussion of the question of the separation of church and state, as it bears upon the problem of religion in the tax-supported colleges and universities.

Since the author's primary concern in the study is not with the voluntary religious activities carried on on the campus, but the official concern of the institutions themselves for religion, he discusses the various ways in which this official concern manifests itself, namely in the maintenance of chapel, the offering of courses in religion, the provision of official leadership, and other methods. Finally, as practical evidence of this concern, he describes in some detail a number of significant programs as they have developed in a variety of church controlled, independent, and tax-supported schools.

In three concluding chapters the author discusses the motivating forces that have made for the existing situation, offers an appraisal of the movement, and finally gives what he regards as an adequate program of religion in colleges and universities. It is to be hoped that this chapter, at least, will be brought

to the attention of all of those who are responsible for the administration of colleges and universities.

The general conclusion of the study is that there has been a decided upturn of interest in religion in the colleges and universities, but that this upturn is only in its beginning. The recognition of administrative responsibility thus far is to be encouraged in every way possible by all those who believe that religion is an integral part of man's life, and that any education that fails to take into acount the whole man is a defective education.

The study suffers at some points through long delay in its publication. Some of the data is recognizably old, and needs bringing down to date. But the conclusions as a whole are sound and are not seriously affected by this delay. It is really an exceptionally able study of a subject of very great importance in the fields both of religion and education.

CHARLES S. BRADEN

The Negro Looks into the South. By EDWARD GHOLSON. Boston: Chapman & Grimes, 1947. 115 pp. $1.25.

The author refers to his book as "a philosophical treatise on the life of the Negro in the South," and "also a revelation of the South's attitude towards the Negro covering the whole sociological field, past and present." These ambitious purposes can scarcely be achieved in a book of 115 pages which is really a group of sermonic essays. The author's real insight has its edge dulled by verbosity and circumlocutions. Few books written by Negroes have shown as good an understanding of the depth of inter-group conflict, but the issues are obscured by the author's ornate language, his failure to document his opinions, and his vague avoidance of specific illustration. The book may arouse some sympathy for the sufferings of a race, but otherwise seems ineffectual.

STILES B. LINES

An Historical Introduction to Modern Philosophy. By HUGH MILLER. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. x, 615 pp. $5.00.

There is a pressing need for new histories of Philosophy. The parade of doctrines in the conventional treatments has become deadly; fresh perspectives and undiscovered relationships await expression. Professor Miller's book points in the right direction, and, while his title, strictly speaking, exempts him from the usual coverage of the field, he has examined philosophic thinking from its beginnings and has tried to show an integral continuity from the Greeks to the present. Two principal theses—or, rather, two sides of one principal thesis—are argued. The first is that scientific advance and moral advances are closely related; that the struggle for understanding and the struggle for justice are ultimately one—in other words, a historical application of the Socratic position. The second is that philosophic systems are best seen as versions of rationalism or empiricism. The struggle for justice culminates in the democratic faith, which emphasizes the importance of the human individual.

The growth of science exhibits progressive realization of the importance of individual being or particular fact. Here the two sides of the thesis meet. The politico-scientific evolution toward the recognition of individuality represents the modern triumph of empiricism; the ancient dominance of rationalism having signified an emphasis on "universal being," law, necessity, and ontological and political absolutism. Professor Miller holds that the present day, as a consequence of revolutions in physics and logic, witnesses genuine progress in the understanding of the proper synthesis of empiricism and rationalism, individuality and universality, freedom and law.

So far as this main contention is concerned, one wonders whether it should be called unconvincing or simply vague. It never becomes clear, for instance, whether rationalists actually are supposed to have been political absolutists, or whether rationalism "implies" absolutism in somebody's notion of implication. To suppose, with the author, that rationalism dominated antiquity and the Middle Ages and that empiricism characterizes "the modern mind" is a gross oversimplification. To this reviewer, Professor Miller's whole discussion of the relation between the scientific and the moral is analytical and prescriptive. His real capacity for significant historical generalization and economy of exposition conflicts with his impulse to draw neat and surprising conclusions. Not content, for example, with a suggestive discussion of St. Augustine, he leaves unexplained (and certainly unreconciled with his general argument) a final declaration that "the modern mind, in its characteristic method and thought, is the extension of Augustine's theory of knowledge and his concept of nature. . . ."

If anyone wants to see how good and bad things can live side by side, he has only to open Professor Miller's book. There is a satisfying account of Plato's importance for the development of science, but the treatment of the Platonic myth, certainly no less influential, is perfunctory. A remarkably unsympathetic discussion of Aristotle stems from a tendency on Miller's part to evaluate philosophic achievement in terms of present-day acceptability, or the appropriateness of a given idiom and conceptional apparatus to twentieth century problems. An interesting statement of the intellectual significance of Christianity gives way to anticlimax with a meager chapter on medieval thought. It could conceivably be argued that fuller explanation of medieval problems lay outside the purview of this particular history, were it not for the fact that the author draws conclusions altogether out of proportion to the discussion. Thus to the Franciscans, indiscriminately, is assigned the "inauguration of modern science" and "the birth of a new mentality, one that is modern, democratic, and empirical." Roger Bacon, in particular, is unhesitatingly credited with having "directed thought into new channels" and with being "the gigantic progenitor of modern science."

Professor Miller's extravagant pronouncements about a great many things would be no more pardonable if he were less dogmatic in assertions that are either questionable, fantastic, or downright erroneous. Aristotle's ethics, he believes, "teach that the first duty of a man is the fullest realization of his

individual (sic) powers." The pioneers of modern science "returned to Plato for their method and inspiration, and so overcame the sterilities of Aristotelian thought." Profiting from the ambiguity of the term "Christian," Professor Miller contends that "what there is of culture or civilization in modern society is of Christian origin." But it is as ironical as it is wierd to find a bit later that "Jesus preferred the naturalistic realism of the Ionian thinkers."

When Professor Miller is as his best he is just and perceptive to a high degree. Thus his account of Dewey's instrumentalism adequately indicates the ramifications of that position. But once again, a choice bit of stock but opaque evaluation intrudes: instrumentalism "confines us within human experience." To certain contemporaries Miller is harsh and uncharitable. Alexander's "natural piety," he thinks, "requires a moratorium on inquiry and curiosity." Santayana is frivolously dismissed in about twenty lines, and appraised as "irresistible to the reader untrained in philosophy." But it is to Professor Miller's credit that he challenges, and even impresses, the historical sense as often as he outrages it.

JUSTUS BUCHLER

The Existence of God. By ERIC G. JAY. London: S. P. C. K.; New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. vii, 72 pp. $1.25.

This is a little book devoted to Christian apologetics and having as its primary concern the five ways advanced by Thomas Aquinas for proving the existence of God. The author commences with Thomas' statements concerning the relation of faith to reason and then proceeds to the proofs themselves. These are stated as they appear in the *Summa Theologica* and further explicated in order to show their cogency. Some time is spent in repeating Thomas' objections to the ontological argument and also to showing that Kant's objections to the same argument have to be qualified. Of some interest is the discussion (pp. 61 ff.) of the fourth proof and the anxiety of the author (following Gilson) to show that this has only a "marked ontological appearance." Obviously the significance of the quesitons involved far surpass the limits of both a very short book and a shorter review.

JOHN E. SMITH

A Scientist's Approach to Religion. By CARL WALLACE MILLER. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1947. vii, 127 pp. $2.00.

This is a vigorous attempt by one who is a professional scientist and a religious man to restate the essentials of Christian thinking for the benefit of those who feel the need to appraise the extent of the conflict between tradition and modern knowledge. The author discusses the concept of God, certain theological questions such as the Trinity and the Atonement, and the general problem of sin, free will, good and evil, immortality, and the relations between Christianity and society. These great matters he approaches in a devout spirit but in refreshingly modern terms, since he fears that "too close

adherence to the old forms of expression may at times conceal rather than clarify the truly vital function of religion in the modern world."

Dr. Miller is professor of physics and frequently introduces ideas and concepts from his own science to help clarify those of religion, reminding one of Henry Drummond's use of principles from biology in his *Natural Law in the Spiritual World* two generations ago. Thus, he compares the concept of God with concepts of energy, entropy, and electrical potential, and believes it is justified equally with them because of its usefulness in correlating the results of experience and suggesting directions for fruitful progress. Again, the meticulous preservation of material things, as exemplified by the conservation of mass and energy, suggests that great spiritual values will be no less carefully husbanded. The theological difficulty which many have felt in trying to combine in the concept of God two such dissimilar ideas as that of the Father and that of the Holy Spirit are not unlike those faced by the physicist in interpreting light as due both to corpuscles and to waves. In the same way, the apparently irreconcilable difference between determination and free will may be compared to the difference between the contrasted interpretations of the rotation of a gas molecule in terms of classical and quantum mechanics. For all such cases the author calls attention to Bohr's principle of Complementarity, which postulates the necessity of such a dual understanding of all natural phenomena. The irreversible tendency of material processes toward chaos, as recognized in the Second Law of Thermodynamics, is compared to the ominous irreversibility of man's moral behavior and his natural proneness to sin. As the scientific pessimism of the Second Law has been somewhat relieved by the discovery of the way in which incalculable reserves of atomic energy can be made available, so man's congenital rebellion against the moral law may be balanced from inexhaustible sources of spiritual power.

Dr. Miller has marshalled much evidence from the sciences in support of an enlightened attitude toward religion. His arguments must necessarily suffer, however, from the same difficulty which confronts all attempts to support religion on intellectual and rational terms alone. That the universe is an orderly and dependable place, that it "makes sense," is surely an argument for a deeper spiritual order, but there are many whom it will not convince. The ultimate support for religion must come from the direct, intuitive experience of the human spirit. That this is a valid approach to reality is maintained not only by poets and mystics and other men of faith, but by not a few hard-headed scientists. Professor Joseph Needham, the distinguished embryologist, states it thus: "The important point is that the religious experience is no more and no less directly in touch with the real than scientific experience; it is only another way of exercising our faculties." And again: "It may well be possible that it is in our periods of spiritual activity that we come as close as we can ever come to reality, that immovable something which lies, we are sure, behind the changing show of facts on which our minds feed." An approach to religion from science alone, significant as its discoveries may be, will never go far enough.

EDMUND W. SINNOTT

Nervous Disorders and Character. By JOHN G. MCKENZIE. New York: Harper and Brothers. 126 pp. $1.50.

This volume is the substance of a series of Tate Lectures delivered at Manchester College, Oxford. They constitute an introduction to pastoral psychology and presumably offer to clergymen and other religious workers insights and suggestions for the understanding and pastoral care of neurotics. The book also attempts a reconcilliation of some of the principles of depth psychology and Evangelical theology.

The somewhat rambling and undisciplined observations on charactology, moral scruples, and pastoral practice are disappointing. There is no evidence of a sound understanding of dynamic psychology, psychotherapy, moral or ascetical theology. There is confusion as to the author's use of such concepts as character, character structure, sentiments, and personality. He offers no definition of "soul" and yet discusses it at length as a psychological entity completely separate from other elements in the structure of personality.

The discussion of unconscious motivation and dynamics is confusing and apparently uninformed. There is confusion as to the mechanisms of repression and suppression. Technical terms are introduced in the early pages long before they are defined in the third chapter. The implications of the theories of unconscious emotional and mental activity are so revolutionary when first realized by many of the clergy that much greater clarity and deeper understanding are needed than evidenced in their presntation in this book.

Any attempt at a reconciliation of the psychoanalytical and the theological views of man must deal realistically with such problems as conscience, free will and responsibility, determinism, original sin, guilt, hate, and love. These offer very real difficulties and cannot be facilely overcome as Dr. McKenzie has tried to do. It is probably far more useful to accept the very genuine conflicts and contradictions that exist.

The author is evidently one of those rare and gifted individuals—"naturals"—who with limited training but surprising aptitude can effect near miracles through his pastoral ministrations. But the danger inherent in his book is the implication that other workers can do likewise without supervised clinical training, personal counseling or psychotherapy, and very careful supervision. No amount of reading or attendance at lectures can qualify the vast number of clergymen for such specialized work.

It is unfortunate, therefore, that Dr. McKenzie did not devote himself to a discussion of the dynamics of the structured relationship of pastor and parishioner, of the possibilities of the "listening" technique in pastoral counseling, the danger signals of those problems the pastor cannot attempt, the methods and co-operation with other agencies, and the special resources and limitation of the pastor. In presenting such material he would have made a far more valuable contribution.

A reading of this work points up the grave need for a rethinking of Christian moral theology and pastoral practice in the light of the insights and procedures of depth psychology and psychotherapy. The whole discipline of pas-

toral theology would be informed and probably reoriented by sound thought and investigation along these lines. OTIS R. RICE

The Lord Reigneth. By ADAM W. BURNET. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1947. 134 pp. $2.00.

The Russell Lectures for 1944, on the Book of Revelation, delivered at the Auburn Theological Seminary by the minister of St. Cuthbert's, Edinburgh. They deal with the historical situation which produced apocalyptic literature in general, the question of authorship, and the origins of the symbolic and mythological material used to conceal the meaning from outsiders. A very interesting little book.

The Bible for the Liberal. Edited by DAGOBERT D. RUNES. New York: Philosophical Library, 1946. xii, 368 pp. $3.50.

An anthology of excerpts, mostly from the Old Testament, purporting to give "the essence of true Judaism and Christianity," i.e., the ethical teachings "viewed apart from the usual mythological and historical material." Lin Yutang, who writes the Foreword, states (somewhat ungrammatically): "Like looking at a great painting without gilt frames, one seems to be better able to size up and recognize their greatness."

Gospel Records of the Message and Mission of Jesus Christ. By ALBERT C. WIEAND. Elgin, Ill.: Brethren Publishing House, 1947. 266 pp. $3.00.

An attempted harmony of the four gospels, arranged in parallel columns, with footnotes, outlines, and maps, written by the President Emeritus of Bethany Biblical Seminary as an aid to comparative study.

A Living Faith for Living Men. By W. NORMAN PITTENGER. Louisville, Ky.: Cloister Press, 1947. vii, 103 pp. 75¢.

Can We Believe in God? By GARDINER M. DAY. Louisville, Ky.: Cloister Press, 1948. 77 pp. 75¢.

Advance into Light. By JAMES W. KENNEDY. Louisville, Ky.: Cloister Press, 1948. 41 pp. 50¢.

These three small books illustrate very well the high quality which we have come to expect from the Cloister Press in this type of religious writing. Although written by and for Episcopalians, and especially suitable for Lenten use, they can be recommended to Christians of all persuasions for their simplicity, forthrightness, and spiritual insight.

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